gift of God added thereto. N‘chasim, besides here, occurs also in Josh. xxii. 8; 2 Chron. i. 11 ἢ; and in the Chald. of the Book of Ezra, vi. 8, vil. 26. Also hishlit, to empower, to make possible, is Aram., Dan. 11, 38, 48, as well as Heb., Ps. cxix. 133; the prevalence of the verbal stem δ is characteristic of the Book of Koheleth. Helqo, “his portion,” is just the cheerful enjoyment as that which man has here below of life, if he has any of it at all.
Ver. 19. Over this enjoyment he forgets the frailty and the darkened side of this life. It proves itself to be a gift of God, a gift from above: “For he doth not (then) think much of the days of his life; because God answereth the joy of his heart.” Such an one, permitted by God to enjoy this happiness of life, is thereby prevented from tormenting himself by reflections regarding its transitoriness, Incorrectly, Hengst.: Remembrance and enjoyment of this life do not indeed last long, according to Ewald, who now, however, rightly explains: He will not, by constant reflection on the brevity of his life, too much embitter this enjoyment; because God, indeed, grants to him true heart-joy as the fairest gift. The meaning of 190 is also, in general, hit upon. The LXX. translates: “because God occupies him with the joy of his heart;” but for that we ought to have had the word %73y2; Jerome helps it, for he reads nn»wa3 instead of ΠΣ: eo quod Deus oceupet delicirs cor ejus. But also, in this form, this explanation of ΠΟ} is untenable; for 2 722, the causat. of which would be myn, signifies, in the style of Koheleth, not in general to busy oneself with something, but to weary oneself with something; hence ‘v2 ΓῺ} cannot mean: to be occupied with joy, and thereby to be drawn away from some other thing. And since the explanation: “he makes him sing,” needs no argument to dispose of it, myo thus remains only as the Hiph. of my, to meet, to respond to, srant a request. Accordingly, Hitz., hike Aben Ezra and Kimchi, comparing Hos. 11. 23 f.: God makes to answer, 1.6. so works that all things which have in or of themselves that which can make him glad, must respond to his wish. But the omission of the obj.—of which Hitz. remarks, that because indefinite it is left indefinite—is insufferably hard, and the explanation thus ambiguous. Most interpreters translate: for God answers (Gesen. Heb. Wort. B., incorrectly: answered) him with joy of his heart, 1.6. grants this to him in the way of answer. Ewald compares Ps. lxv. 6; but that affords no voucher for the expression: to answer one with something = to grant it to him; for my is there connected with a double accus., and P1¥3 is the adv. statement of the way and manner. But above all, against this interpretation is the fact of the want of the personal obj.
The author behoved to have written ¥2Y9 or ink myn. We take the Hiph. as in the sense of the Kal, but give it its nearest signification: to answer, and explain, as in a similar manner Seb. Schmid, Rambam, and others have already done: God answers to the joy of his heart, ic. He assents to it, or (using an expression which is an exact equivalent), He corresponds to it. This makes the joy a heart-joy, 6. 8 joy which a man feels not merely externally, but in the deepest recess of his heart, for the joy penetrates his heart and satisfies it (Song iii. 11; Isa. xxx. 29; Jer. xv. 16). A similar expression, elsewhere not found, we had at ver. 9 in 32.39%, Why should not 3 ΤῺ» (myn) be possible with ¥3¥, just as ἀμείβεσθαι πρός τι is with ἀμείβεσθαί twa? For the rest, 39 'y2 is not needed as obj.; we can take it also as an expression of the state or condition: God gives answer in the heart-joy of such an one. In my, to answer, to hear the answer, is thought of as granting a request; here, as giving assent to. Job xxxv. 9 affords a twofold suitable example, that the Hiph, can have an enlarged Kal signification.
