mar, ought to have been joined to 33D as the object of the going about.
unbound”) has also its difficulty. The verb PM signifies to bind together, to chain; the bibl. Heb. uses it of the binding of prisoners, Nah. 111. 18, cf. Isa. xl. 19; the post-bibl. Heb. of binding = shutting up (contrast of nna, Pesikta, ed. Buber, 176a, whence Mezia 1078, ΣΡ.) ἐξ), a wall and enclosure); the Arab. of shutting up and closing a hole, rent, split (¢.g. murtatik, a plant with its flower-buds as yet shut up; rutik, inaccessibleness). The Targumist’ accordingly understands PN of binding = lameness (palsy); Rashi and Aben Ezra, of shrivelling; this may be possible, however, for P73, used of a “cord,” the meaning that first presents itself, is “to be firmly bound;” but this affords no appropriate sense, and we have therefore to give to the Niph. the contrasted meaning of setting free, discatenare (Parchon, Kimchi); this, however, is not justified by examples, for a privat. Niph. is unexampled, Ewald, ὃ 1216; 2353, Job xi 12, does not mean to be deprived of heart (understanding), but to gain heart (understanding). Since, however, we still need here the idea of setting loose or tearing asunder (LXX. ἀνατραπῇ; Symm. κοπῆναι; Syr. popny, from PDB, abscindere; Jerome, rumpatur), we have only the choice of interpreting yérathég either, in spite of the appearance to the contrary, in the meaning of constringitur, of a violent drawing together of the cord stretched out lengthwise; or, with Pfannkuche, Gesen., Ewald, to read PN3. (“is torn asunder”), which one expects, after Isa. xxxill. 20; cf. Judg. xvi. 9, Jer. x. 20. Hitzig reaches the same, for he explains PM=?P 7M, from (Arab.) kharak, to tear asunder (of the sound of the tearing’); and Bottcher, by adopting the reading ΡΠ", but without any support in Heb. and Chald. wsus log. mpa, which is applied to the second figure, is certainly* a vessel of a round form (from ΩΣ to roll, revolve round), like the ΠΡ which received the oil and conducted it to the seven lamps of the candlestick in Zech. iv.; but to understand 77M of the running out of the oil not expressly named (Luther: “and the golden fountain runs out”) would be contrary to the usus log.; it is the metapl. form for 7), et confringitur, as Y9, Isa. xlii. 4, for 7, from Y¥%, cogn. yyn, Ps. ii. 9, whence 73, 60, the regularly formed Niph. (the fut. of which, yi0", Ezek. xxix. 7). We said that oil is not expressly named. But perhaps it is meant by 2733. The gullah above the candlestick which Zechariah saw was, according to ver. 12, provided with two golden pipes, in which were two olive trees standing on either side, which sunk therein the tuft-like end of their branches, of which it is said that they emptied out of themselves hazzahav into the oil vessels. Here it is manifest that hazzahav means, in the one instance, the precious metal of: which the pipes are formed; and in the other, the fluid gold of the oil contained in the olive branches. Accordingly, Hitzig understands gullath hazzahav here also; for he takes gullah as a figure of the body, the golden oil as a figure of the soul, and the silver cord as a figure of vital energy.
Thus, with Hitz. understanding gullath hazzahev after the passage in Zechariah, I have correctly represented the meaning of the figures in my Psychol. p. 228, as follows:-—‘“ The silver cord = the soul directing and bearing the body as living; the lamp hanging by this silver cord=the body animated by the soul, and dependent on it; the golden oil=the spirit, of which it is said, Prov. xx. 27, that it is a lamp of God.” I think that this interpretation of the golden oil commends itself in preference to Zockler’s interpretation, which is adopted by Dachsel, of the precious fluidwm of the blood; for if hazzahav is a metaphorical designation of oil, we have to think of it as the material for burning and light; but the principle of bright life in man is the spirit (rwahh hhayim or nishmath hhayim); and in the passage in Zechariah also, oil, which makes the candlestick give light, is a figure of the spirit (ver. 6, ki am-b’ruhhi). But, as one may also suppose, it is not probable that here, with the same genit. connection, }D37 is to be understood of the material and the quality; and hazzahav, on the contrary, of the contents. A golden vessel is, according to its most natural meaning, a vessel which is made of gold, thus a vessel of a precious kind. A golden vessel cannot certainly be broken in pieces, but we need not therefore understand an earthenware vessel only gilded, as by a silver cord is to be understood only that which has a silver line running through it (Gesen. in the 7,168.); 339 may also denote that which is violently crushed or broken, Isa. xlii. 3; cf. Judg.ix. 53. 1 gullath hazzahav, however, designates a golden vessel, the reference of the figure to the body, and at the same time of the silver cord to the vital energy or the soul, is then excluded,—for that which animates stands yet above that which is animated,—the two metallic figures in this their distribution cannot be comprehended in this reference. We have thus to ask, since gullath hazzahav is not the body itself: What in the human body is compared to a silver cord and to a golden vessel? What, moreover, to a pitcher at the fountain, and to a wheel or a windlass? Winzer settles this question by finding in the two double figures only in general the thoughts represented: antequam vita ex tenut quasi filo suspensa pereat, and (which is essentially the same) antequam machina corporis destruatur. Gurlitt also protests against the allegorical explanation of the details, but he cannot refrain from interpreting more specially than Winzer. Two momenta, he says, there are which, when a man dies, in the most impressive way present themselves to view: the extinction of consciousness, and the perfect cessation, complete ruin, of the bodily organism. The extinction of consciousness is figuratively represented by the golden lamp, which is hung up by a silver cord in the midst of a house or tent, and now, since the cord which holds it is broken, it falls down and is shattered to pieces, so that there is at once deep darkness; the destruction of the bodily organism, by a fountain, at which the essential parts of its machinery, the pitcher and windlass, are broken and rendered for ever useless. This interpretation of Gurlitt’s affords sufficient support to the expectation of the allegorical meaning with which we approached ver. 6; and we would be satisfied therewith, if one of the figures did not oppose us, without seeking long for a more special allegorical meaning: the pitcher at the fountain or well (73, not 137, because determined by ’al-hammabw’a) is without doubt the heart which beats to the last breath of the dying man, which is likened to a pitcher which, without intermission, receives and again sends forth the blood. That the blood flows through the body like living water is a fact cognizable and perceptible without the knowledge of its course; fountain (1p) and blood appear also elsewhere as associated ideas, Lev. xii. 7; and nishbar, as here v‘tishshaber, used of a pitcher, is a usual scriptural word for the heart brought into a state of death, or near to death, Jer. xxiii. 9; Ps. lxix. 21. From this gullath hazzahav must also have a special allegorical sense; and if, as Gurlitt supposes, the golden vessel that is about to be destroyed is a figure of the perishing self-consciousness (whereby it is always doubtful that, with this interpretation, the characteristic feature of light in the figure is wanting), then it is natural to go further, and to understand the golden vessel directly of the head of a man, and to compare the breaking of the skull, Judg. ix. 53, expressed by vataritz eth-gulgolto, with the words here before us, vatharutz gullath hazzahav; perhaps by gullath the author thought of the cogn—both as to root and meaning—nbsd3; but, besides, the comparison of the head, the bones of which form an oval bowl, with gudlath is of itself also natural. It is true that, according to the ancient view, not the head, but the heart, is the seat of the life of the spirit; “in the heart, Ephrem said (Opp. Syr. ii. 316), the thinking spirit (chuschobo) acts as in its palace;” and the understanding, the Arabians’ also say, sits in the heart, and thus between the nbs. Everything by which 1w2 and ws») is affected—thus, briefly formulated, the older bibl. idea—comes in the 25 into the light of consciousness. But the Book of Koheleth belongs to a time in which spiritual-psychical actions began to be placed in mediate causal relation with the head; the Book of Daniel represents this newer mode of conception, 11. 28, iv. 2, vii. 10, vil. 15. The image of the monarchies seen in Nebuchadnezzar’s dream, il. 32, 38, had a golden head; the head is described as golden, as it is the membrum praecipuum of the human body; it is compared to gold as to that which is most precious, as, on the other hand, wx is used as a metaphorical designation of that which is most precious. The breaking to pieces of the head, the death-b!ow which it receives, shows itself in this, that he who is sick unto death is unable to hold his head erect, that it sinks down against his will according to the law of gravity; as also in this, that the countenance assumes the aspect which we designate the facies hippocratica, and that feeling is gradually destroyed; but, above all, that is thought of which Ovid says of one who was dying: et resupinus humum moribundo vertice pulsat.
