f See 1 Cor. xv. 45, 'The first Adam was made (th -±J%»v £Co-av) to a living soul.' 'The last Adam to a quickening spirit.' Or the preposition («'?) may express the grade or point to which anything reaches, and «? astraa^* be equi valent to tlf ro jwrajigjWda/, a sentence unto condemnation; a decision which went to the extent of condemning. So, in the next clause, th Jut*i*fMt, unto Justification, a sentence by which men are justified. — See Wahl, p. 428.
is nere to be taken in its usual and obvious signification. It is then plainly stated that 4 a sentence of condemnation has passed on all men on account of the one sin of Adam.' This is one of the clauses which can hardly be forced into the meaning that the sin of Adam was the occasion merely of men being condemned, because it was the means of their being led into sin. Here again we have a mere exegetical question to decide; not a matter of theory or deduction, but simply of exposition. What does the phrase <a sentence of condemnation by, or for one offence,' in this connection, mean? The common answer to this question is, It means that the one offence was the ground of the sentence. This answer, for the following reasons, appears to be correct: 1. It is the simple and obvious meaning of the terms. To say a sentence is for an offence, is, in ordinary lan guage, to say that it is on account of the offence; and not that the offence is the cause of something else, which is the ground of the sentence. Who, uninfluenced by theological prejudice, would imagine that the apostle, when he says that condemna tion for the offence of one man lias passed on all men, means that the sin of Adam was the occasion of our sins, on account of which we arc condemned? The preposition (sx), here trans lated by, expresses properly the idea of the origin of one thing from another; and is, therefore, used to indicate almost any relation in which a cause may stand to an effect. The logical character of this relation depends, of course, on the nature of the subject spoken of. In the phrases "faith is by hearing" (I? u.xoy^,) chap. x. IT; "by fJii* cr</ft (I/. Ta'JTT^ r?t~ z<rl'a<7>.a~} we have our wealth,".Acts xix. —>; "our sufficiency is o/* God" (ix 7<)rj 6^00,) "2 Cor. iii. o; and a multitude of similar cases, the general idea of causation is expressed, but its precise character differs according to the nature of the subject. In the former of these examples the word indicates the instrumental, in the lattor the efficient cause. But when it is said that "a man is not justified by works" (Ig ey/fwy,) Gal. ii. 10; that the purpose of election "is not of works," Rom. ix. 11; that our salvation is not "by works of righteousness (^ Zfrfcov raw iv oixatoaovfi) which we have done," Tit. iii. 5; and in a hundred similar examples, the preposition expresses the ground or reason. We arc not elected, Dr justified, or saved on account of our works.
In like manner, when it is said we are condemned fy/, or fot the offence of one, and that we are justified for the righteous ness of another, the meaning obviously is, that it is on account of the offence we are condemned, and on account of the right eousness we are justified. If it is true, therefore, as is so often asserted, that the apostle here, and throughout this passage, states the fact merely that the offence of Adam has led to our condemnation, without explaining the mode in which it has pro duced this result, it must be because language cannot express the idea. The truth is, however, that when he says "the sen tence was by one offence" (TO */>///« lz i>oc,) he expresses the mode of our condemnation just as clearly as he denies one mode of justification by saying it "is not by works;" and as he affirms another by saying it is "by the righteousness of Christ." 2. This interpretation is not only the simple and natural mean ing of the words in themselves considered, but is rendered necessary by the context. We have, in this verse, the idea of pardon on the one hand, which supposes that of condemnation on the other. If the latter clause of the verse means, as is admitted, that we are pardoned for many offences, the former must mean that we are condemned for one. 3. The whole force of the contrast lies in this very idea. The antithesis in this verse is evidently between the one offence and the many offences. To make Paul say that the offence of Adam was the means of involving us in a multitude of crimes, from all of which Christ saves us, is to make the evil and the benefit exactly tantamount: 'Adam leads us into offences from which Christ delivers us.' Here is no contrast and no superiority. Paul, however, evidently means to assert that the evil from which Christ saves us, is far greater than that which Adam has brought upon us. According to the simple and natural inter prctation of the verse, this idea is retained: 'Adam brought the condemnation of one offence only; Christ saves us from that of many.' 4. Add to these considerations the obvious meaning of the corresponding clauses in the other verses, especially in ver. 19, and the design of the apostle in the whole passage, so often referred to, and it seems scarcely possible to resist the evidence in favour of this view of the passage. 5. This inter pretation is so clearly the correct one, that it is conceded oy commentators and theologians of every shade of doctrine.
"Justly indeed," says Koppc, "on account of one offence, many are subjected to punishment; but by divine grace many are freed from the punishment of many offences." His own words are, '-Jure quidem unius delicti causa poenas subeunt irulti; ex gratia vero divina a multorum poems liberantur beanturque multi." Flatt says, " Ka-dxwua. setzt als nicht iiothwendig eigene Verschuldung voraus, so wie das gegentheil dexaicopa nicht eigene oMMOffhy voraussetzt. Urn cincr cinzigen Siindc willen wurden allc dazu verurtheilt, den #dyaroc, (vs. 15, 17,) zu leiden." That is, 'Condemnation does not necessarily suppose personal transgression, any more than the opposite, justification, presupposes personal righteousness. On account of one single sin, all are condemned to suffer death.' So Storr:• <; Dunmatio qua propter Adamum tenemur, unius peccati causa damnatio est." 'The condemnation which we suffer on account of Adam, is a condemnation on account of one sin.' Whitby expresses the meaning thus: " The judgment was by one sin to condemnation, we being all sentenced to death on account of Au<mi s sin.
Tin', free i/t'ft is of many offences unto justification; that is, the free irii't is justification. The free- gift, TO ok y/i.ntatia, the act of grace is antithetical to xf>i/ia, the judgment; as the clauses x<>(tta £:c -/.ardxo'tjLa and yfunaiuj. el- dixaia) pa, (sentence of con demnation and gratuitous juxtijicalwn*} are opposed to each other. The word ot/.acoj/ia is (i. o-) riglttcoas judgment; here, as antitlietical to •/.a-dxo'ti.a, condemnation. It means justifica tion, which is a righteous judgment, or decision of a judge, pronouncing one to be just. This interpretation suits the signi fication of the word, and is to be preferred to making it mean righteousness, a sense which the word has in ver. 18, when opposed to transgression, and interchanged with obedience. This justification is Ix -O/JMV -aoa-Tcofidrcov, from many offences. The relation indicated by Ix, in the first clause, where it is said 'the sentence was e? ivo'c, for one offence,' is slio-htlv different from what it is in the second clause, where it is said justification is Ix nottatv napaTCTOJpdTcov, jrom many offences. That is, sin stands in a different relation to con demnation from that which it sustains to justification; both, however, may be expressed by the same preposition Christ has done far more than remove the curse pronounced en us for the one sin of Adam; he procures our justification from our own innumerable offences. This is the main idea presented in this verse.
VERSE 17. For if l>y one mans offence, &c. The connection of this verse, as indicated by for, is with vcr. 16: '\Ve are jus tified by Christ not only from the guilt of Adam's first sin, but from our own innumerable transgressions; for if death reigned over us for one offence, much more shall life reign through one who is none other and no less than Jesus Christ.' It is doubt ful, however, whether this verse is a mere amplification of the idea of vcr. 15, which, in import and structure, it so much resembles; or whether the stress is to be laid on the last clause, reigning in life; so that the point of the difference between Adam and Christ, as here indicated, is, Christ not only delivers from death, but bestows eternal life; or, finally, whether the emphasis is to be laid on the word receive. The idea would then be, 'If we are thus subject to death for an offence, in which we had no personal concern, how much more shall we be saved by a righteousness which we voluntarily embrace.' This appears to be Calvin's view, who says: " Ut miseria peccati hsereditate potiaris, satis est esse hominem, residet enim in carne ct sanguine; ut Christi justitia fruaris, fidelem esse necessarium est, quia fide acquiritur ejus consortium." The decision of these questions is not at all material to the general interpretation of the passage. Both of the ideas contained in the two latter views of the verse are probably to be included. By one mans offence, T(p TO~J k^b^ ~aoa-i:co<.t<j~c, ly the offence of the one (viz. Adam) death reiyncd, i. e. triumphed over all men, by one. Here again the dative Ttaoa-Tojtmri has a causal force, and the assertion of the apostle is, that the offence of Adam was the cause of death coming on all men. His sin was not the cause of death by any physical efficiency; nor as the mere occasion of leading men to incur by their own act the Denalty of death; nor by corrupting the nature of man, which corruption is the ground of the inflicted curse; but, as is asserted in the preceding verse, because his sin was the ground of the judicial condemnation, TO xpipa e«V xardxpcfjia, which passed on all mankind. If that is so, much more, sa^s the apostle, shall they which receive; be %alufidi>ovT£Z may he taken Bubstantively, the receivers; or the present participle, those receiving, is used to express the condition on which the enjoy ment of the blessing is suspended. The abundance of grace, the abounding grace, the grace which, in ver. 15, is said (IxzpcffGZ'jffs} hath abounded towards us. This grace is the unmerited love of God, which is the source of the gift of rigiiteousness, ocoo-.a r/j~ ocxatoff'ji/TjZ) i- e. righteousness is the i^ift offered and received. That righteousness hero does not mean holiness, is evident from the constant use of the word by Paul in a different sense in this epistle; from the fact that it is pardon, justification, justifying righteousness, not sanctification, that Paul in the context represents as the blessing received from Christ; and because it is in this verse opposed to the reigning of death, or state of condemnation on account of the offence of Adam. Professor Stuart, therefore, in aivordanco with the great majority of commentators, very correctly states the sentiment of the verse thus: "For it' all are in a Mate of condemnation by reason of the offence of one1, much more; shall those towards whom abundance of mercy and pardonin"- *Traco are shown, be redeemed from a state of condemnation, and advanced to a state of happiness." The general sentiment of the verse is thus correctly exhibited; but some of the inoro prominent terms do not appear to have their lull force assigned to them. TiH'i/ tclii'-li receive tin' al>ii.n>lant grace, expresses more than that this grace is manifested to them; all such do not reign in life. This plira.se evidently implies the voluntary reception of the offered boon. The gift of righteousness, too. is something more than pardoning grace. It is that which is expressed in ver. lf>, by the free gift; and in ver. i»j, by the free gift unto justification* It is, therefore, the gift of justifica tion; or what is but another method of stating the same idea, it is the righteousness of Christ by which we are justified, since the gift of justification includes the gift of Christ's righteous ness. The meaning of the verse consequently is, ' If on account of the offence of one man we are condemned, much more shall those wrho receive the righteousness graciously offered to them in the gospel, not only be delivered from condemnation, but also reign in life by one, Jesus Christ;' that is, be gloriously exalted in the participation of that life of holiness and com munion with God which is the end of our being.