After the author has taken the opportunity of once more expressing his wtimatum, he continues to register the sad evils that cling to wealth.
vi. 1, 2. “There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and in great weight it lies upon man: a man to whom God giveth riches, and treasures, and honour, and he wanteth nothing for his soul of all that he may wish, but God giveth him not power to have enjoyment of it, for a strange man hath the enjoyment: that is vanity and an evil disease.” The author presents the result of personal observation; but inasmuch as he relates it in the second tense, he generalizes the matter, and places it scenically before the eyes of the reader. A similar introduction with ™%, but without the unnecessary asker, is found at v.12, x. 5. Regarding "32, vid. under viii. 6; by does not denote the subj., as at ii. 17: it appears great to a man, but it has its nearest lying local meaning; it is a great (ii. 21) evil, pressing in its greatness heavily upon man. The evil is not the man himself, but the condition in which he is placed, as when, ¢g., the kingdom of heaven is compared to a merchant (Matt. xiii. 45 f.)—-not the merchant in himself, but his conduct and life is a figure of the kingdom of heaven.
Ver. 2. To ‘23 Wy, as at 2 Chron i 11,3) [and honour] is added as a third thing. What follows we do not translate: “and there is nothing wanting...;” for that 2® with the pleonastic suff. may mean: “there is not,” is not to be proved from Gen. xxxix. 9, thus: and he spares not for his soul (LXX. καὶ οὐκ «.7.A.) what he always desires. 07 is adj. in the sense of wanting, lacking, as at 1 Sam. xxi. 16; 1 Kings xi. 22; Prov. xii, 9. ΠΡ “ for hig soul,” ae. his person, is = the synon. inyy> found in the later usage of the language; > (different from the min, iv. 8) is, as at Gen. vi. 2, partitive. The "33, to whom this considerable estate, satisfying every wish, finally comes, is certainly not the legal heir (for that he enters into possession, in spite of the uncertainty of his moral character, ii. 19, would be in itself nothing less than a misfortune, yet perfectly in order, v. 13), but some stranger without any just claim, not directly a foreigner (Heiligst.), but, as Burger explains: talis qui proprie nullum habet jus in bona ejus cui “33 dicitur (cf. ΠΥ) of the unmarried wife in the Book of Proverbs).
That wealth without enjoyment is nothing but vanity and an evil disease, the author now shows by introducing another historical figure, and thereby showing that life without enjoyment is worse than never to have come into existence at all:
Ver. 3. “If a man begat an hundred, and lived many years, and the amount of the days of his years was great, and his soul satisfied not itself in good, and also he had no grave, then I say: Better than he is the untimely birth.” The accentuation of 3a is like that of 2a. The disjunctives follow the Athnach, as at 2 Kings xxiii. 13, only that there Zelisha Gedhola stands for Pazer. Hitzig finds difficulty with the clause $... “pn, and regards it as a marginal gloss to 5a, taken up into the text at a wrong place. But just the unexpected form and the accidental nature, more than the inward necessity of this feature in the figure, leads us to conclude that the author here connects together historical facts, as conjecturally noted above at pp. 214, 215, into one fanciful picture. 9 is obviously to be supplemented by (nwa) O22; the Targ. and Midrash make this man to be Cain, Ahab, Haman, and show at least in this that they extend down into the time of the Persian kingdom a spark of historical intelligence. ‘D1 '2¥ interchanges with ἽΠ 2%, xi. 8, as at Neh. xi. 30. In order to designate the long life emphatically, the author expresses the years particularly in days: “and if it is much which (Heiligst.: multwm est quod) the days of his years amount to;” cf. "2? 9 in Gen. v. With v’naphsho there follows the reverse side of this long life with many children: (1) his soul satisfies not itself, ie. has no self-satisfying enjoyment of the good (min, as at Ps. civ. 13, etc.), 72. of all the good things which he possesses,—in a word, he is not happy in his life; and (2) an honourable burial is not granted to him, but ὉΠ ‘37, Jer. xxii. 19, which is the contrary of a burial such as becomes a man (the body of Artaxerxes Ochus which comes lifeless from the mother's womb.