If we now further inquire regarding the meaning of the silver cord, nothing can obviously be meant by it which is locally above the golden bowl which would be hanging under it; also yp2n nba itself certainly admits no such literal antitype——the concavity of the nbsbs is below, and that of a nba, on the other hand, is above. The silver cord will be found if a component part of the structure of the body is pointed to, which stands in a mutually related connection with the head and the brain, the rending asunder of which brings death with it. Now, as is well known, dying finally always depends on the brain and the upper spinal marrow; and the ancients already interpreted the silver cord of the spinal marrow, which is called by a figure terminologically related to the silver cord, 777#0 ΘΠ (the spinal cord), and as a cord-like lengthening of the brain into the spinal channel could not be more appropriately named; the centre is grey, but the external coating is white. We do not, however, maintain that hakkeséph points to the white colour; but the spinal marrow is related, in the matter of its value for the life of man, to the brain as silver is to gold. Since not a violent but a natural death is the subject, the fatal stroke that falls on the spinal marrow is not some kind of mechanical injury, but, according as PN {is unbound] is explained or is changed into PN3 [is torn asunder], is to be thought of either as constriction = shrinking together, consuming away, exhaustion; or as unchaining = paralysis or disabling; or as tearing asunder = destruction of the connection of the individual parts. The emendation pn» most commends itself; it remains, however, possible that pnv is meant in the sense of morbid contraction (vid. Rashi); at any rate, the fate of the m3 is the consequence of the fate of the San, which carries and holds the gullah, and does not break without at the same time bringing destruction on it; as also the brain and the spinal marrow stand in a relation of solidarity to each other, and the head receives’ from the spinal marrow (as distinguished from the so-called prolonged marrow) the death-stroke. As the silver cord and the bowl, so the pitcher and the well and the wheel stand in interchangeable relation to each other. We do not say: the wheel at the fountain, as is translated by Hitz., Ewald, and others; for (1) the fountain is called 783, not 713 (ΟΝ 2), which, according to the usage (vid. Hitz. under Jer. vii. 9), signifies a pit, and particularly a hole, for holding water, a cistern, reservoir; but for this there was no need for a wheel, and it is also excluded by that which had to be represented; (2) the expression galgal él-habor is purposely not used, but hagalgal el-habor, that we may not take él-habor as virtual adj. to galgal (the wheel being at the 13), but as the designation of the place into which the wheel falls when it is shattered. Rightly, the LX X. renders ’al-hammabu'a by ἐπὶ τῇ πηγῆ, and el-habor by ἐπὶ τὸν λάκκον. The figure of a well (mabbu’a) formed by means of digging, and thus deep, is artistically conceived; out of this the water is drawn by means of a pitcher (13, Gen. xxiv. 14, a word as curiously according with the Greek κάδος as those mentioned in pp. 12 and 74, whence (Arab.) kadd, to exhaust, to pitcher-out, as it were; syn. ‘77, a vessel for drawing out water; Assyr. di-lu, the zodiacal sign of the water-carrier), and to facilitate this there is a wheel or windlass placed above (Syr. gigla d*vira), by which a rope is wound up and down (vid. Smith's Bibl. Dict. under “ well”).? The Midrash refers to the deep draw-
‘ Many interpreters (lately Ewald, Hengst, Zockl., Taylor, and others) understand the silver cord of the thread of life; the spinal marrow is, without any figure, this thread of life itself.
* Wetzstein remarks, that it is translated by ‘‘ cylinder” better than by ‘‘ wheel,” since the galgal is here not at a river, but over a draw-well.
well of the hill town of Sepporis, which was supplied with such rollers serving as a pulley (polyspast). Wheel and pitcher stand in as close mutual relation as air and blood, which come into contact in the lungs. The wheel is the figure of the breathing organ, which expands and contracts (winds and unwinds) itself like a draw-rope by its inhaling and exhaling breath. The throat, as the organ of respiration and speech, is called {i73 (Ps. οχν. 7) and nina (vid. under Prov. i. 9), from 773 or 73, to draw, σπᾶν (τὸν aépa, Wisd. vii. 3). When this wheel makes its last laborious revolution, there is heard the death-rattle. There is a peculiar rattling sound, which they who once hear it never forget, when the wheel swings to an end—the so-called choking rheum, which consists in this, that the secretion which the dying cannot cough up moves up and down in the air-passage, and finally chokes him. When thus the breathings become always weaker, and sometimes are interrupted for a minute, and at last cease altogether, there takes place what is here designated as the breaking to pieces of the wheel in the pit within—-the life is extinguished, he who has breathed his last will be laid as a corpse in the grave (nia, Ps. xxviii. 1, and frequently), the σῶμα has become a πτῶμα (Mark vi. 29; cf. Num. xiv. 32). The dust, 14. the dust of which the body was formed, goes back to the earth again like as it was (originally dust), and the spirit returns to God who gave it. 2 subordinates itself to the ’ad asher lo, also in the form as subjunct.; the interchange of the full and the abbreviated forms occurs, however, elsewhere in the indic. sense, e.g. Job xii. 27; Ewald, ὃ 3430. Shuv ’al occurs also at 2 Chron. xxx. 9; and OX and °Y interchange without distinction in the more modern language; but here, as also at 6), not without intention, the way downwards is to be distinguished from the way upwards (cf. iii, 21). MND is=7 WRI, instar ejus quod fuit. The body returns to the dusk Gena which it was taken, Gen. i. 19, to the dust of its original material, Ps. civ. 29; and the spirit goes back to the God of its origin, to whom it belongs.