By one, Jesus Christ. As it was by one man, antecedently to any concurrence of our own, that we were brought into a state of condemnation, so it is by one man, without any merit of our own, that we are delivered from this state. If the one event has happened, much more may we expect the other to occur. If we are thus involved in the condemnation of a sin in which we had no personal concern, much more shall we, who voluntarily receive the gift of righteousness, be not only saved from the consequences of the fall, but be made partakers of eternal life.
VERSE 18. Therefore, as l>y the offence of one, judgment came on all men to condemnation; even so, &c. The words doa. oov (therefore) are the inferential particles so often used in Paul's epistles, at the beginning of a sentence, contrary to the ordinary classical usage — vii. 3, 25, viii. 12, ix. 16, £c. They frequently serve to introduce a summation of what had previously been said. The inference from the whole discussion, from the begin ning of the epistle to ver. 12 of this chapter, is introduced in that verse by oca TO~JTO, wherefore. It followed, from all the apostle had said of the method of justification through Jesus Christ, that there is a striking analogy between our fall in Adam and our restoration in Christ. The carrying out of this comparison was interrupted, in the first place, to prove, in vs. lo, 14, the position assumed in ver. 12, that all men are subject to death on account of the sin of Adam; and, in the second place, to limit and explain the analogy asserted to exist between Christ and Adam, at the close of ver. 14. This is done in vs. 15 — 17. Having thus fortified and explained his meaning, the apostle now states the case in full. The word therefore, at the beginning of ver. 12, marks an inference from the whole doctrine of the epistle; the corresponding ivonls here are also strictly inferential. It had been proved that we are justified by the righteousness of one man, and it had also been proved that we are under condemnation for the offence of one. Therefore, as we are condemned, even so are we Justified.
It will be remarked, from the manner in which they are Di'inted, that the words judgment came, in the first clause of > this verse, and the free gift cime, in the second, have nothing t to answer to them in the original. That they are correctly and necessarily supplied, is obvious from a reference to ver. 16," where these elliptical phrases occur in full. The construction in the clauses (xpi/jLa) e^c xardxpefia and fydpefffjici) el^ dexaiaxrev ^to7^, is the same as in ver. 10. Judgment unto condemnation is a sentence of condemnation, and the free gift unto justifica tion is gratuitous justification. The sentence is said to be 3i ii/6c TtapaxTcouaroz, through the offence of one, and the justifica tion is oi l^oc otxatco/jiaToz, through the righteousness oj one. In ver. 10, this word or/aUoim is rendered justification, because it is there in antithesis to xardxpi/ia, condemnation; it is here properly rendered righteousness, because it is in antithesis to ~an6.-Tu)u.a, offenee, and because what is here expressed by dixaUotta, is in ver. IT expressed by u-axo'/j, obedience. This explanation is consistent with the signification of the word which means a righteous thin;/, whether it be an act, a judg ment, or an ordinance. In Rev. xix. 8, ra ocxatco/mTa TOW &f'uoi> is correctly rendered the righteousness of the saints. Luther translates the word in the passage before us, gereeht~ iykeit, agreeing with our translators. Calvin renders it justijicatio, 'bv i\\Q justification of one.' In this interpretation many of the modern commentators concur. The principal argument for this explanation of the word is, that it is used in that sense in ver. 10; but there, as just remarked, it is opposed to xardxit'.iM, condemnation, while here it is opposed to xaixi-rwtLa, offence. As the word may mean either justification or right eousness, that sense should be adopted which suits the immediate context. Many of the older theologians render it satisfaction; according to the Aristotelian definition, dtxaitofm TO kxav6pd-cQ[j.a TO~J adtxYjimroz. This gives a good sense: 'By the satisfaction of one, the free gift has come on all men unto justification of life.' But this, although in accordance with the strict classical use of the word, is not the sense in which it is used in the Bible, and it is not so suitable to the context.
Instead of rendering oi li/oc napanrconaro^ by the offence of one, and 3e hoz ocxacto/mToz, by the righteousness of one, a large class of commentators render them, 'by one offence,' and 4by one righteousness.' This does not materially alter the sense, and it is favoured by the absence of the article before ivoc- In vs. 17, 19, it is roi) £vo'c, the one. In favour of the version in our English translation, however, it may be urged: 1. That Ivoc, throughout the whole context in vs. 12, 15, 17, 19, is masculine, except in vcr. 16, where it is opposed to the neuter 7ro//fl5y. The omission of the article is sufficiently accounted for from the fact that the one intended, viz. Adam, had been before distinctly designated. 2. The comparison is between Adam and Christ, rather than between the sin of the one and the righteousness of the other. 3. The expression, one right eousness, is awkward and unusual; and if Ivoc dexaecb/jtaroz be rendered one righteous act, then it is inappropriate, inasmuch as we are not justified by one act of Christ, but by his whole life of obedience and suffering. 4. The natural opposition between one and all, requires e^o; to be masculine: 'It was by the offence of one man that all men were condemned.'
That the apostle here again teaches that there is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation of his race, cannot be denied. The only possible question is, What is the nature of that relation, as expressed by did? It was dt Ivoc ~aoa~Tc!)jmToz, '?>?/ the offence of one that judgment came upon all men.' Does this mean that the offence of one was simply the occasion of all being condemned, or that it was the ground or reason of their condemnation? It is of course admitted that the proper force of ocd with the genitive is, l>y means of, and with the accusative, on account of. As the genitive and not the accusative is here used, it might seem that the apostle design edly avoided saying that all were condemned (oca TO -aodTzrtoua TOL* Ivo'c) on account of the offence of one. But there is no necessity for departing from the ordinary force of the preposi tion with the genitive, in order to justify the interpretation given above. The relation of a means to an end, depends on the nature of that means. To say that condemnation is through, or by means of an offence, is to say that the offence is the rational or judicial means, i. e. the ground of the condemnation. No man doubts that when, in ver. 12, the apostle says, that death was (oca rr^ 6\fj.o.priaz) by means of sin, he means that it was on account of sin. This is not a solitary case. In chap. iii. 24, we are said to be justified (d'.a TY^ dxokjTpdjffscoz) through the redemption of Christ, i. e. by means of the redemption; but the ransom paid by Christ, in being the means, was the ground of our redemption. So in the familiar phrases, "through his blood," Eph. i. 7, Col. i. 20; "through his death," Rom. v. 10, Col. i. 22; "by his cross," Eph. ii. 1G; "by the sacrifice of himself," Heb. ix. 26; "through the offering of the body of Jesus," and in many similar expressions the preposition retains its proper force with the genitive, as indicating the means, and yet the means, from the nature of the case, is the ground or reason. Thus also, in this immediate connection, we have the expressions, "fy/ the righteousness of one" all are justified, and "by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." We have, therefore, in this single passage, no less than three cases, vs. 12, 18, 10, in which this preposition with the genitive indi cates such a means to an end, as the ground or reason on account of which M.miething is given or performed. All this is surely suilicient to prove that it tnciy, in the case before us, express the ground why the sentence of condemnation has passed on all men. That such, in this connection, must be its meaniiiLT, appears, 1. From the nature of the subject spoken of. To sav that one man has been corrupted by another, may indeed express very generally, that one was the cause of the corruption of the other, without giving any informal ion as to the mode in which the result was secured. But to say thai a man was ju-tiiied by means of a good action, or that he was con demned bv means of a bad one; or plainer still, in Raul's own language, that a condemnatory sentence came upon him by means of that action; according to all common rules of inter pretation, naturally means that such action was the reason of the sentence. 2. From the antithesis. If the phrase, " by the righteousness of one all are justified," means, as is admitted, that this righteousness is the ground of our justification, the opposite clause, "by the offence of one all are condemned," must have a similar meaning. 3. The point of the comparison, as frequently remarked before, lies in this very idea. The fact that Adam's sin was the occasion of our sinning, and thus incurring the Divine displeasure, is no illustration of the fact that Christ's righteousness, and not our own merit, is the ground of our acceptance. There would be some plausibility in this
'< not being the case, the interpretation in question cannot be adopted in consistency with the design of the apostle, or the common rules of exposition. 4. This clause is nearly identical
! with the corresponding one of ver. 16, "the judgment was by one (offence) to condemnation." But that clause, as shown above, is made, almost by common consent, to mean that the
- offence was the ground of the condemnatory sentence. Such, therefore, must be the meaning of the apostle in this verse;
The second question of importance respecting this verse is, I whether the all men of the second clause is co-extensive with 1 the all men of the first. Are the all who are justified for the! righteousness of Christ, the all who are condemned for the sir. of Adam? In regard to this point, it may be remarked, in the first place, that no inference can be fairly drawn in favour of an affirmative answer to this question, from the mere universality of the expression. Nothing is more familiar to the readers of the Scriptures than that such universal terms are to be limited by the nature of the subject or the context. Thus, John iii. 24, it is said of Christ, "all men come to him;" John xii. 32, Christ says, "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." Thus the expressions, "all the world should be taxed," "all Judea," "all Jerusalem," must, from the nature of the case, be limited. In a multitude of cases, the words all, all things, mean the all spoken of in the context, and not all, without exception; see Eph. i. 10, Col. i. 20, 1 Cor. xv. 22, 51, 2 Cor. v. 14, &c. 2. This limitation is always implied when the Scriptures else where speak of a necessary condition connected with the bless ing to which all are said to attain. It is everywhere taught that faith is necessary to justification; and, therefore, when it is said "all are justified," it must mean all believers. 'By him," says the apostle, "all that believe are justified from all tilings," &c. Acts xiii. 39. 3. As if to prevent the possibility of mistake, Paul, in ver. 17, says it is those who "receive the gift of righteousness" that reign in life. 4. Even the all men, in the first clause, must be limited to those descended from Adam "by ordinary generation." It is not absolutely all. The! man Christ Jesus must be exceptcd. The plain meaning is, all connected with Adam, and all connected with Christ. 