departeth in darkness; and with darkness its name is covered.
with it than with that other.” It has entered into existence, 72) because it was a lifeless existence into which it entered when its independent life should have begun; and ἮΡΙ, it departeth, for it is carried away in all quietness, without noise or ceremony, and “ with darkness” its name is covered, for it receives no name and remains a nameless existence, and is forgotten as if it had never been. Not having entered into a living existence, it is also (gam) thus happy to have neither seen the sun nor known and named it, and thus it is spared the sight and the knowledge of all the vanities and evils, the deceptions and sorrows, that are under the sun. When we com- apparent: ‘>... DM, plus quictis est hic quam illi, which, with the
‘zation of the idea of rest (Job iii 13) in a wider sense (vid. above, p. 194), is — melius est huic quam illi (Mm... ™M,as at iii 19). The izatl of the idea proceeds yet further in the Mishn.
thus the point of the comparison in which it terminates is broken, for 5b draws the facil. It is true that this contains a thought to which it is not easy to reconcile oneself. For supposing that life were not in itself, as over against non-existence, a good, there is yet scarcely any life that is absolutely joyless; and a man who has become the father of an hundred children, has, as it appears, sought the enjoyment of life principally in sexual love, and then also has found it richly. But also, if we consider his life less as relating to sense: his children, though not all, yet partly, will have been a joy to him; and has a family life, so lengthened and rich in blessings, only thorns, and no roses at all? And, moreover, how can anything be said of the rest of an untimely birth, which has been without motion and without life, as of a rest excelling the termination of the life of him who has lived long, since rest without a subjective reflection, a rest not felt, certainly does not fall under the point of view of more or less, good or evil? The saying of the author on no side bears the probe of exact thinking. In the main he designs to say: Better, certainly, is no life than a joyless life, and, moreover, one ending dishonourably. And this is only a speciality of the general clause, iv. 2 f., that death is better than life, and not being born is better than both. The author misunderstands the fact that the earthly life has its chief end beyond itself; and his false eudaemonism, failing to penetrate to the inward fountain of true happiness, which is independent of the outward lot, makes exaggerated and ungrateful demands on the earthly life.
Ver. 6. A life extending to more than even a thousand years without enjoyment appears to him worthless: “And if he has lived twice a thousand years long, and not seen good—Do not all go hence to one place?” This long period of life, as well as the shortest, sinks into the night of Sheol, and has advantage over the shortest if it wants the ‘© Nik, ie. the enjoyment of that which can make man happy. That would be correct if “good” were understood inwardly, ethically, spiritually; but although, according to Koheleth’s view, the fear of God presides over the enjoyment of life, regulating and hallowing it, yet it remains unknown to him that life deepened into fellowship with God is in itself a most real and blessed, and thus the highest good. Regarding 3X (here, as at Esth. vii. 4, with perf. foll.: etsi viwisset, tamen interrogarem: nonne, etc.), vid. above, p. 191; it occurs also in the oldest liturgical Tefilla, as well as in the prayer Nishmath (vid. Baer’s Siddur, Abodath Jisrael, p. 207). ΙΒ... OX, a thousand years twice, and thus an Adam’s life once and yet again. Otherwise Aben Ezra: 1000 years multiplied by itself, thus a million, like DYE ONvY, 20 x 20 = 400; ef. Targ. Isa. xxx. 26, which translates D'NYIY by 343 = 7 x 7x 7. Perhaps that is right; for why was not the expression ΠΡ D'BDN directly used? The “one place” is, as at iii. 20, the grave and Hades, into which all the living fall A life extending even to a million of years is worthless, for it terminates at last in nothing. Life has only as much value as it yields of enjoyment.