We have purposely not interrupted our interpretation of the enigmatical figures of ver. 6 by the citation and criticism of diverging views, and content ourselves here with a specification of the oldest expositions. The interpretation of Shabbath 152a does not extend to ver. 6. The Midrash says of the silver cord: mw win ¥ (as later, Rashi, Aben Ezra, and many others), of the golden vessel: ndada 1 (as we), and it now adds only more in jest: “the throat which swallows up the gold and lets the silver run through.” The pitcher becoming leaky must be D9, the belly, which three days after death is wont to burst. And as for hagalgal, reference is made to the draw-wells of Sepporis; so for el havor, after Job xxi. 33, to the clods of Tiberias: he lies deep below, “ like those clods of the deep-lying Tiberias.” The Targ. takes its own way, without following the Midrash, and translates: “ before thy tongue [this of San] is bound and thou art unable to speak any more, and the brain of thy head [this the nds] is shattered, and thy gall [=15] is broken with thy liver [= wann], and thy body [= biban] hastens away [72 of 17] into the grave.” These interpretations have at least historical and linguistic value; they also contain separate correct renderings. <A quodlibet of other interpretations’ is found in my Psychol. p. 229, and in Zéckler, ad loc. A principal error in these consists in this, that they read Koheleth as if he had been a disciple of Boerhaave, and Harvey, and other masters. Wunderbar in his bibl.-Talm. medicin (1850) takes all in earnest, that the author knew already of the nervous system and the circulation of the blood; for, as he himself says, there is nothing new under the sun. As far as concerns my opinion, says Oetinger in his exposition (Sammt. Schrift. herausg. von Ehmann, IV. p. 254), I dare not affirm that Solomon had a knowledge systematis nervolymphatici, as also circuli sanguinis, such as learned physicians now possess; yet I believe that the Holy Spirit spake thus through Solomon, that what in subsequent times was discovered as to these matters might be found under these words. This judgment also goes too far; the figure of death which Koheleth presents contains no anticipation of modern discoveries; yet it is not without its value for the historical development of anthropology, for science and poetry combine in it; it is as true to fact as it is poetically beautiful.
The author has now reached the close. His Koheleth-Solomon has made all earthly things small, and at last remains seated on this dust-heap of vanitas vanitatum. The motto-like saying, i. 2,is here repeated as a quod erat demonstrandum, like a summary conclusion. The book, artistically constructed in whole and in its parts, comes to a close, rounding itself off as in a circle in the epiphonema:
Ver. 8. “ O vanity of vanities, saith Koheleth, all is vain.” If we here look back to ver. 7, that which is there said of the spirit can be no consolation. With right, Hofmann in his Schriftbeweis, I. 490, says: “That it is the personal spirit of a man which returns to God; and that it returns to God without losing its consciousness, is an idea foreign to this proverb.” Also, Psychol. p. 410, it is willingly conceded that the author wished here to
1 Geiger in the Deut. Morg. Zeitsch. xxvii. 800, translates xii. 6 arbitrarily: and the stone-lid (59) in the sense of the Mish.-Targ. $y) presses on the grave.
express, first, only the fact, in itself comfortless, that the component parts of the human body return whence they came. But the comfortless averse of the proverb is yet not without a consoling reverse. For what the author, 111. 21, represents as an unsettled possibility, that the spirit of a dying man goes not downwards like that of a beast, but upwards, he here affirms as an actual truth.’ From this, that he thus finally decides the question as an advantage to a man above a beast, it follows of necessity that the return of the spirit to God cannot be thought of as a resumption of the spirit into the essence of God (resorption or remanation), as the cessation ot his independent existence, although, as also at Job xxxiv. 14, Ps. οἷν. 29, the nearest object of the expression is directed to the ruin of the soul-corporeal life of man which directly follows the return of the spirit to God. The same conclusion arises from this, that the idea of the return of the spirit to God, in which the author at last finds rest, cannot yet stand in a subordinate place with reference to the idea of Hades, above which it raises itself; with the latter the spirit remains indestructible, although it has sunk into a silent, inactive life. And in the third place, that conclusion flows from the fact that the author is forced by the present contradiction between human experience and the righteousness of God to the postulate ofa judgment finally settling these contradictions, 111. 17, xi. 9, οἵ, xii. 14, whence it immediately follows that the continued existence of the spirit is thought of as a well-known truth (Psychol. p. 127). The Targ. translates, not against the spirit of the book: “the spirit will return to stand in judgment before God, who gave it to thee.” In this connection of thoughts Koheleth says more than what Lucretius says (11. 998 ss.):
Cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante,
In terras, et quod missum est ex aetheris oris
Id rursum caeli rellatum templa receptant. A comforting thought lies in the words ΠΣ Wx. The gifts of God are on His side ἀμεταμέλητα (Rom. xi. 29). When He receives back that which was given, He receives it back to restore it again in another manner. Such thoughts connect themselves with the reference to God the Giver. Meanwhile the author next aims at showing the vanity of man, viz. of man as living here. Body and spirit are separated, and depart each in its own direction. Not only the world and the labours by which man is encompassed are “ vain,” and not only is that which man has and does and experiences “vain,” but also
1 In the Rig-Veda that which is immortal in man is called manas; the later language calls it dtman; vid. Muir in the Asiatic Journal, 1865, p. 505.
man himself as such is vain, and thus—this is the facit—all is ban, “ vain.”
In an unexpected manner there now follows a postscript. Since the book closes with the epiphonema xii. 8 as having reached the intended goal, the supposition that what follows xu. 8 is from another hand is more natural than the contrary. Of the question of genuineness there cannot be here properly anything said, for only that which is not what it professes to be and ought to be, is spurious; the postscript is certainly according to tradition an integral part of the Book of Koheleth (Bullock), but not as an original organic formal part of it, and still less does it expressly bear self-evidence of this. At the least, those who regard Solomon as the author of the book ought to contend against the recognition in xii. 9 ff.of an appendix by a later hand. Hahn, however, regards the same Solomon who speaks in ver. 8 as continuing to speak in ver. 9, for he interprets 198, which, however, only means znquit, as perf., looking back to the completed book, and regards this retrospect as continued in ver. 9 ff., without being hindered by the interchange of the J and of the following historical he, which is contained in “ saith Koheleth.” Dale even ventures the assertion, that the Book of Koheleth could have closed with the unsatisfying pure negative, ver. 8, as little as the Gospel of Mark with “ and they were afraid” (xvi, 8). As if ver. 13 ἢ. expressed postulates not already contained in the book itself! The epilogue has certainly manifestly the object of recommending the author of the book, Koheleth-Solomon, and of sealing the contents ofthe book. If Solomon himself were the author, the epilogue would stand in the same relation to the book as John xxi. 24f. to the fourth Gospel, of the Johannean origin of which a voice from the apostolic church there bears witness.’