5. A reference to the similar passage in 1 Cor. xv. 22, confirms this interpretation, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all bo made alive;" that is, shall be made partakers of a glorious resur rection and of eternal life. Thus the original word (^coorcor^d w (TOI<-M) and the context require the latter clause of that verso, to be understood. The all there intended arc immediately called! "they that are Christ's," ver. 2->. i. e. all connected with him,! and not numerically the all that die in Adam. (j. This inter pretation is necessary, because it is impossible, with any regard to scriptural usage or truth, to carry the opposite interpretation i through. In this whole passage there are two classes of per sons spoken of — those connected with Adam, and those con nected with Christ. Of the former, it is said "they die," ver. lo; "they are condemned,'' vs. 1<>, 18; "they are made sinners," ver. 11), by the offence of one man. Of the latter it; is said, that to them "the grace of (ilod and the gift by grace hath abounded," ver. 1~>: that "they are freely justified from | many offences," vs. l»i, IS; that '"they shall reign in life | through Christ Jesus," ver. 17; that "they are regarded and all men, of impenitent sinners and hardened reprobates, what '/ remains to be said of the people of (Jod'.' It is not possible so j to eviscerate these declarations as to make them contain nothing more than that the chance of salvation is offered to all men. To sav that a man is justified, is not to say that he has the opportunity of justifying himself; and to say that a man shall reign in life, is not to say he may possibly be saved. Who ever announces to a congregation of sinners, that they are all justi fied, they are all constituted righteous, they all have the justifi cation of life? The interpretation which requires all these strong and plain declarations to be explained in a sense which they confessedly have nowhere else in the Bible, and which makes them mean hardly anything at all, is at variance with every sound principle of construction. If the all in the latter)
'part of the verse is co-extensive with the all in the former, the passage of necessity teaches universal salvation; for it is impossible that to be justified, constituted righteous, can mean.simply that justification is offered to all men. The all who are justified are saved. If therefore the all means all men, the apostle teaches that all men are saved. And this is the use to which many Universalists have put the passage. As, however, not only the Scriptures generally, but Paul himself, distinctly teach that all men are not to be saved, as in 2 Thess. i. 9, this interpretation cannot be admitted by any who acknowledge the inspiration of the Bible. It is moreover an unnatural interpre tation, even if the attention be limited to this one passage; jbecause as death on account of Adam supposes union with Adam, so life on account of Christ supposes union with Christ. jit is all who are in Adam who are condemned for his offence, and the all who are in Christ who are justified by his righteous ness. The modern German commentators, even those who do riot hesitate to differ from the apostle, admit this to be the meaning of the passage. Thus Meyer says, Die /ravrsc fod-pco- 7:0: in the first clause, are die gesammtheit der Adams-genera tion, and in the second clause, die gesammtheit der Christusgeneration. Philippi says, "The limitation of the -ckrsc avftpto-ot is of necessity to be assumed. It can only mean all who believe.... The apostle views, on the one hand, the gene ration of those lost in Adam, and on the other, the generation of those saved in Christ."
VERSE 19. For as by one mans disobedience many were made fanners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous. This verse presents the doctrine of the preceding one in a some what different form. As in the doctrine of justification, there are the two ideas of the ascription of righteousness, and treat ing as righteous; and in the doctrine of the fall, the ascription of guilt (legal responsibility,) and the treating all men as guilty; so either of these ideas is frequently presented more promi nently than the other. In ver. 18, it is the latter, in each case, which is made most conspicuous, and in ver. 19, the former. In ver. 18, it is our being treated as sinners for the sin of Adam, and our being treated as righteous for the righteousness of Christ, that is most prominently presented. In ver. 19, on the contrary, it is our being regarded as sinners for the disobedience. of Adam, and our being regarded as righteous for the obediences of Christ, that are rendered most conspicuous. Hence, Paul begins this verse with for: i We are treated as sinners for the offence of Adaai, fur we arc regarded as sinners on his account,' &c. Though the one idea seems thus to be the more prominent in vcr. 18, and the other in ver. 11', yet it is only a greater degree of prominency to the one, and not the exclusion of the other, that is in either case intended.
BIJ one iiuuis dixoln-dienee. The disobedience here is evidently the first transgression of Adam, spoken of in ver. 16, as tin', one offt'tw. The obedience of Christ here stands for all his work in satisfying the demands of the law: his obedience unto und in death; that by which the law was magnified and rendered honourabb'. as well as satisfied. From its opposition to the, disobedience <»f Adam, his obedience, strictly speaking, rather' than his sufferings, seems to be the prominent idea. "Paulus' unterschridet in dem Werke Chri.-ti diese beiden Momentc, das Thun und das Leiden." Meander. kPuul distinguishes, in the work of Christ, these two elements — doing and suffering.' Gcwlt'c'ltte d'-r PjliHZiui'j, &c-? P-;"^;'- ^u tne paragraph which follows this statement, Neander presents the old distinc-l tion l)etwci'ii the active ami passive obedience of Christ, veryi nearlv in its ii-nai i-Tin. On p. ">4o, lie says, "Dies heiligc Leben Chri-ti will (l<»tt als That der gan/en Menschheit - betraehten." "(.Ind regards the holy life of Christ as the act of all men.' The word.- the innnif. in both clauses of this verse,,. are obviously equivalent to the nil of the corresponding t.-lausrsl of ver. 1^. and arc to be explained in the same manner.
The words <L".<i<>T<t)/j,>''. xaTeffrdOr^av ot rro//o/, rendered "the many were made sinners," properly mean, were set down in the rank or category of sinners. Ka&lffTTjfJU never, in the New Tes tament, means to make, in the sense of effecting, or causing a person or thing, to be in its character or nature other than ifc was before. KafJ-fffTdyai ~L^<L haaoTcoAov does not mean to make one sinful, but to set him down as such, to regard or appoint him to be of that class. Thus, when Christ is said to have been "constituted the Son of God," he was not made Son, but declared to be such: ^ Who constituted tliee a ruler or judge?"
i. e. Who appointed thee to that office? So, "Whom his lord made ruler." When, therefore, the apostle says, that the many were (xaTeff-cd&ijffav) constituted sinners by the disobedi ence of Adam, it cannot mean, that the many thereby were
! rendered sinful, but that his disobedience was the ground of their being placed in the category of sinners. It constituted a good and sufficient reason for so regarding and treating them. The same remark applies, of course, to the other clause of this
(verse: dixcuoe xaTaff-ad-ijffovToe of ~oAAoi This cannot mean, that by the obedience of one the many shall be made holy. It, can only mean, that the obedience of Christ was the ground on
I which the many are to be placed in the category of the right eous, i. e. shall be so regarded and treated. It is not our personal righteousness which makes us righteous, but the imputation of the obedience of Christ. And the sense in which we are here declared to be sinners, is not that we are such per sonally, (which indeed is true,) but by the imputation of Adam's disobedience.
Of course the several interpretations above mentioned are applied to this verse. 1. That the sin of Adam was the mere occasion of other men becoming sinners; whether this was by the force of example, or by an unfavourable change in their external circumstances, or in some other unexplained manner, oeing left undecided. 2. That in virtue of community, or numerical oneness of nature between Adam and his posterity, his act was strictly their act, and made them sinners as it made him a sinner. 3. That as the apostasy of Adam involved a corruption of nature, that corruption was transmitted to his descendants, by the general physical law of propagation. 4. That the sin of Adam was the judicial ground of the con demnation of his race. They were by his sin constituted sin ners in a legal or forensic sense; as by the righteousness of Christ we are constituted legally righteous.
That this last is the true interpretation, is plain, 1. Because it is in accordance with usage. To make clean, to make unclean, to make rif/hteous, to make guilty, are the constant expressions for regarding and treating as clean, unclean, righteous, or un righteous. 2. The expression, to make sin, and to make righteous ness, occurring in a corresponding sense, illustrate and confirm this interpretation. Thus in 2 Cor. v. 21, Christ is said to be ''made sin," i. e. regarded and treated as a sinner, "that we might be made the righteousness of God in him," i. e. that we might be regarded and treated as righteous in the sight of God, on his account. 3. The antithesis is here so plain as to be of itself decisive. "To be made righteous" is, according to Pro fessor Stuart, "to be justified, pardoned., regarded and treated as righteous." With what show of consistency then can it be denied that " to be made sinners," in the opposite clause, means to be regarded and treated as sinners? If one part of the verse speaks of justification, the other must speak of con demnation. 4. As so often before remarked, the analogy between the case of Adam and Christ requires this interpreta tion..It' the first clause means either that the disobedience of Adam was the occasion of our committing sin, or that it was the cause of <>ur becoming inherently corrupt, and on the ground of these sins, or of this corruption, being condemned; then must the other clause mean that the obedience of Christ is the cause of our becoming holy, or performing good works, on the ground of which we arc justified..But this confessedly is not the meanin tr of the apostle. If then the same words, in the same con nection, and the same grammatical construction, have the same meaninir, the interpretation irivrn above must be correct. • >. The design <>f the apostle to illustrate the great doctrine of the cospel, that men, although in themselves ungodly, are regarded and treated as righteous for Christ's sake, demands this inter pretation. (>. This view of the passage, so obviously required bv the usa ire of the words and the context, is as remarked above on ver. l'>. adopted by commentators of every class, as to theological opinion. See the passages there quoted. "The
mani] are here again all. who, from the opposition to the one, are in this place, as in ver. lf>. denominated from their great number. These have without exception become sinners (6.ij.aprco/.o'. •/ji~-,n-nj}-ftaivs.} not in reference to their o\vn inward cor ruption, of which Paul is not here speaking, but in reference to their guilt (Strafwiirdigkeit) and actual punishment on account of Adam's sin."* Even Flatt, whose general view of the pas
sage would lead to a different interpretation, gives, as a correct exhibition of the meaning of the apostle, "As on account of the disobedience of one the many are treated as sinners, so on account of the obedience of one shall the many be treated as righteous." Storr also renders the first clause, "They were regarded and treated as sinners;" this, he says, must be its meaning, from its opposition to the words "were constituted righteous," which obviously express the idea of justification, and also from the use of the word condemnation in the corres ponding clause of ver. 18. These writers are referred to rather than Calvinistic commentators, to show how entirely destitute of foundation is the reproach, that the interpretation given above is the result of theological prejudice.