Ver, 7. “All the labour of man is for his mouth, and yet his soul has never enough;” or, properly, it is not filled, so that it desires nothing further and nothing more; "7? used as appropriately of the self-preservation, that is here meant; Aon PB, “ beautiful soul,” Chullin iv. 7, is an appetite which is not fastidious, but is contented. ὍΣ, καὶ ὅμως, ὅμως δέ, as at iii, 18; Pa exxix 2. All labour, the author means to say, is in the service of the impulse after
Ver. 8. “For what hath the wise more than the
“135, what preference hath the poor, such an one, viz, as understands (vid. regarding y™ instead of yn, under Ps. cxliii. 10); not: who
ἀπιέναι ἀντικρὺ τῆς ζωῆς, is not clear; scarcely as Griitz, with Mendelss.: who, to go against (122, as at iv. 12) life, to fight against it, has to exercise himself in self-denial and patience; for “to fight with life” is an expression of modern coinage. ‘nn signifies here, without doubt, not life, but the living. But we explain now, not as Ewald, who separates yw from the foll. inf. y$n5: What profit has then the wise man, the intelligent, patient man, above the fool, that he walks before the living /—by which is meant (but how does this interrog. form agree thereto?), that the wise, patient man has thereby an advantage which makes life endurable by him, in this, that he does not suffer destroying eagerness of desire so to rule over him, but is satisfied to live in quietness. Also this meaning of a quiet life does not lie in the words ‘nn... 75m. “Τὸ know to walk before the living” is, as is now generally acknowledged = to understand the right rule of life (Elst.), to possess the savoir vivre (Heiligst.), to be experienced in the right art of living. The question accordingly is: What advantage has the wise above the fool; and what the poor, who, although poor, yet knows how to maintain his social position? The matter treated of is the insatiable nature of sensual desire. The wise seeks to control his desire; and he who is more closely designated poor, knows how to conceal it; for he lays upon himself restraints, that he may be able to appear and make something of himself. But desire is present in both; and they have in this nothing above the fool, who follows the bent of his desire and lives for the day. He is a fool because he acts as one not free, and without con- _ sideration; but, in itself, it is and remains true, that enjoyment and satisfaction stand higher than striving and longing for a thing.
Ver. 9. “ Better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of the soul: also this is vain and windy effort.” We see from the inf. ‘xa interchanging with ‘> that the latter is not meant of the object (xi. 9), but of the action, viz. the “rejoicing in that which one has” (Targ.); but this does not signify grassatio,—i.e. impetus animae appetentis, ὁρμὴ τῆς ψυχῆς (cf. Marcus Aurelius, iii. 16), which Knobel, Heiligst., and Ginsburg compare (for sn means grassari only with certain subjects, as fire, contagion, and the like; and in certain forms, as "pn for 1, to which 7a = n3? does not belong),—but erratio,a going out in extent, roving to a distance (cf. 271, wanderer), ῥεμβασμὸς ἐπιθυμίας, Wisd. iv. 12—Going is the contrast of rest; the soul which does not become full or satisfied goes out, and seeks and reaches not its aim. This insatiableness, characteristic of the soul, this endless unrest, belongs also to the miseries of this present life; for to have and to enjoy is better than this constant
Hungern und Lungern (hungering and longing]. More must not be put into 9a than already lies in it, as Elster does: “the only enduring enjoyment of life consists in the quiet contemplation of that which, as pleasant and beautiful, it affords, without this mental joy mingling with the desire for the possession of sensual enjoyment.” The conception of “ the sight of the eyes” is certainly very beautifully idealized, but in opposition to the text. If 9a must be a moral proverb, then Luther's rendering is the best: “It is better to enjoy the present good, than to think about other good.”
The future, toward which the soul stretches itself out to find what may satisfy it, is not man’s: a power against which man is helpless fashions it.