It is a serious anachronism when modern interpreters of Scripture occupy the standpoint of the old, who take the name of the man after whom the book is entitled, without more ado, as the name of its author from first to last.2 To what childish puerilities a bigotry so uncritical descends is seen in the case of Christ.
1 Hoelemann, in Abth. 11. of his Bibel-Studien (1860), draws a parallel between these two epilogues; he regards them as original formal parts of the Solomonic Koheleth and of the Johannean Gospel, and seeks to prove that they stand in more than external and accidental relation to the two works respectively.
* Thus John Miller, in his Commentary on the Proverbs (New York, 1872), regards Solomon as the author of the entire Book of Proverbs and also of Ecclesi-
Fried. Bauer (1732). In this section, vers. 9-12, he says Solomon turns especially to his son Rehoboam, and delivers ta him this Solennel-discourse or sermon as an instruction for his future life. He recommends it [the sermon] at once on account of the author, ver. 9, and of its contents, ver. 10, which accord, ver. 11, with his other writings, and from which altogether Rehoboam could find sufficient information, so that to write to him several books would be unnecessary. After this apostrophe to his son the preacher turns round to the entire auditorio, and addresses them in ynws boa, But we are all permitted to hear what is the final aim and intention of this sermon: Fear thou God, and keep His commandments; for such ought every man to be, etc.
A rationalism not less fruitful in wonderful conceits appeared over against this dreamy irrationalism. Ddéderlein (1784) says of Koheleth: “ As it appears, so the author feigned, that this was a lecture or treatise which Solomon delivered before his literary academy; for this academy I am inclined to understand under the name ‘ Koheleth.” The epilogue appears to hint as an appendage by another hand. Such is the opinion also of J. E. Ch. Schmidt (1794), Bertholdt (in his Hinlevt. 1812 ff.), Umbreit (1818, 20), and Knobel (1836), who maintain that this appendage is aimless, in form as in doctrine, out of harmony with the book, revealing by the “ endless book-making ” a more recent time, and thus is an addition by a later author. This negative critical result Gratz (1871) has sought, following Krochmal (in his More nebuche hazeman, 1851, 54), to raise to a positive result. Vers. 9-11 are to him as an apology of the Book of Koheleth, and vers. 12-14 as a clause defining the collection of the Hagiographa, which is completed by the reception into it of the Book of Koheleth; and this bipartite epilogue as an addition belonging to the period of the Synod of Jabneh, about a.p. 90 (vid. above, p. 189).
If, nevertheless, we regard this epilogue as a postscript by the author of the book himself, we have not only Herzfeld on our side, who has given his verdict against all Knobel’s arguments, but also Hitzig, who (Hilgenfeld’s Zeitsch. 1872, p. 566) has rejected Gritz’ Herod-hypothesis, as well as also his introduction of the epilogue into the history of the canon, or, as Geiger (Jiid. Zeitsch. 1872, p. 123) has expressed himself, has dealt with it according to its astes. His interpretation of Scripture proceeds on the fundamental principle, in itself commendable, that the Scripture never expresses trivialities (‘‘ each text must be a brilliant”); but it is not to be forgotten that the O. T., in relation to the high school of the New, is in reality a trivium, and that the depth of the words of Scripture is not everywhere the same, but varies according to the author and the times.
merit. Also in Bloch’s monograph on the Book of Koheleth (1872) there are many striking arguments against placing the authorship of the book in the Herod-Mishn. period, although the view of this critic, that the book contains notes of Solomon’s with interpolations, and an epilogue by the collector, who sought to soften the impression of the gloomy pessimism of these notes, is neither cold nor hot.
We have already (p. 206) shown that the epilogue is written quite in the same style as the book itself; its language is like that of the chronicler; it approaches the idiom of the Mishna, but, with reference to it, is yet somewhat older. That the first part of the epilogue, vers. 9-11, serves an important end, is also proved (p. 206), — Ὁ establishes the book as a production of the Chokma, which had Solomon as its pattern; and the second part, vers. 12-14, bears on it the stamp of this Chokma, for it places all the teaching of the book under the double watchword: “Fear God,” and “ There is a judgment” (Job xxviii. 28, xix. 29; cf. Eccles. v. 6, xi. 9). In the book, Koheleth-Solomon speaks, whose mask the author puts on; here, he speaks, letting the mask fall off, of Koheleth. That in his time (the Persian) too much was done in the way of making books, we may well believe. In addition to authors by profession, there have always been amateurs; the habit of much writing is old, although in the course of time it has always assumed greater dimensions. A complaint in reference to this sounds strange, at least from the mouth of an author who has contented himself with leaving to posterity a work so small, though important. We nowhere encounter any necessity for regarding the author of the book and of the epilogue as different persons. The spirit and tone of the book and of the epilogue are one. The epilogue seals only the distinction between the pessimism of the book and the modern pessimism, which is without God and without a future.
Ver. 9. In connection with ver. 8, where Koheleth has spoken his last word, the author, who has introduced him as speaking hitherto, continues: “ And, moreover, because Koheleth was wise, he taught the people knowledge; he applied and searched out and formed many proverbs.” The postscript begins with “and” because it is connected with the concluding words of the book—only externally, however; nothing is more unwarrantable than to make ver. 8 the beginning of the postscript on account of the vav. The LXX. translate καὶ περισσὸν (Venet. περιττὸν) ὅτι; as Hitz.: “10 remains (to be said) that Koheleth was a wise man,” etc.; and Dale may be right, that 1m is in this sense as subj., pointed with Zakeph gadhol (cf. Gen. xvi. 16, xx. 4, and the obj. thus pointed, Ex. xxiii. 3). But that Koheleth was “a wise man” is nothing remaining to be said, for as such he certainly speaks in the whole book from beginning to end; the “iy, unconnected, following, shows that this his property is presupposed as needing no further testimony. But untenable also is the translation: So much the greater Koheleth was as a wise man, so much the more, etc. (Heinem., Siidfeld); tiv does not signify eo magis; the Heb. language has a different way of expressing such an intensification: won Syma Hy’ Many Syn 55, ie. the higher the position is which one assumes, so much the greater are the temptations to which he is exposed. Rightly, Luther: “This same preacher was not only wise, but,” etc. 1) signifies, vii. 11, “and an advance (benefit, gain);” here δ΄ In, “and something going beyond this, that,” etc.—thought of as accus.-adv.: “going beyond this, that = moreover, because” (Gesen., Knobel, Vaih., Ginsb., Gritz); vid. above, p. 192. Thus ’od is in order, which introduces that which goes beyond the property and position of a “wise man” as such. That which goes beyond does not consist in this, that he taught the people knowledge, for that is just the meaning of the name Koheleth; the statement which ’od introduces is contained in the concluding member of the compound sentence; the after-word begins with this, that it designates the Koheleth who appears in the more esoteric book before us as 03n, as the very same person who also composed the comprehensive people’s book, the Mishle. He has taught the people knowledge; for he has placed, 6. formed (“ stellen,” to place, as “ Schriftsteller”” = author; modern Heb. 1292; Arab. musanni/’),’ many proverbs, as the fruit of mature reflection and diligent research. The obj. m’shalim harbéh belongs only to tiggén, which ἀσυνδέτως (according to the style of the epilogue and of the book, as is shown above, p. 207) follows the two preparative mental efforts, whose resultat it was. Rightly, as to the syntax, Zockler, and, as to the matter, Hitzig: “Apparently the author has here not 1 Kings v. 12, but the canonical Book of Proverbs in his eye.” The language is peculiar. Not only is {3 exclusively peculiar (vid. above, p. 196) to the Book of Koheleth, but also jt, perpendere (cf. Assyr. uzunu, reflection), to consider, and the Pik. ΡΠ, Regarding the position of harbeh, vid. above, p. 230.?