. The meaning then of the whole passage is this: BY ONE MAN j sin entered into the world, or men were brought to stand in the I relation of sinners to God; death consequently passed on all, ' because for the offence of that one man they were all regarded ' and treated as sinners. That this is really the case is plain, ' Localise the execution of the penalty of a law cannot be more | extensive than its violation; and consequently, if all are subject to penal evils, all are regarded as sinners in the sight of God. This universality in the infliction of penal evil cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to such evil before that law was given; nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil, who have never personally sinned at all. We must con clude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners ' on account of the sin of Adam.
He is, therefore, a type of Christ. The cases, however, are jnot entirely analogous; for if it is consistent with the Divine 'character, that we should suffer for what Adam did, how much ' more may we expect to be made happy for what Christ has done! Besides, we are condemned for one sin only, on Adam's account; whereas Christ saves us not only from the evils con sequent on that transgression, but also from the punishment of 1 our own innumerable offences. Now, if for the offence of one,; death thus triumphs over all, how much more shall they who receive the grace of the gospel, not only be saved from evil, but ' rei°"n in life through Christ Jesus!
Wherefore, as on account of one the condemnatory sentence has passed on all the descendants of Adam, so on account of the righteousness of one, gratuitous justification conies on all who receive the grace of Christ; for as on account of the disobedi ence of one we are regarded as sinners, so on account of the obedience of the other we are regarded as righteous.
It may be proper to add a few remarks on the preceding interpretation of tliis whole section. 1. The first is, that the evidence of its correctness is cumulative, and is therefore not to be judged exclnsivelv bv what is said in favour of the view presented of nny one of its parts. If it is jirnlaWc that ver. 12 asserts, -that all men became subject to death on account of one man, this is rendered still plainer by the drift and force of vs. lo, 14; it is rendered almost certain by ver. lo, where it is asserted, that for the offence of one the many die; by ver. ll>, where it is said that for out' offence all are condemned; by ver. IT, which affirms again, that the ground of death's reigning over all is to be found in this one offence; and it would appear to be rnised almost bevond the reach of doubt by ver. IS, where the words of ver. lo' are repeated, and the analogy with the method of our justification is expressly asserted; and by ver. 10, in which this same idea is reiterated in a form which seems to set all efforts at misunderstanding or misinterpretation at defiance.
2. The force of a remark previously made may now be moro fullv appreciated, viz. that the sentiment attributed to ver. 12, after having been proved in vs. 1-5, 14. is ever after assumed as the ground of illustrating the nature, and confirming the cer tainty of our iustifieation. Thus, in ver. 1(>. F«R IF by the, offence of one many be dead, &c.; and ver. IT, FOR IF by one man's offence, etc.; in ver. IS, TIIKIIFFOKH AS by the offence of one all are condemned, even *" by the righteousness of one all are iustilied: and, finally, in ver. 10. FOI; AS by one man's dis obedience, ivc.
3. In connection with these remarks, it should be remem bered that the interpretation given to the several clauses in this passage is the simple natural meaning of the words, as, with scarcely an exception, is admitted. The objections relied upon against it are almost exclusively of a theological, rather than a philological or exegetical character. This interpretation, too,
v O O
• is perfectly consistent with itself, harmonious with the design: of the apostle, and illustrative of the point which he proposed ( to explain. If all these separate sources of proof be properly / considered and brought to bear, with their mutually sustaining I force, on a candid mind, it can hardly fail to acknowledge that ' the commonly received view of this interesting portion of the ' word of God, is supported by an amount and force of evidence ' not easily overthrown or resisted.
4. This interpretation is old. It appears in the writings of? the early Christian fathers; it has the sanction, in its essential I features, of the great body of the Reformers; it has commanded I the assent of men of all parties, and of every form of theolo-; gical opinion. The modern Rationalist, certainly an impartial witness, who considers it a melancholy proof of the apostle's subjection to Jewish prejudices, unites with the devout and humble Christian in its adoption. An interpretation which has stood its ground so long and so firmly, and which has com mended itself to minds so variously constituted, cannot be dismissed as a relic of a former age, or disparaged as the offspring of theological speculation.
5. Neither of the opposite interpretations can be consistently carried through. They are equally at variance with the design of the apostle, and the drift of his argument. They render the design and force of vs. 13, 14, cither nugatory or unintelligible. They require the utmost violence to bo clone to the plainest rules of exposition; and the most unnatural interpretations to be given to the most perspicuous and important declarations of the apostle. Witness the assertion, that u receiving the abun dance of grace and gift of righteousness," means to be brought under a dispensation of mercy; and that " to reign in life by one, Jesus Christ," is to be brought under a dispensation of life. Thus, too, " the free gift of justification of life has come upon all men,'1 is made to mean that all are in a salvable state; and " all are constituted righteous," (i. e. li justified, pardoned, regarded and treated as righteous,") is only to have the offer of pardon made to all. These are but a tithe of the exegetical difficulties attending the other interpretations of this passage, which make the reception of either, the severest of all sacrifices to prejudice or authority.
VERSE 20. Moreover, tlie law entered, that the offence might abound, &c. Paul, having shown that our justification was effected without the intervention of either the moral or Mosaic law, was naturally led to state the design and effect of the renewed revelation of the one, and the superinduction of the other. The law stands here for the whole of the Old Testament economy, including the clear revelation of the moral law, andj all the institutions connected with the former dispensation. The main design and result of this dispensation, considered as law, that is, apart from the evangelical import of many of its parts, was ha ro 7:a(jd~rcotJLa TTAsovdfffl, that the offence majJtt abound. The offence TO -aod-Tcoua is in the context used of the specific offence of Adam. But it is hard to see how the entrance of the law made the offence of Adam to abound, unless the idea is, that its dire effects were rendered more abundant. It is more probable that the apostle uses the word in a collective sense; compare Gal. iii. 11). Agreeably to this view, the mean ing of the clause is, that the great design of the law (in refer ence to justification] is to produce the knowledge and conviction of sin. Taking the word in its usual sense, the meaning is, that the result of the introduction of the law was the increase of sin. This result is to be attributed partly to the fact, that by enlarging the knowledge of the rule of duty, responsibility was proportionally increased, according to chap. iv. 15, and partly to the consideration that the enmity of the heart is awakened, by its operation, and transgressions actually multiplied, agree ably to chap. vii. 8. Both views of the passage express anj important truth, as the conviction of sin and its incidental! increase are alike the result of the operation of the law. It seems, however, more in accordance with the apostle's object, and with the general, although not uniform force of the particle (ha) rendered that, to consider the clause as expressing the design, rather than the result simply of the giving of the law. The word xaoeeffYjAd-ev does not mean simply entered, nor entered between, that is, came between Adam and Christ. This is indeed historically true, but it is not the meaning of the word, and therefore not the idea which the apostle intended to express. Nor docs the word mean here, as in Gal. ii. 4, entered surreptitiously, "crept in unawares," for this is not true. It rather means entered thereto, i. e. as the same idea is expressed ti Gal. iii. 19, "it was added." It was superinduced on a plan heady laid, and for a subordinate, although necessary purpose. t was not intended to give life, but to prepare men to receive 'Christ as the only source of righteousness and salvation.
But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. That is, great as is the prevalence of sin, as seen and felt in the light of God's holy law, yet over all this evil the grace of the gospel has abounded. The gospel or the grace of God has proved itself much more efficacious in the production of good, than sin in the production of evil. This idea is illustrated in the follow ing verse. The words ov and e/cel have a local force. Where, ft'iz', as Trepia-abv is more than Tr\eov. The fact, therefore, of the triumph of grace over sin, is expressed in the clearest manner.
\"va,in- order that, as expressing the divine purpose. The design of God in permitting sin, and in allowing it to abound, was to
(et? farjv alwviov,) in securing as the result of its exercise, eter nal life. This is done (Bta SIKCUOO-VVJJS) ly means of rigliteousncss, and that righteousness is THROUGH JESUS CHRIST OUR LOUD. As the triumph of sin over our race was through the offence of Adam, so the triumph of grace is through the right eousness of Christ. The construction of this passage, assumed in the above interpretation, is to be preferred to that which con nects &i/caiocrvvr}s ei9 &*}v ai&vLov, ' righteousness ivhich is unto eternal life, because the antithesis is not between death and ri'/hteousness, but between death and life: 'Sin reigns in death, grace reigns unto life.' That the benefits of redemption shall far outweigh the evils of the fall, is here clearly asserted. This we can in a measure comprehend, because, 1. The number of the saved shall doubtless greatly exceed the number of the lost. Since the half of mankind die in infancy, and, according to the Protestant doctrine, arc heirs of salvation; ami since in the future state of the Church the knowledge of the Lord is to cover the earth, we have reason to believe that the lost shall' bear to the saved no greater proportion than the inmates of a prison do to the mass of the community. ~. Because the eter nal Son of God, by his incarnation and mediation, exalts his people to a far higher state of being than our race, if nnfailen, could ever have attained, o. Because the benefits of redemp tion are not to be confined to the human race. Christ is to be admired in his saints. It is through the Church that the mani fold wisdom of God is to be revealed, throughout all ages, to principalities and powers. The redemption of man is to be the great source of knowledge and blessedness to the intelligent 1 universe.