Ver. 10. “That which hath been, its name hath long ago been named; and it is determined what a man shall be: and he cannot dispute with Him who is stronger than be." According to the usage of the tense, it would be more correct to translate: That which (at any time) has made its appearance, the name of which was long ago named, ἐς, of which the What? and the How? were long ago deter- parallel to 7} 739, i 10; for the expression here does not refer to toe’, and signifies known, viz. previously known, as passive of ¥7, in the sense of Zech. xiv. 7; cf. Ps. exxxix. 1f Bullock rightly compares Acts xv. 18. After srr, asher, like i, which is more common, may signify “that,” viii. 12, Ezek. xx. 26; but neither “that he is a man” (Knobel, Vaih., Luzz., Hengst., Ginsb.), nor “that he is the man” (Ewald, Elst, Zéckler), affords a consistent meaning. As mah after yada’ means quid, so asher after it may mean quod = that which (cf. Dan. viii 19, although it does not at all stand in need of proof); and id quod homo est (we cannot render wn without the expression of a definite conception of time) is intended to mean that the whole being of ἃ man, whether of this one or that one, at all times and on all sides, is previously known; cf. to this pregnant substantival sentence, xii. 13. Against this formation of his nature and of his fate by a higher hand, man cannot utter a word.
The thought in 104 is the same as that at Isa. xlv. 9; Rom. ix. 20f. The Chethtdb VpNN’' is not inadmissible, for the stronger than man is ™D..."9. Also PN might in any case be read: with one who overcomes him, has and manifests the ascendency over him. There is indeed no Hiph. D7 found in the language of the Bible (Herzf. and Fiirst compare 27, Ps. xii. 5); but in the Targ., ἜΡΙΝ is common; and in the school-language of the Talm., ΤΠ is used of the raising of weighty objections, eg. Kamma 71a. The verb, however, especially in the perf., is in the passage before us less appropriate. In °2""N? lie together the ideas of physical (cf. Gen. xiii. 32; Deut. xii. 17, xvi. 5, etc.) and moral inability.
Ver. 11. “For there are many words which increase vanity: What cometh forth therefrom for man?” The dispute (objection), "9, takes place in words; 5% here will thus not mean “things” (Hengst., Ginsb., Zéckl., Bullock, etc.), but “words.” As that wrestling or contending against God’s decision and providence is vain and worthless, nothing else remains for man but to be submissive, and to acknowledge his limitation by the fear of God; thus there are also many words which only increase yet more the multitude of vanities already existing in this world, for, because they are resultless, they bring no advantage for man. Rightly, Elster finds herein a hint pointing to the influence of the learning of the Jewish schools already existing in Koheleth’s time. We know from Josephus that the problem of human freedom and of God's absoluteness was a point of controversy between opposing parties: the Sadducees so emphasized human freedom, that they not only excluded (Antt. xiii. 5. 9; Bell. ii. 8. 14) all divine predetermination, but also co-operation; the Pharisees, on the contrary, supposed an interconnection between divine predetermination (εἱμαρμένη) and human freedom (Antt. xiii. 5. 9, xviii. 1.3; Bell.ii. 8.14), The Talm. affords us a glance at this controversy; but the statement in the Talm. (in Berachoth 33a, and elsewhere), which conditions all by the power of God manifesting itself in history, but defends the freedom of the religious-moral self-determination of man, may be regarded as a Pharisaic maxim. In Rom. ix., Paul places himself on
1 With He unpointed, because it is omitted in the Keri, as in like manner in “3, x. 3, ‘nv’, Lam. v. 18. In the bibl. Rabb., the Π is noted as superfluous.