Ver. 10. It is further said of Koheleth, that he put forth efforts not only to find words of a pleasant form, but, above all, of exact truth: “ Koheleth strove to find words of pleasantness, and, written in sincerity, words of truth.” The unconnected beginning biggesh Koheleth is like dibbarti ani, 1. 16, etc., in the book itself. Three objects follow limtso. But Hitz. reads the inf. absol. 3\N3) instead of 333), and translates: to find pleasing words, and correctly to write πάν of truth. Such a continuance of the inf. const. by the inf. absol. is possible; 1 Sam. xxv. 26, cf. 31. But why should 3inn not be the continuance of the finite (Aq., Syr.), as eg. at vill. 9, and that in the nearest adverbial sense: e¢ scribendo quidem sincere verba veritatis, 1.6. he strove, according to his best knowledge and conscience, to write true words, at the same time also to find out pleasing words; thus sought to connect truth as to the matter with beauty as to the manner? V‘chathuv needs no modification in its form. But it is not to be translated: and that which was right was written by him; for the ellipsis is inadmissible, and ἢ 2) is not correct Heb. Rightly the LXX., καὶ γεγραμμένον εὐθύτητος. an signifies “ written,” and may also, as the name of the Hagiographa D’and shows, signify “a writing;” kakathuvah, 2 Chron. xxx. 5, is = “in accordance with the writing;” and bo kakathuv, 2 Chron. xxx. 18, “contrary to the writing;” in the post-bibl. the phrase TO’ ANI — ἡ γραφὴ λέγει, is used. The objection made by Ginsburg, that kathuv never means, as /*thav does, “a writing,” is thus nugatory. However, we do not at all here need this subst. meaning, an>) is neut. particip., and ὍΔ᾽ certainly not the genit., as the LXX. renders (reading BO), but also not the nom. of the subj. (Hoelem.), but, since 1 is the designation of a mode of thought and of a relation, the accus. of manner, Tika v'yashar, Ps. cxix. 18; emeth, Ps. exxxii. 11; emunah, Ps. cxix. 75. Regarding the common use of such an accus. of the nearer definition in the passive part., wd. Ewald, ὃ 284c. The asyndeton v’chathuv yosher divre emeth is like that at x. 1, mehhochmah michvod. That which follows limtso we interpret as its threefold object. Thus it is said that Koheleth directed his effort towards an attractive form (cf. avne-hephets, Isa. liv. 12); but, before all, towards the truth, both subjectively (1%) and objectively (NPE), of that which was formulated and expressed in writing.
Ver. 11. From the words of Koheleth the author comes to the words of the wise man in general; so that what he says of the latter finds its application to himself and his book: “ Words of the wise are as like goads, and like fastened nails which are put together in collections—they are given by one shepherd.” The LXX., Aq., and Theod. translate darvonoth by βούκεντρα, the Venet. by βουπλῆγες; and that is also correct. The word is one of three found in the Jerus. Gemara, Sanhedrin x. 1, to designate a rod for driving (oxen) —j217 (from 395, to sharpen, to point), 1020 (from 105, to adjust, teach, exercise), and Y37 (from y1, to hold back, repellere); we read ka-dar‘vonoth; Gesen., Ewald, Hitz., and others are in error in reading dorvonoth; for the so-called light Metheg, which under certain circumstances can be changed into an accent, and the Kametz chatuph exclude one another.’ If j395 is the goad, the point of comparison is that which is to be excited intellectually and morally. Incorrectly, Gesen., Hitz., and others: like goads, because easily and deeply impressing themselves on the heart as well as on the memory. For goads, aculei, the Hebrews use the word O's; dar‘vonoth also are goads, but designed for driving on, thus stimuli (Jerome); andis there a more natural commendation for the proverbs of the wise men than that they incite to self-reflection, and urge to all kinds of noble effort? Dwre and dar’vonoth have the same three commencing consonants, and, both for the ear and the eye, form a paronomasia. In the following comparison, it is a question whether ba’ale asuppoth (plur. of baal asuppoth, or of the double plur. ba’al asuppah, like eg. sare missim, Ex. i. 11, of sar mas) is meant of persons, like ba’al hallashon, x. 11, ef. baal k’*naphayim, x. 20, or of things, as baal piphiyoth, Isa. xli. 15; and thus, whether it is a designation parallel to man or to "21. The Talm. Jer. Sanhedrin x. 1, wavers, for there it is referred first to the members of assemblies (viz. of the Sanedriwm), and then is explained by “ words which are spoken in the assembly.” If we understand it of persons, as it was actually used in the Talm. (vid. above, p. 191), then by aswppoth we must understand the societies of wise men, and by baale aswppoth, of the academicians (Venet.: δεσπόται ξυναγμάτων; Luther: “masters of assemblies”) belonging to such academies. But an appropriate meaning of this second comparison is not to be reached in this way. For if we translate: and as nails driven in are the members of the society, it is not easy to see what this wonderful comparison means; and what is then further said: they are given from one shepherd, reminds us indeed of Eph. iv. 11, but, as said of this perfectly unknown great one, is for us incomprehensible. Or if we translate, after Isa. xxviii. 1: and (the words of
1 The Kametz is the Kametz gadhol (opp. Kametz chatuph), and may for this reason have the accent Munach instead of Metheg. Vid. Michlol 1536, 182b. The case is the same as at Gen. xxxix. 34, where mimmachdérath is to be read. Cf. Baer’s Metheg-Setz. ὃ 27 and ὃ 18.