I. The doctrine of imputation is clearly taught in this pas sage. This doctrine does not include the idea of a mysterious! identity of Adam and his race; nor that of a tran.-fer of themoral turpitude of his sin to his descendants. It does not teach that his offence was personally or properly the sin of all men, or that his act was. in any mysterious sense, the act of his posteritv. Neither does it imply, in reference to the righteousness of Christ, that his righteousness becomes personally and inhe rently ours, or that his moral excellence is in any way trans- I ferrcd from him to believers. The sin of Adam, therefore, is.j no ground to us of remorse; and the righteousness of Christ is no ground of self-complacency in those to whom it is imputed. This doctrine merely teaches, that in virtue of the union, repre- » sentative and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the ground of their condemnation, that is, of their subjection { to penal evils; and that in virtue of the union between Christ/ jand his people, his righteousness is the ground of their justi fication. This doctrine is taught almost in so many words in 'vs. 12, 15 — ID. It is so clearly stated, so often repeated or (assumed, and so formally proved, that very few commentators of any class fail to acknowledge, in one form or another, that it is the doctrine of the apostle.
It would be easy to prove that the statement of the doctrine just given is a correct exhibition of the form in which it was held by the great body of the Reformed Churches and divines. A few quotations from men of universally recognized authority, as competent witnesses on this subject, must suffice. Turrettin (T I tool. Elench. Quaest. IX., p. 678) says, "Imputation is either
of something foreign to us, or of something properly our own. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours; in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions. Some times that is imputed which is without us, and not performed by ourselves; thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins are imputed to him, although he.has neither sin in himself, nor we righteousness. Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not of the former, because we are treating of a sin committed by Adam, not by us." The ground of this imputation is the union between Adam
and his posterity. This union is not a mysterious identity of
person, but, 1. "Natural, as he is the father, and we are the children. 2. Political and forensic, as he was the representa tive head and chief of the whole human race. The foundation, therefore, of imputation is not only the natural connection which exists between us and Adam, since in that case all his sins might be imputed to us, but mainly the moral and federal, in virtue of which God entered into covenant with him as our head." Again, "We are constituted sinners in Adam in the 'same way in which we are constituted righteous in Christ." | Again, (Vol. II., p. 707,) to impute, he says, "is a forensic I term, which is not to be understood physically of the infusion of righteousness, but judicially and relatively." Imputation
j does not alter the moral character; hence the same individual • may, in different respects, be called both just and unjust: "For
j when reference is had to the inherent quality, he is called a sinner and ungodly; but when the external and forensic relation
co Christ is regarded, he is pronounced just in Christ." "When? God justifies us on account of the righteousness of Christ, his; judgment is still according to truth; because he does not pro-, nounce us just in ourselves subjectively, which would be false, j but in another putatively and relatively." Tuckney, (Prcdee • tiones, p. 234,) "We are counted righteous through Christ in the same manner that we are counted guilty through Adam. The latter is by imputation, therefore also the former." "We are not so foolish or blasphemous as to say, or even to think, that the imputed righteousness of Christ makes us formally and subjectively righteous;" see further quotations from this writer
says, "Things which are not our own originally, inherently, may vet be imputed to us, ex justitia, by the rule of righteous ness. And this may be done upon a double relation unto those whose they are, 1. Federal. 2. Natural. Things done by one may be imputed unto others, pro^tcr relationem foederalem, because of a covenant relation between them. So the sin of Adam was imputed unto all his posterity. And the ground hereof is, that we stood in the same covenant with him who was our head and representative." On page 242, he says, "This imputation (of Christ's righteousness) is not the transmission or transfusion of the righteousnos of another into them which are to be justified, that they should become perfectly and inherently righteous thereby. For it is impossible that the righteousness of one should be transfused into another, to become- his sub jectively and inherently.'' Again, page 3UT, "As we are made guilty by Adam's actual sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us; so are we made righteous by the righteous ness of Christ, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us." On page 408, he says, "Nothing is intended by the « imputation of sin unto any, but the rendering them justly. obnoxious unto the punishment due unto that sin. As the not I imputing of sin is the freeing of men from being subject or i liable to punishment." It is one of his standing declarations, "To be alienee culpee reus, MAKES NO MAN A SINNEII." Knapp
(in his Lectures on Theology, sect. TOj says, in stating what the
doctrine of imputation is, "God's imputing the sin of our first parents to their descendants, amounts to this: God punishes the descendants on account of the sin of their first parents." Tliis
he £jivcs as a mere historical statement of the nature of the doctrine, and the form in which its advocates maintained it. Zacharhe (Bib. Theologie, Vol. II., p. 394) says, "If God allows
the punishment which Adam incurred, to come on all his de scendants, he imputes his sin to them all. And, in this sense. Paul maintains that the sin of Adam is imputed to all, because the punishment of the one offence of Adam has come upon all."
And Bretselmeider, as quoted above, on chap. iv. 8, when stating the doctrine of the Reformers, as presented in the various creeds published under their authority, says, that they regarded justification, which includes the idea of imputation, as a forensic or judicial act of God, by which the relation of man to God, and not the man himself, was changed. And imputation of righteousness they described as "that judgment of God, according to which he treats us as though AVC had not sinned, but had fulfilled the law, or as though the righteousness of Christ was ours." This view of justification they constantly maintained in opposition to the Papists, who regarded it as a moral change, consisting in what they called the infusion of righteousness.
Though this view of the nature of imputation, both of sin and righteousness, is so familiar, yet as almost all the objections to the doctrine are founded on the assumption that it proceeds on the ground of a mysterious identity between Adam and his race on the one hand, and Christ and his people on the other; and that it implies the transfer of the moral character of the acts • imputed, it seemed necessary to present some small portion of [the evidence which might be adduced, to show that the view of the subject presented above is that which has always been jheld by the great body of the Reformed Churches. The objec tions urged against this doctrine at the present day, are pre-, cisely the same which were urged by the Roman Catholics against the Reformers; and the answers which we are obliged ' to repeat, are the same which the Reformers and their suc- Jcessors gave to those with whom they had to contend.
It will be seen how large a portion of the objections are answered by the mere statement of the doctrine. 1. It is
objected that this doctrine "contradicts the essential principles of moral consciousness. We never did, and never can feel guilty of another's act, which was done without any knowledge or concurrence of our own. We may just as well say we can appropriate to ourselves, and make our own, the righteousness of another, as his unrighteousness. But we can never, in either case, even force ourselves into a consciousness that any act is really our own, except one in which we have had a personal and voluntary concern. A transfer of moral turpitude is just as impossible as a transfer of souls; nor docs it lie within the boundary of human effort, that we should repent of Adam's sin." Prof. Stwrrt, p. 2o(J. Tins idea is repeated very fre
quently in his commentary on this passage, and the Ej-cursus,
IV. A. "To say Adams disobedience was the occasion, or ground, or instrumental cause of all men becoming sinners, and was thus an evil to them all, and to say that his disobedience was y^/'x"//'///'/ f/n'i/'ft. is.-aying two very different things. I see no wav in which this last assertion can ever be made out by philology." Compare Mr. Barnes, p. ll'J. Profcs^r Stuart
further says, page 212, that if verse 12 speaks of the imputation of Adam's sin. it could not be said men had not sinned after tho
likeness of Adam's transgression. " So far from this must it be, that Adam's sin is their very sin, and the ground why death reigns over them.'' Mr. Barnes says, page ll'J, "If the doc trine of imputation be true, they not only //'/</ sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, but had sinned th<- very identical tin. It was precisely ///,v him. It was the very thin"-
itself." In like manner, on page 1*0, he says, " Hut if the doc trine of the Scriptures was, that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over to them, was really and truly theirs, and was transferred to them in any sense, with what propriety could the apostle say that God justified the ungodly?'' &c. "They are eminently pure, and have a claim not of grace, but of debt, to the very highest rewards of heaven." It will be at once
perceived that these and similar objections are all founded on a misapprehension of the doctrine in question. They are all directed again>t the ideas of identity of person, and transfer of moral character, neither of which is, as we have seen, included in it; they are, moreover, not only inconsistent with the true nature of the doctrine, but with the statements and arguments of these writers themselves. Thus Professor Stuart, page 230, says, " That 'the son shall not die for the iniquity of the father,' is as true as that ' the father shall not die for the iniquity of the son;' as God has most fully declared in Ezek. xviii." According to this view of the subject, "for the son to die for the iniquity of the father," is to have the sin of the father imputed to him, or laid to his charge. The ideas of personal identity and transfer of moral character are necessarily excluded from it, by its opponents themselves, who thus virtually admit the irrelevancy of their previous objections. The fact is, that imputation is never represented as affecting the moral charac ter, but merely the relation of men to God and his law. To impute sin is to regard and treat as a sinner; and to impute righteousness is to regard and treat as righteous.
2. It is said that this doctrine is nothing but a theory, an attempt to explain what the apostle does not explain, a philo sophical speculation, &c. This again is a mistake. It is neither a theory nor a philosophical speculation, but the statement of a scriptural fact in scriptural language. Paul says, For the offence of one man all men are condemned; and for the right eousness of one all are regarded and treated as righteous. This is the whole doctrine.
•). It is asserted that the word impute is never used in the Bible, in reference to reckoning or charging upon a man any thing which is not strictly and properly his own. But this has been shown to be incorrect; see chap. iv. 3. It is used twice in chap, iv., of '"imputing righteousness" to those without works, to the ungodly, &c. But if the objection were well founded, it would be destitute of any force; for if the word means so to ascribe an action to a man as to treat him as the author of it, it would be correct and scriptural to say that the sin or righteousness of one man is imputed to another, when that sin or righteousness is made the ground of the condemna tion or justification of any other than its personal authors.
4. It is denied that Adam was the representative of his pos terity, because he is not so called in Scripture, and because a representative supposes the consent of those for whom he acts. ' I Jut this is a mistake. It is rare that a representative is ' appointed by the choice of all on whom his acts are binding.
This is the case in no country in the world; and nothing is more common than for a parent or court to appoint a guardian to act as the representative of a minor. If it is competent for a parent to make sucli an appointment, it is surely proper in God. It is a mere question of fact. If the Scriptures teachthat Adam was on trial not for himself only, but also for hisj posterity; if the race fell when he fell; then do they teach that he was in fact and form their representative. That they do teach the fact supposed, can scarcely be denied; it is asserted as often as it is stated that the sin of Adam was the ground of the condemnation of men.
5. It is said that the doctrine of imputation is inconsistent with the first principles of justice. This objection is only of force against the mistaken view given above. It lias no weight against the true doctrine. It is on all hands admitted that the sin of Adam involved the race in ruin. This is the whole diffi culty. How is it to be reconciled with the divine character, that the fate of unborn millions should depend on an act over which they had not the slightest control, and in which they had no agency? This difficulty presses the opponents of the doc trine more heavilv than its advocates. The former have no advantage over the latter; not in the amount ot evil inflicted, because thev make the evil directly inflicted on account of Adam's sin much greater than the others do; not in the pro vision made for the redemption of the race from this evil, because both maintain that the work of Christ brings the oiler of life to the whole race, while it infallibly secures the salvation of a multitude which no man can number. The opinion of those writers not onlv has no advantage over the common doctrine, but it is encumbered with difficulties peculiar to itself. Jt represents the race as being involved in ruin and condemnation, without having the slightest probation. According to one view, thev " are born with a- corrupt disposition, and with the loss of righteousness, and subjection to pain and wo," by a mere arbitrary appointment of God, and without a trial, either per sonally, or by a representative. According to another view, men are born without any such corrupt disposition, but in a state of indifference, and are placed on their probation at the verv first moment of moral agency, and under a constitution which infallibly secures their becoming sinners. According to the realistic doctrine, revived by the modern speculative theo logians of the school of Schleiermacher, humanity existed as a generic life in Adam. The acts of that life were therefore the acts of all the individuals to whom, in the development of the race, the life itself was communicated. All men consequently sinned in Adam, by an act of self-determination. They are 1 punished, therefore, not for Adam's act, but for their own; not i simplv for their innate depravity, nor for their personal acts ' unlv, but for the act which they committed thousands of years aero, when their nature, i. e. their intelligence and will, were determined to evil in the person of Adam. This is avowedly a philosophical doctrine. This doctrine assumes the objective roalit v of human nature as a generic life. It takes for granted thai persons can act before they exist, or that actual sin can be committed by an impersonal nature, which is a contradiction in I terms, inasmuch as an intelligent, voluntary act is an act of a person. If 'ire actually sinned in Adam, then we (as persons) were then in conscious being. This doctrine is directly opposed to Scripture, which expressly teaches that the sin of Adam, and not our personal sin, was the original ground of condemnation; as the righteousness of Christ, and not our personal righteous ness, is the ground of our justification. No less clearly does the Bible condemn the other doctrines just mentioned. Paul represents the evils which came on men on account of the ofF<'m-o of Adam, as a condemnation; not as an arbitrary inflic tion, nor as a merely natural consequence. We are bound to acquiesce in the truth as taught in the Scriptures, and not to introduce explanations and theories of our own. The denial of this doctrine involves also the denial of the scriptural view | of atonement and justification. It is essential to the scriptural form of these doctrines, that the idea of legal substitution should be retained. Christ bore our sins; our iniquities were laid upon him, which, according to the true meaning of scriptural lan guage, can ordy signify, that he bore the punishment of those sins; not the same evils, indeed, either in kind or degree; but still penal, because judicially inflicted for the support of law. It matters little whether a debt be paid in gold or copper, pro vided it is cancelled. And as a comparatively small quantity of the former is of equal value with a great deal of the latter, so the temporary sufferings of Christ are of more value for all the purposes of punishment, than the eternal sufferings of all mankind. It is then no objection to the scriptural doctrine of sacrifice and atonement, that Christ did not suffer the same kind or degree of evil, which those for whom he died must have endured in their own persons. This idea of legal substitution enters also into the scriptural view of justification. In justifi cation, according to Paul's language, God imputes righteousness to the ungodly. This righteousness is not their own; but they arc regarded and treated as righteous on account of the obedi ence of Chri.-t. That is, his righteousness is so laid to their account, or imputed to them, that they are regarded and treated as if it were their own; or k'as if they had kept the law." This is the great doctrine of the Reformation, Luther's arti>'it!us stand* vel cadc.ntis ccclesice. The great question between the Papists and Protestants was, whether men are justified on account of inherent or imputed righteousness. For the latter, the Protestants contended as for their lives, and for the life of the Church. See the passages quoted above on chap. iv. 3, and the Confessions of that period.*
* Apn]., art. 0, p.!>:!>;. M.-rita propitiatoris— - uliis donuntur imjwtutinnr divma, ut p.-r ea, laa'piain prnpriis mentis justi repntentur, ut si <[uis amieu.s pro amico solvit aes alienum, debitor alieno merito tanquam prnprio liberatur.
ciliati.uu'iii cum Di-o, a'loutinuoin in iilios Dei et h:rreilitatein vitae aeteriia? consequinmr.
F. (\ III., p. G84. Fides non \>r -ptcrea justificat, rjuod ipsa tain l.onum opus, tamque prreclara virtus -it, sed quia in promissione evanjiHii meritum Clu-isti appreh'-ndil ct amplectitur, iilu-l eiuiu per fi.lem nobis api.licari <lebet, si eo ip.so merito justiticari veliinus.
the Reformation, justification "is that act of God in which he imputes to a man the merit of Christ, and no longer regards and treats him as a sinner, but as righteous.'' '-It is an act in which neither man nor God changes, but the man is merely freed from guilt, and declared to be free from punishment, and hence the relation only between God and man is altered." This, lie says, the sym
bolical books maintained, in opposition to the Romish Church, which makes justification a moral change.
G. As the term death is used for any and every evil judicially inflicted as the punishment of sin, the amount and nature of the evil not being expressed by the word, it is no part of the apos tle's doctrine, that eternal misery is inflicted on any man for the sin of Adam, irrespective of inherent depravity or actual transgression. It is enough for all the purposes of his argu ment, that this sin was the ground of the loss of the divine favour, the withholding of divine influence, and the consequent corruption of our nature. Turrettin, Theologia EU'tid., vol. i.,
pa ire 080: u Puma quam peccatum Adami in nos accersit, vcl estprivativa,VQ\positiva. Quoad primam dicimus Adami peecatum nobis imputari immediate ad poonani privativam,quiaest causa privationis justit i;e originalis, et sic corruptioncm antecedere debet sultem ordine natura?: Bed quoad posteriorcm potest dici imputari mediate quoad poenam positivam, quia isti po?nae obnoxii non smnus, nisi postquam nati et corrupt! sumus."
7. It is said that it is inconsistent with the omniscience and voracity of God, and consequently with his nature as God, that he should regard and treat as sinners those who are not sinners, lor those as righteous who are in fact unrighteous. God's judg- (meuts are according to truth, and therefore must be determined i by the real, subjective character of those whom they concern. < This difficulty arises simply from the ambiguity of language. 'The words sinner, just, unjust, righteous, and unrighteous, in! English, and the corresponding words in other languages, are familiarly and properly used in two distinct senses. They sometimes express moral character, and sometimes legal rela tions. A man may therefore be just and unjust, righteous and unrighteous at the same time. A criminal who has satisfied the demands of justice, is just in the eye of the law; he cannot be ao-ain or further punished for his offence, and is entitled to all bis rights as a citizen, although morally unrighteous. The i sinner, and every sinner whom God accepts or pronounces right eous for the righteousness of Christ, feels himself to be in his! own person most unrighteous. God's judgment, in pronouncing him righteous, is none the less according to truth. He does not pronounce the sinner subjectively righteous, which he is not, j but forcnsically righteous, which he is, because Christ has satisfied the demands of justice on his behalf. In like manner, when our blessed Lord, although he knew no sin, is said toj have been made sin, it only means that he assumed the respon-' sibility of meeting the requirements of the law in our place; sot that his sufferings were not chastisements or calamities, 1m; the nature of punishment. He was condemned for our sakes. i as we are justified for his. It is no impeachment, therefore, j of the omniscience or veracity of God, when he holds us as guilty on account of Adam's sin, as he does not pronounce us! morally criminal fur his offence, hut simply declares that for' the ends of justice we are involved in his condemnation.
8. Perhaps the most operative of all objections against the doctrine of imputation is founded on the assumption that moral character must he self-originated. It is assumed that inhe rent, hereditary depravity in man cannot have the nature of sin and involve guilt, unless it is due to his own act. This princi ple, however, is not only erroneous, hut contrary to the plainest and most universally received doctrines of tin1 l>ible. Lt is the* intuitive judgment of men that moral (jualities owe their charac ter to their nature, and not to their origin. A holy being is recognized as holy, whether his holiness be concreated, infused, or self-originated. All Churches believe that Adam was created holy; all Churches believe that holiness is the product of divine' power in regeneration; and all Churches, that is. the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed, acknowledge that innate depravity is truly sin, although anterior to anv act of self-determination on our part to evil. It is not necessary, therefore, to assume that if men are born in sin, their sinfulness is to be referred to their personal act. It may, consistently with the common judg ment of men, and with the faith of the Church universal, be a penal consequence of the sin of Adam.