the wise are) like the fastened nails of the members of the society, it is as tautological as if I should say: words of wise men are like fastened nails of wise men bound together in a society (as a confederacy, union). Quite impossible are the translations: like nails driven in by the masters of assemblies (thus eg. Lightfoot, and recently Bullock), for the accus. with the pass. particip. may express some nearer definition, but not (as of the genit.) the effective cause; and: like a nail driven in are the (words) of the masters of assemblies (Tyler: “those of editors of collections”), for ellipt. genit., dependent on a governing word carrying forward its influence, are indeed possible, e.g. Isa. lxi. 7, but that a governing word itself, as δα’ αἴθ, may be the governed genit. of one omitted, as here divre, is without example.’ It is also inconsistent to understand ba’ale asuppoth after the analogy of ba’ale masoreth (the Masoretes) and the like. It will not be meant of the persons of the wise, but of the proverbs of the wise. So far we agree with Lang and Hoelem. Lang (1874) thinks to come to a right understanding of the “much abused” expression by translating, “lords of troops,’—a designation of proverbs which, being by many acknowledged and kept in remembrance, possess a kind of lordship over men’s minds; but that is already inadmissible, because asuppoth designates not any multitude of men, but associations with a definite end and aim. Hoelem. is content with this idea; for he connects together “ planted as leaders of assemblies,” and finds therein the thought, that the words of the wise serve as seeds and as guiding lights for the expositions in the congregation; but ba’ale denotes masters, not in the sense of leaders, but of possessors; and as ba’ale b’rith, Gen. xiv. 13, signifies “the confederated,” ba’ale sh*vwah, Neh. vi. 18, “the sworn,” and the frequently occurring ba’ale ha’ir, “the citizens;” so ba’ale asuppoth means, the possessors of assemblies and of the assembled themselves, or the possessors of collections and of the things collected. Thus ba’ale asuppoth will be a designation of the “words of the wise” (as in shalishim, choice men = choice proverbs, Prov. xxii. 20, in a certain measure personified), as of those which form or constitute collections, and which stand together in order and rank (Hitz., Ewald, Elst., Zockl., and others). Of such it may properly be said, that they are like nails driven in, for they are secured against separation,—they are, so to speak, made nail-fast, they stand on one common ground; and their being fixed in such connection not only is a help to the memory,
1 Regarding this omission of the mudaf [the governing noun], where this is but also to the understanding of them. The Book of Koheleth itself is such an asuppah; for it contains a multitude of separate proverbs, which are thoughtfully ranged together, and are introduced into the severe, critical sermon on the nothingness of all earthly things as oases affording rest and refreshment; as similarly, in the later Talmudic literature, Haggadic parts follow long stretches of hair-splitting dialectics, and afford to the reader an agreeable repose.
And when he says of the “ proverbs of the wise,” individually and as formed into collections: ΠΕΣ ΠΡ WM), 1.96. they are the gift of one shepherd, he gives it to be understood that his “ words of Koheleth,” if not immediately written by Solomon himself, have yet one fountain with the Solomonic Book of Proverbs,—God, the one God, who guides and cares as a shepherd for all who fear Him, and suffers them to want nothing which is necessary to their spiritual support and advancement (Ps. xxiii. 1, xxviii. 9). “ Méro’eh chad,” says Gratz, “is yet obscure, since it seldom, and that only poetically, designates the Shepherd of Israel. It cannot certainly refer to Moses.” Not to Moses, it is true (Targ.), nor to Solomon, as the father, the pattern, and, as it were, the patron of “the wise,” but to God, who is here named the ἀρχυποίμην as spiritual preserver (provider), not without reference to the figure of a shepherd from the goad, and the figure of household economy from the nails; for 7), in the language of the Chokma (Prov. v. 21), is in meaning cogn. to the N. T. conception of edification." Regarding masm*roth (iron nails), vid. above, p. 193; the word is not used of tent spikes (Spohn, Ginsb.), —it is masc., the sing. is 72¥D ΞΟ; Arab. mismdr. D'YIDI is = OPA (cf. Dan. xi. 45 with Gen. xxxl. 25), post-bibl. (vid. Jer. Sanhedrin) D337 (Jerome, in altwm defixi). Min with the pass., as at Job xxl. 1, xxvui. 4, Ps. xxxvii. 23 (Ewald, ὃ 2956), is not synonymous with the Greek ὑπό (vid. above, p. 67). The LXX. well: “ given by those of the counsel from one shepherd.” Hitzig reads ΠΡ, and accordingly translates: “ which are given united as a pasture,” but in méro eh ehad there lies a significant apologetic hint in favour of the collection of proverbs by the younger Solomon (Koheleth) in relation to that of the old. This is the point of the verse, and it is broken off by Hitzig’s conjecture.”
* J. F. Reimmann, in the preface to his Introduction to the Historia Litterarum antediluviana, translates, ver. 11: ‘‘ The words of the wise are like hewn-out marble, and the beautiful collectanea like set diamonds, which are presented by a good friend.” A Disputatio philologica by Abr. Wolf, Kénigsberg 1723, contends against this παρερμηνεία.
Ver. 12. With v*yother mehemmah the postscript takes a new departure, warning against too much reading, and finally pointing once more to the one thing needful: “ And besides, my son, be warned: for there is no end of much book-making; and much study is a weariness of the body.” With “my son,” the teacher of wisdom here, as in the Book of Proverbs, addresses the disciple who places himself under his instruction. Hitzig translates, construing mehemmah with hizeaher: “And for the rest: by these (the ‘words of Koheleth, ver. 10) be informed.” But (1) 14%, according to usage, does not signify in general to be taught, but to be made wiser, warned; particularly the imper. 137 is cogn. with 2289 (cf. Targ. Jer, Ex. x. 28, BPs ITN = Ἢ 1287), and in fact an object of the warning follows; (2) min after yothér is naturally to be regarded as connected with it, and not with hizzaher (cf. Esth. vi. 6, Sota vii. 7; ef. Ps. xix. 12). The punctuation of v’yother and mehemmah is thus not to be interfered with. Either hémmah points back to dure (ver. 11): Andas to what goes beyond these (in relation thereto) be warned (Schelling: guidquid ultra haec est, ab vis cave tibt, and thus eg. Oehler in Herzog’s #. ΑΚ. vii. 248); or, which is more probable, since the divre are without a fixed beginning, and the difference between true and false “wise men” is not here expressed, hemmah refers back to all that has hitherto been said, and v‘yother mehemmah signifies not the result thereof (Ewald, ὃ 286), but that which remains thereafter: and what is more than that (which has hitherto been said), z.e. what remains to be said after that hitherto said; Lat. et quod superest, quod reliquum est.
In 120, Hitzig also proposes a different interpunction from that which lies before us; but at the same time, in the place of the significant double sentence, he proposes a simple sentence: “ to make many books, without end, and much exertion of mind (in making these), is a weariness of the body.” The author thus gives the reason for his writing no more. But with xii 8 he has certainly brought his theme to a close, and he writes no further; because he does not write for hire and without an aim, but for a high end, according to a fixed plan; and whether he will leave off with this his book or not is a matter of perfect indifference to the readers of this one book; and that the writing of many books without end will exhaust a man’s mind and bring down his body, is not that a flat truism? We rather prefer Herzfeld’s translation, which harmonizes with Rashbam’s: “But more than these (the wise men) can teach thee, my son, teach thyself: to make many books there would be no end; and much preaching is fatiguing to the body.” But 1 cannot mean to
“teach oneself,” and én gétz does not mean non esset finis, but non est finis; and for lahach the meaning “ to preach” (which Luther also gives to it) is not at all shown from the Arab. lahjat, which signifies the tongue as that which is eager (to learn, etc.), and then also occurs as a choice name for tongues in general. Thus the idea of a double sentence, which is the most natural, is maintained, as the LXX. has already rendered it. The. actionis ΓΝ with its object is the subject of the sentence, of which itis said én géts, it is without end; Hitzig’s opinion, that én lach gétz must mean non est οἱ finis, is not justified; for én géts is a virtual adj., as én ’avel, Deut. xxxiii. 4, and the like, and as such the pred. of the substantival sentence. Regarding 2, avidwm discendi legendique studiwm, vid. above, p. 193. C. A. Bode (1777) renders well: polygraphiae nullus est finis et polymathia corpus delessat. Against this endless making of books and much study the postscript warns, for it says that this exhausts the bodily strength without (for this is the reverse side of the judgment) truly furthering the mind, which rather becomes decentralized by this πολυπραγμοσύνη. The meaning of the warning accords with the phrase coined by Pliny (£p. vil. 9), multwm non multa. One ought to hold by the “ words of the wise,” to which also the “ words of Koheleth,’ comprehended in the asuppah of the book before us, belong; for all that one can learn by hearing or by reading amounts at last, if we deduct all that is unessential and unenduring, to a unum necessarium:
Ver. 13. “ The final result, after all is learned, (is this): Fear God and keep His commandments; for this is the end of every man.” Many expositors, as Jerome, the Venet., and Luther, render ΣΟῚ as fut.: The conclusion of the discourse we would all hear (Salomon), or: The conclusion of the whole discourse or matter let us hear (Panzer, 1773, de Wette-Augusti); Hitzig also takes together soph davar hakol = soph davar kol-haddavar: The end of the whole discourse let us hear. But 929 for ΠΕΣ is contrary to the style of the book; and as a general rule, the author uses $an for the most part of things, seldom of persons. And also soph davar hakol, which it would be better to explain (“the final word of the whole”), with Ewald, § 291a, after y’mé-olam mosheh, Isa. 1Χ111. 11 (cf. Proverbs, vol. II. p. 267, note), than it is explained by Hitzig, although, in spite of Philippi’s (Stat. const. p. 17) doubt, possible in point of style, and also exemplified in the later period of the language (1 Chron. ix. 13), is yet a stylistic crudeness which the author could have avoided either by writing soph d’var hakol, or better, soph kol-haddavar. yowi, Ewald, ὃ 168%, renders as a particip. by audiendwm; but that also does not commend itself, for 23 signifies nothing else than auditum, and acquires the meaning of audiendwm when from the empirical matter of fact that which is inwardly necessary is concluded; the translation: The final word of the whole is to be heard, audiendum est, would only be admissible if also the translation auditum est were possible, which is not the case. Is Y2¥3 thus possibly the pausal form of the finite 92¥2? We might explain: The end of the matter (swmma summarum), all is heard, when, viz., that which follows is heard, which comprehends all that is to be known. Oras Hoelem.: Enough, all is heard, since, viz., that which is given in the book to be learned contains the essence of all true knowledge, viz., the following two fundamental doctrines. This retrospective reference of hakol nishm’a is more natural than the prospective reference; but, on the other hand, it is also more probable that soph davar denotes the final vesultat than that it denotes the conclusion of the discourse. The right explanation will be that which combines the retrospective reference of hakol nishm’a and the resultative reference of soph davar. Accordingly, Mendelss. appears to us to be correct when he explains: After thou hast heard all the words of the wise... this is the final result, etc. Finis (summa) rei, omnia auditais = omnibus auditis, for the sentence denoting the conditions remains externally undesignated, in the same way as atx. 14; Deut. xxi.1; Ezra x. 6 (Ewald, ὃ 3416). After the clause, soph... τυϊβῆγη᾽ α, Athnach stands where we put a colon: the mediating hocce est is omitted just as at vil. 120 (where translate: yet the preference of knowledge is this, that, etc.).
The sentence, eth-haelohim y’ra (“ fear God ”), repeating itself from v. 6, is the kernel and the star of the whole book, the highest moral demand which mitigates its pessimism and hallows its eudaemonism. The admonition proceeding therefrom, “and keep His commandments,” is included in lishmo’a, iv. 17 [v. 1], which places the hearing of the divine word, viz. a hearing for the purpose of observing, as the very soul of the worship of God above all the opus operatum of ceremonial services.
The connection of the clause, ki-zeh kol-haadam, Hitzig mediates in an unnecessary, roundabout way: “ but not thou alone, but this ought every man.” But why this negative here introduced to stamp ‘> as an wmmo establishing it? It is also certainly suitable as the immediate confirmation of the rectitude of the double admonition finally expressing all. The clause has the form of a simple judgment, it is a substantival clause, the briefest expression for the thought which is intended. What is that thought? The LXX.
renders: ὅτι τοῦτο πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος; also Symm. and the Venet. render kol haadam by πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρ., and an unnamed translator has ὅλος ὁ avOp., according to which also the translation of Jerome is to be understood, hoc est enim omnis homo. Thus among the moderns, Herzf., Ewald, Elst., and Heiligst.: for that is the whole man, viz. as to his destiny, the end of his existence (cf. as to the subjectmatter, Job xxvii. 28); and v. Hofmann (Schriftbew. 11. 2, p. 456): this is the whole of man, viz. as Grotius explains: totwm hominis bonum; or as Dale and Bullock: “the whole duty of man;” or as Tyler: “ the universal law (65, like the Mishnic 203) of man;” or as Hoelem.: that which gives to man for the first time his true and full worth. Knobel also suggests for consideration this rendering: this is the all of man, 2.6. on this all with man rests. But against this there is the one fact, that kol-haadam never signifies the whole man, and as little anywhere the whole (the all) ofaman. It signifies either “ all men” (πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι, vi Ta. ἄνθρ. οἱ ἄνθρ. πά.), as at vil. 2, hu soph kol-haadam, or, of the same meaning as kol-haadam, “every man” (πᾶς ἄνθρωπος), as at iii. 13, v.18 (LXX., also vii. 2: τοῦτο τέλος παντὸς ἀνθρώπου); and it is yet more than improbable that the common expression, instead of which haadam kullo was available, should here have been used in a sense elsewhere unexampled. Continuing in the track of the wsus log., and particularly of the style of the author, we shall thus have to translate: “for this is every man.” If we use for it: “for this is every man’s,’ the clause becomes at once distinct; Zirkel renders kolhaadam as genit., and reckons the expression among the Graecisms of the book: παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, viz. πρᾶγμα. Or if, with Knobel, Hitz., Bottch., and Ginsburg, we might borrow a verb to supplement the preceding imperat.: “for this ought every man to do,” we should also in this way gain the meaning to be expected; but the clause lying before us is certainly a substantival clause, like meh haadam, ii. 12, not an elliptical verbal clause, like Isa. xxii. 5, xxvi. 9, where the verb to be supplied easily unfolds itself from the S of the end of the movement.