II. Whatever evil the Scriptures represent as coming upon •is on account of Adam, they regard as penal: they call it death, which is the general term by which any penal evil is expressed. It is not however the doctrine of the Scriptures, nor of the Reformed Churches, nor of our standards, that the corruption of nature of which they speak, is any depravation of the soul, or an essential attribute, or the infusion of any posi tive evil. "Original sin," as the Confessions of the Reformers maintain, " is not the substance of man, neither his soul nor
[body; nor is it anything infused into his nature by Satan, as;poison is mixed with wine; it is riot an essential attribute, but jan accident,* i. e. something which does not exist of itself, an incidental quality," &c. Brctselineider, vol. ii., p. 30. These confessions teacli that original righteousness was lost, as a punishment of Adam's sin, and by that defect, the tendency to sin, or corrupt disposition, or corruption of nature is occaisioned.f Though they speak of original sin as being, first, [negative, i. e. the loss of righteousness; and secondly, positive, 'or corruption of nature; yet by the latter, they state, is to be understood, not the infusion of anything in itself sinful, but an factual tendency or disposition to evil, resulting from the loss »of righteousness. This is clearly expressed in the quotation 'just made. It is therefore in perfect consistency writh his own views, and with those of the Protestant creeds, that President Edwards teaches, in his book on Original Sin, "It is agreeable to the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin comes from a defective or privative cause," (p. 28;) and that he argues against the idea of any evil quality being infused, implanted, or wrought into our nature by any positive cause or influence whatever, either of God or the creature, &c. With equal con sistency and propriety, he goes on to state that "the absence of positive good principles," and "the withholding of special divine iniluence," and "the leaving of the common principles of self-love, natural appetite, which were in man in innocence," are sufficient to account for all the corruption which appears among men. Goodwin, one of the strictest Puritanical divines, (vol. iii., p. 323,) has a distinct chapter to prove, "that there is no necessity of asserting original sin to be a positive quality in our souls, since the privation of righteousness is enough to infect the soul with all that is evil." Yet he, in common with
* Aceidens: quod non per se subsistit, sed in aliqua substantia est et ab ea discern! possit.
f F. Cuneor. I., p. 043: Etsi enira in Adamo et Heva natura initio pura, bona et saueta creata cst; tamen per lapsum. peccaturu non eo modo ipsorum Tiaturam invasit, ut Manichrei dixerunt — quiu potius cum seductione Satanse per lapsum, justo Dei judicio (in poenam hominum) justitia concreata ^eu originalis ami?sa esset, defectu illo, privatione sen spoliatione et vulneratione, (quorum malorum Satan causa est) humana natura ita corrupta est, ut jam natura, ana cum illo defectu et corruptioue, &c.
the Reformers, represents original sin as having a positive as) well as a negative side. This, however, results from the active | nature of the soul. If there is no tendency to the love and service of God, there is, from this very defect, a tendency to self and sin. How larire a portion of the objections to the doctrine of original sin is founded on the idea of its being an evilj/ positively infused into our nature, "as poison is mixed with| wine," may be inferred from the exclamation of Professor Stuart, in reference to the passage just quoted from President Edwards. He says it is "a signal instance, indeed, of the triumph of the spontaneous feelings of our nature over the power of system!" It would seem from this, that he has no objection to the doctrine as thus stated. And yet this is the form in which, as we have ju.-t seen, it is presented in the creeds of the Reformers, and the works of the "best divines."
It will he at once perceived that all such questions as thel following, proceed on an incorrect apprehension of the point at I issue. It is often asked. If Adam's first sin is propagated to us. why not all his other sins, and the HIIS of all our ancestors? iNo one properly maintains that Adam's tirxf sin, his act of eating the forbidden fruit, is propagated to anv one. This is a,1 sheer impossibility. We derive from Adam a nature destitute of anv native tendency to the love and service of God: and since the soul, from its nature, is filled as it were with suscep tibilities, dispositions or tendencies to certain modes of acting, or to objects out of itself, if destitute of the governing tendency or disposition to holiness and God. it has. of course, a tendency to self-gratification and sin. There is surely nothing incredible, or inconceivable in the existence of a native tendency to delight in God, any more than in the existence of a tendency or dis position to delight in beauty, or social intercourse, or in our own offspring. Men have still an innate sense of right and wrong, a natural sense of justice, &c. Why then may not Adam nave been created with an analogous tendency to delight in God? And if this disposition presupposes a state of friendship with his Maker, or if it is the result of special Divine influence, why may not that influence be withheld as the expression of God's displeasure for the apostasy and rebellion of man? This
;and agreeable to the declarations of his word. lie abandons sinners to themselves as a punishment of their transgressions; he withholds or withdraws blessings from children, in punish ment, or as an expression of his displeasure, for the sins of their parents. There is, therefore, nothing in this doctrine at vari ance with the Divine character or conduct. On the contrary, it tfrom the beginning of the world. The objections, therefore, founded on the supposed absurdity of the propagation of sin, 'ind especially of Adam's first sin, all rest on misapprehension
Nor is the objection any better supported, that the doctrine of corruption of nature makes God, from whom that nature proceeds, the author of sin. Our nature is not corrupted by
' any positive act of God, or by the infusion, implanting, or inworking of any habit or principle of sin; God merely with-
;• holds judicially those influences which produced in Adam a tendency or disposition to holiness; precisely as a monarch often, from the purest and wisest motives, withholds favours from the children of traitors or rebels, or bestows them upon the children of patriots and public benefactors. There is in
• every human being a tendency to act upon the same principle. We are all disposed to regard with less favour the children of the wicked than the children of the good. If this principle is recognized even in the ordinary dealings of Divine Providence, we need not wonder at its being acted upon in that great trans-
As little weight is due to the objection, that the law of pro pagation does not secure the transmission of bodily defects, or mental and moral peculiarities of parents to their children. This objection supposes that the derivation of a corrupt nature from Adam is resolved into this general law; whereas it is uniformly represented as a peculiar case, founded on the repre sentative character of Adam, and not to be accounted for by this general law exclusively. It is constantly represented as resulting from the judicial withholding of the influences of the Holy Spirit from an apostate race. See the Confessions of the
Reformers quoted above: Defectus et coneupiscentia suntpoence^ Apolgia I., p. 58. That the peculiarities, and especially that the piety of parents, are not transmitted by the law of propa gation, from parents to children, does not therefore present a shadow of an objection to the common doctrine on this subject. The notorious fact, however, that the mental and moral pecu liarities of parents are transmitted to their children, frequently and manifestly, though not with the uniformity of an established. law, answers two important purposes. It shows that there is nothing absurd, or out of analogy with God's dealing with men, in the doctrine of hereditary depravity; and also, that the doc trine is consistent with God's goodness and justice. For if, under the administration of the divine Being, analogous facts are daily occurring, it must be right and consistent with the perfections of God.
The most common and plausible objection to this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with the nature of sin and holiness to suppose that either one or the other can be innate, or that a disposition or principle, which is not the result of choice, can posse.-s a moral character. To this objection, President Edwards
answers, "In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature ol things, as judged of by the common-sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds of men in all n<j;es. not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself, from which that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but the antecedent good disposition, tempo-, or affec tion of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtu ous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is good is no farther virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle or virtuous disposition of mind, which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite." Original /Sin, p. 140. It is certainly accord
ing to the intuitive judgment of men, that innate dispositions are amiable or unamiable, moral or immoral, according to their nature; and that their character does not depend on the mode of their production. The parental instinct, pity, sympathy with the happiness and sorrows of others, though founded in innate principles of our nature, are universally regarded as amiable attributes of the soul; and the opposite dispositions as the reverse. In like manner, the sense of justice, hatred of cruelty and oppression, though natural, are moral from their very nature. And the universal disposition to prefer ourselves to others, though the strongest of all the native tendencies of the mind, is no less universally recognized as evil.
The opposite opinion, which denies the possibility of moral dispositions prior to acts of choice, is irreconcilable with the nature of virtue, and involves us in all the difficulties of the doctrine, that indifference is necessary to the freedom of the will and the morality of actions. If Adam was created neither holy nor unholy, if it is not true that " God made man upright," but that he formed his own moral character, how is his choice of God as the portion of his soul to be accounted for? Or what moral character could it have? To say that the choice was made from the desire of happiness, or the impulse of self-love, affords no solution of the case; because it docs not account for the nature of the choice. It assigns no reason why God, in preference to any other object, was chosen. This desire could only prompt to a choice, but could not determine the object. If it be said that the choice was determined by the superior excellence of God as a source of happiness, this supposes that this excellence was, in the view of the mind, an object supremely desirable; but the desire of moral excellence is, from the nature of the case, a moral or virtuous desire; and if this determined the choice, moral character existed prior to this determination of the will, arid neither consisted in it, nor resulted from it. On the other hand, if the choice was determined by no desire of the object as a moral good, it could have no moral character. How is it possible that the choice of an object which is made from no regard for its excellence, should have any moral character? The choice, considered as an act of the mind, derives its character entirely from the motive by which it is determined. If the motive be desire for it as morally excel lent, the choice is morally good, and is the evidence of an ante cedent virtuous disposition of mind; but if the motive be mere self-love, the choice is neither good nor bad. There is no way, on the theory in question, of accounting for this preference for God, but by assuming the self-determining power of the will, and supposing that the selection of one object, rather than another, is made prior to the rise of the desire foi it as excel lent, and consequently in a state of indifference.
This reasoning, though it applies to the origin of holiness, is not applicable to the origin of sin; and, therefore, the objection that it siq^oses a sinful disposition to exi>t in Adam, prior to his first transgression, is not valid. ]>ec;nise an act of disobedi ence performed under the impulse of self-love, or of some animal appetite, is sinful, it does not follow that an act of obedience, performed under a similar impulse, and without any regard for God or moral excellence, is virtuous.
Of all the facts ascertained by the history of the world, it would seem to be among the plainest, that men are born desti tute of a disposition to seek their chief good in God, and with a disposition to make self-gratification the great end of their being. Even reason, conscience, and natural affection, are le.-s universal characteristics of our fallen race. For there are idiots and moral monsters often to be met with; but fora child of Adam, uninfluenced by the special grace of God, to delight in his Maker, as the portion of his soul, from the first dawn of his moral bein«r, is absolutely without example among all the thou sands of millions of men who have inhabited our world. If experience can establish anything, it establishes the truth of the scriptural declaration, "that which is born of the flesh is flesh." It would seem no less plain, that this cannot be the original and normal state of man; that human nature is not now what it was when it proceeded from the hand of God. Every thing else which God has made, answers the end of its being; but human nature, since the fall, has uniformly worked badly: in no one instance has it spontaneously turned to God as its chief good. It cannot be believed that God thus made man; that there has been no perversion of his faculties; no loss of some original and guiding disposition or tendency of his mind. It cannot be credited that men are now what Adam was, when he first opened his eyes on the wonders of creation and the glories of God. Reason, Scripture, and experience, therefore, all concur in support of the common doctrine of the Christian world, that the race fell in Adam, lost their original rectitude, and became prone to evil as the sparks fly upward.