We have here a case which is frequent in the Semitic languages, in which subj. and pred. are connected in the form of a simple judgment, and it is left for the hearer to find out the relation sustained by the pred. to the subj.—e.g. Ps. cx. 3, cix. 4,“ I am prayer;” and in the Book of Koheleth, iii. 19, “ the children of men are a chance.” In the same way we have here to explain: for that is every man, viz. according to his destiny and duty; excellently, Luther: for that belongs to all men. With right, Hahn, like Bauer (1732), regards the pronoun as pred. (not subj. as at vil. 2): “ this, ae. thus constituted, that they must do this, are all men,” or rather: this = under obligation thereto, is every man.’ It is a great thought that is thereby expressed, viz. the reduction of the Israelitish law to its common human essence. This has not escaped the old Jewish teachers. What can this mean: zh kol-haadam? it is asked, Berachoth 6b; and R. Elazar answers: “The whole world is comprehended therein;” and R. Abba bar-Cahana: “This fundamental law is of the same importance to the universe;’ and R. Simeon Ὁ. Azzai: “The universe has been created only for the purpose of being commanded this.” Ver. 14. As we render zeh kol-haadam as expressive of the same obligation lying on all men without exception, this verse appropriately follows: “ For God shall bring every work into the judgment upon all that is concealed, whether it be good or bad.” To bring into judgment is, as at xi. 9=to bring to an account. There the punctuation is ‘W3, here ‘v3, as, according to rule, the art. is omitted where the idea is determined by a “elative clause or an added description; for b’mishpat ’al kol-nellam are taken together: in the judgment upon all that is concealed (cf. Rom. ii. 16; 1 Cor. iv. 5, τὰ κρυπτά). Hitzig, however, punctuates here ‘#3, and explains ὃν as of the same meaning as the distributive 5, eg. Gen. ix. 5, 10; but in this sense Sy never interchanges with 5. And wherefore this subtlety? The judgment upon all that is concealed is a judgment from the cognition of which nothing, not even the most secret, can escape; and that Sy movin is not a Germanism, is shown from xi. 9; to execute judgment on (Germ. an) any one is expressed by 3, Ps. cxix. 84, Wisd. vi. 6; judgment upon (067) any one may be expressed by the genit. of him whom it concerns, Jer. li. 9; but judgment upon anything (Symm. περὶ παντὸς παροραθέντος) cannot otherwise be expressed than by ὃν. Rather by may be rendered as a connecting particle: “together with all that is concealed” (Vaih., Hahn); but mynd» certainly comprehends all, and with ndy:-s
2 Cf. Jer. Nedarim ix. 3: ‘‘ Thou oughtest to love thy neighbour as thyself,” says R. Akiba, is a principal sentence in the Law. Ben-Azzai says: ‘*‘ The words zeh... adam (Gen. vy. 1) are it in a yet higher degree,” because therein the oneness of the origin and the destiny of all men is contained. Aben Ezra alludes to the same thing, when at the close of his Comm. he remarks: ‘‘ The secret of the non-use of the divine name ΠῚ. in Gen. iii. 3 is the secret of the Book of Koheleth.”
this comprehensive idea is only deepened. The accent dividing the verse stands rightly under Dy;\ for sive bonum sive malum (as at v. 11) is not related to nellam as disjoining, but to kolma'aseh.
This certainty of a final judgment of personal character is the Ariadne-thread by which Koheleth at last brings himself safely out of the labyrinth of his scepticism. ‘The prospect of a general judgment upon the nations prevailing in the O. T., cannot sufficiently set at rest the faith (vid. eg. Ps. lxxiii., Jer. xii. 1-3) which is tried by the unequal distributions of present destiny. Certainly the natural, and particularly the national connection in which men stand to one another, is not without an influence on their moral condition; but this influence does not remove accountability,—the individuwm is at the same time a person; the object of the final judgment will not be societies as such, but only persons, although not without regard to their circle of life. This personal view of the final judgment does not yet in the O. T. receive a preponderance over the national view; such figures of an universal and individualizing personal judgment as Matt. vii. 21-23, Rev. xx. 12, are nowhere found in it; the object of the final judgment are nations, kingdoms, cities, and conditions of men. But here, with Koheleth, a beginning is made in the direction of regarding the final judgment as the final judgment of men, and as lying in the future, beyond the present time. What Job xix. 25-27 postulates in the absence of a _ present judgment of his cause, and the Apocalyptic Dan. xii. 2 saw as a dualistic issue of the history of his people, comes out here for the first time in the form of doctrine into that universally-human expression which is continued in the announcements of Jesus and the apostles. Kleinert sees here the morning-dawn of a new revelation breaking forth; and Himpel says, in view of this conclusion, that Koheleth is a precious link in the chain of the preparation for the gospel; and rightly. In the Book of Koheleth the O. T. religion sings its funeral song, but not without finally breaking the ban of nationality and of bondage to this present life, which made it unable to solve the mysteries of life, and thus not without prophesying its resurrection in an expanded glorified form as the religion of humanity.
The synagogal lesson repeats the 13th verse after the 14th, to gain thereby a conclusion of a pleasing sound. The Masoretic Siman (vox memorvalis) of those four books, in which, after the last verse, on account of its severe contents, the verse going before is repeated in reading, is ΡΠ. The’ refers to myv* (Isaiah), n to non (the Book of the Twelve Prophets), the first p to ndnp, the second p to mp (Lamentations). The Lamentations and Koheleth always stand together. But there are two different arrangements of the five Megilloth, viz. that of the calendar of festivals which has passed into our printed editions: the Song, Ruth, Lamentations, Koheleth, and Esther (vid. above, p. 3); and the Masoretic arrangement, according to the history of their origin: Ruth, the Song, Koheleth, Lamentations, and Esther.
The eynagogal teen rephets the: a th ‘ven tart ro ΝΟΣ theroky te eouciqaion οἵα pleasing porn, ᾿ " Semcae ἐῶ ds) of ὅδιοῦα Hor books, io cwhish “aftan't vored, σα “86 pint οὗ ἐξὸ ee vontents, the verse going: ἢ εἰ tepented 0 néiliog, 1 pP’n The sefors to meh Classe som (the eulk οὔ. Chew, veil ve Prophets), the’ rat p ta. es Ἂς second p te ΦῸ (iaanen tations), ‘The Lanieutations nud. abwava heii together, “Fnt-there axe, two difiment armanger vthe tive BMoyatoth, vies that οἱ the valentar-ot fen ivahs whith; passe into our printed otitionas the Song, Rath, Loman meaty ᾿ ‘Ka hel th. 556 ist her (ut ROG, δι 3)< end the Mesomtic =e", | secording to the pone of, then wi fia a: Ruth: the sn, Roe