This doctrine has so strong a witness in the religious experi ence of Christians, that it is not wonderful that it has been almost universally received. Individual opponents and objectors have indeed appeared, from time to time; but it is believed that no organized sect, bearing the Christian name, the Socinians excepted, have ever discarded it from the articles of their faith. It is so intimately connected with the doctrines of divine influ ence and redemption, that they have almost uniformly been held or rejected together. It has indeed often been said, because the term original sin was first used by Augustine, that the doctrine itself took its origin with him; although perfectly synonymous expressions occur so constantly in the writings of the earlier Fathers. Equally destitute of foundation is the assertion, so often made, that Augustine was driven to his views on this subject by his controversy with Pelagius. He had arrived at all the conclusions on which he ultimately rested, at least ten years before any controversy on the subject.* He was led to these results by the study of the Scriptures, and by his own personal experience. His earlier views on the intimately related doctrines of depravity, ability, dependence, and grace, were all modified as he became more thoroughly acquainted with the word of God, and with his own heart. When lie passed what Neander calls the crisis of his religious history, he saw clearly the depth of the evil which existed within him, and had corresponding views of the necessity and efficacy of the grace of God, by which alone this evil could be removed.
With regard to Pelagius, the case was just the reverse. His views of depravity being superficial, he had very high ideas of the ability of man, and very low conceptions of the operations of the Spirit of God. The latter, as the author just referred to strikingly remarks, was the representative and champion of uthe general, moral, and religious consciousness of men;" the other, of '-the peculiar nature of Christian consciousness." A doctrine which enters so much into the experience of all Christ ians, and which has maintained its ground in all ages and sections of the Church, must have its deep foundations in the testimony of God, and the consciousness of men.
III. It is included in the doctrines already stated, that man kind lii»ve had a fair probation in Adam, their head and repre sentative, and that we are not to consider God as placing them on their probation, in the very first dawn of their intellectual and moral existence, and under circumstances (or "a divine constitution") which secure the certainty of their sinning. Such a probation could hardly deserve the name.
IV. It is also included in the doctrine of this portion of Scripture, that mankind is an unit, in the sense in which an armv, in distinction from a mob, is one; or as a nation, a com munity, or a family, is one, in opposition to a mere fortuitous collection of individuals, Hence the frequent and extensive transfer of the responsibility and consequences of the acts of the heads of these communities to their several members, and from one member to others. This is a law which pervades the whole moral government and providential dispensations of God. We are not like the separate grains of wheat in a measure, but links in a complicated chain. All influence the destiny of each, and each iniluences the destiny of all.
V. The design of the apostle being to illustrate the nature and to confirm the certainty of our justification, it is the leading doctrine of this passage, that our acceptance with God is founded neither on our faith nor our good Avorks, but on the obedience or righteousness of Christ, which to us is a free "iiL This is the fundamental doctrine of the gospel, vs. ]V,, 11).
VI. The dreadful evil of sin is best seen in the fall of Adam, and in the cross of Christ. By the one offence of one man, what a waste of ruin has been spread over the whole world! How far beyond conception the misery that one act occasioned! There was no adequate remedy for this evil but the death of the Sou of God, vs, 12,15,10, &c.
VII. It is the prerogative of God to bring good out of evil, and to make the good triumph over the evil. From the fall has sprung redemption, and from redemption results which eternity alone can disclose, vs. 20, 21.
1. Every man should bow down before God, under the humi liating consciousness that he is a member of an apostate race; the son of a rebellious parent; born estranged from God, and exposed to his displeasure, vs. 12, 15, 16, &c.
2. Every man should thankfully embrace the means provided for his restoration to the Divine favour, viz. "the abundance of grace and gift of righteousness," ver. 17.
3. Those that perish, perish not because the sin of Adam has brought them under condemnation; nor because no adequate provision has been made for their recovery; but because they will not receive the offered mercy, ver. 17.
4. For those who refuse the proffered righteousness of Christ, and insist on trusting to their own righteousness, the evil of sin and God's determination to punish it, show there can be no rea sonable hope; while, for those who humbly receive this gift, there can be no rational ground of fear, ver. 15.
5. If, without personal participation in the sin of Adam, all •men are subject to death, may we not hope that, without perj sonal acceptance of the righteousness of Christ, all who die in I infancy are saved?
6. We should never yield to temptation on the ground that the sin to which we are solicited appears to be a trifle, (merely eating a forbidden fruit;) or that it is but for OXCE. Remember the ONE offence of one man. How often has a man, or a family, been ruined for ever by ONE sin! ver. 12.
7. Our dependence on Jesus Christ is entire, and our obliga tions to him are infinite. It is through his righteousness, with out the shadoAV of merit on our own part, that we are justified. lie alone was adequate to restore the ruins of the fall. From those ruins he has built up a living temple, a habitation of God through the Spirit.
8. We must experience the operation of the law, in producing the knowledge and conviction of sin, in order to be prepared for the appreciation and reception of the work of Christ. The Church and the world were prepared, by the legal dispensation of the Old Testament, for the gracious dispensation of the New, ver. '20.
9. "\Vc should open our hearts to the large prospects of purity and blessedness presented in the gospel; the victory of grace over sin and death, which is to be consummated in the triumph of true religion, and in the eternal salvation of those multitudes out of every tribe and kindred, which no man can number,
As the gospel reveals the only effectual method of justification, so also it alone can secure the sanct iiication of men. To exhibit this truth is the object of this and the following chapter. The sixth is partly argumentative, and partly exhortatory. In vs. 1 — 11, the apostle shows how unfounded is the objection, that gratuitous justification leads to the indulgence of sin. In vs. IL! — 2o, he exhorts Christians to live agreeably to the nature and design of the gospel; and presents various considerations adapted to secure their obedience to this exhortation.
THE most common, the most plausible, and vet Ilie most unfounded objection to tbe doctrine of just ideation bv faith, is, that it allows men to live in sin that grace mav abound. This object ion arises from ignorance of the doct rine in <juest ion, and of the nature and means of sanct ill eat ion. It is so preposterous in the eyes of;ui enlightened believer, that Paul deals witli it rather by exclamations at its absurdity, than with logical argu ments. The main idea of this section is, that such is the nature of the believer's union with Christ, that his living in sin is not merely an inconsistency, but a contradiction in terms, as much 60 as to speak of a live dead man, or a good bad one. Union with Christ, being the only source of holiness, cannot be the source of sin. In ver. 1, the apostle presents the objection. In vcr. 2, he declares it to be unfounded, and exclaims at its absurdity. In vs. 3, 4, he exhibits the true nature and design of Christianity, as adapted and intended to produce newness of life. In vs. 5 — 7, he shows that such is the nature of union with Christ, that it is impossible for any one to share the benefits of his death, without being conformed to his life. Such being the case, he shows, vs. 8 — 11, that as Christ's death on account of sin was for once, never to be repeated, and his life, a life devoted to God; so our separation from sin is final, and our life a life consecrated to God.
VERSE 1. What shall we say then? What inference is to be drawn from the doctrine of the gratuitous acceptance of sinners, or justification without works, by faith in the righteousness of Christ?
{ Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? i. e. be more conspicuously displayed. The form in which the objection to the apostle's doctrine is here presented, is evidently borrowed fi-om the close of the preceding chapter. Paul had there spoken of the grace of the gospel being the more conspicuous and abundant, in proportion to the evils which it removes. It is no fair inference from the fact that God has brought so much good out of the fall and sinfulness of men, that they may continue in sin. Neither can it be inferred from the fact that he accepts of sinners on the ground of the merit of Christ, instead of their own, (which is one way in which grace abounds,) that they may sin without restraint.
VERSE 2. God forbid, //.^ -fzvoiTo, let it not be. Paul's usual mode of expressing denial and abhorrence. Such an inference is not to be thought of. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any lonyer therein? The relative o'lrevsz is as usual causative, and it stands first, for thf sake of emphasis; dxs&duojjieu does not mean are dead, nor have died, but died. It refers to a spe cific act in our past history: 'Since we died to sin, how can wel still live in it?' The act which in its nature was a dying to sin, | was our accepting of Christ as our Saviour. That act involves in it not only a separation from sin, but a deadness to it. Xo man can apply to Christ to be delivered from sin, in order that he may live in it. Deliverance from sin, as offered by Christ, and as accepted by the believer, is not mere deliverance from its penalty, but from its power. We turn from sin to God when we receive Christ as a Saviour. It is, therefore, as the apo>tle argues, a contradiction in terms, to say that gratuitous justifica tion is a license to sin, as much as to say that death is life, or that dying to a thing is living in it. Instead of giving r/y (Ltu/.oTta the usual force of the dative, to, or at if respects, sin, Storr, Flatt, and many other commentators, say it sin mid be understood as in v. 1">, xi. 20, on <i<\>ount <>f. ' How shall we, who in Christ, died on <ii'<-<,unt of sin, i. e. who suffered vicari ously its penalty, inasmuch as we were crucified in him, live any longer therein?'
In favour of this interpretation, it is urged, 1. That this phrase must express the same idea with the subsequent clauses, buried with him, ver. 4; axnoc'mt<>d hi hi* <l<'(tt/i, ver. ~>; d<'«<l with Christ, ver. 8. 2. That it must have this meaning in ver. 10, where it is said of Christ, In'. <licd unto *///. i. e. on account of sin. >}. The other interpretation, 'How shall we, who have renounced sin, live any longer therein?' it is said, is not suited to the apostle's object; because it dors not give any adequate answer to the objection presented in ver. 1. In order to answer that objection, it was necessary to show not merely that the believer had renounced sin, but that the doctrine of gratuitous justification effectually secures this renunciation. According to the second interpretation, this answer is plain and conclusive: ' How shall we, who have died on account of sin, live any longer therein? If we are regarded and treated by God, in virtue of our union with Christ, and if we regard our selves, as having suffered and died with him on account of sin, we cannot but look upon it as hateful, and deserving of punish ment.'