this side; and the author of the Book of Koheleth would subscribe murmuring, submit to His sway: “For who knoweth what is good for man in life during the number of the days of his vain life, and which he spendeth like a shadow? No one can certainly show a man what shall be after him under the sun.” We translate ἫΝ only by “ja” (“certainly”), because in Germ. no interrogative can follow “dicweil” (“because”). The clause with asher (as at iv. 9, viii, 11, x. 15; ef. Song, under v. 2), according to its meaning not different from Ki, is related in the way of proof to that beginning with ki. Man is placed in our presence. To be able to say to him what is good for him —ie what position he must take in life, what direction he must give to his activity, what decision he must adopt in difficult and important cases,—we ought not only to be able to penetrate his future, but, generally, the future; but, as Zropfen [drops] in the stream of history, we are poor Tripfe [simpletons}, who are hedged up within the present. Regarding the accus. of duration, Ὃν 189, pointing to the brevity of human life, vid. at ii. 3. With $39, the attribute of breath-like transitiveness is assigned to life (as at vii. 15, ix. 9) (as already in the name given to Abel, the <econd son of Adam), which is continued by 9 ‘#7 with the force of a relative clause, which is frequently the case after preceding part. attrib., eg. Isa. v. 23. We translate: which he spendeth like the (a) shadow [in the nom.] (after viii. 13; Job xiv. 2); not: like 8 shadow [in the accus.]; for although the days of life are also likened to a shadow, Ps. cxliv. 4, ete, yet this use of ney does not accord of transigere. Aharav does not mean: after his present condition (ZockL); but, as at iii 22, vii. 14: after he has passed away from this scene. Luzz. explains it correctly: Whether his children will remain in life? Whether the wealth he has wearied himself in acquiring will remain and be useful to them? But these are only illustrations. The author means to say, that a man can say, neither to himself nor to another, what in definite cases is the real advantage; because, in order to say this, he must be able to look far into the future beyond the limits of the individual life of man, which is only a small member of a great whole.
PROVERDS OF BETTER THINGS, THINGS SUPPOSED TO BE BETTER, GOOD THINGS, GOOD AND BAD DAYS.—VII. 1-14.
We find ourselves here in the middle of the book. Of its 220 verses, Vi. 10 is that which stands in the middle, and with vii. 1 begins the third of the four Sedarim' into which the Masora divides the book. The series of proverbs here first following, vii. 1-10, has, as we remarked above, p. 189, the word tov as their common catchword, and mah-tov, vi. 12, as the hook on which they hang. But at least the first three proverbs do not stand merely in this external connection with the preceding; they continue the lowly and dark estimate of the earthly life contained in vi. 3 ff.
The first proverb is a synthetic distich. The thought aimed at is that of the second half of the distich.
vii. 1. “ Better is a name than precious ointment; and better is the day of death than the day when one is born.” Like 8" and RT, so OY and jDv stand to each other in the relation of a paronomasia (vid. Song underi. 3). Luther translates: “ Hin gut Geriicht ast besser denn gute Salbe” {“ a good odour (= reputation) is better than good ointment]. If we substitute the expression denn Wolgeruch {than sweet scent], that would be the best possible rendering of the paronomasia. In the arrangement 2p... 21 ov, tov would be ad). to shem (a good reputation goes beyond sweet scent); but ¢ov standing first in the sentence is pred., and shem thus in itself alone, as in the cogn. prov., Prov. xxii. 1, signifies a good, well-sounding, honourable, if not venerable name; cf. anshé hashshem, Gen. vi. 4; v‘li-shem, nameless, Job xxx. 8. The author gives the dark reverse to this bright side of the distich: the day of death better than the day in which one (a man), or he (the man), is born; cf. for this reference of the pronoun, iv. 12, v.17. It is the same lamentation as at iv. 2f, which sounds less strange from the mouth of a Greek than from that of an Israelite; a Thracian tribe, the Trausi, actually celebrated their birthdays as days of sadness, and the day of death as a day of rejoicing (vid. Bahr’s Germ. translat. of Herodotus, v. 4)—Among the people of the Old Covenant this was not possible; also a saying such as 15 is not in the spirit of the O. T. revelation of religion;
1 Of three books the Masora gives only the number of verses: Ruth, 85 verses; Shir (the Song), 117 verses; and Kinoth (Lamentations), 154; but no sections yet it is significant that it was possible’ within it, without apostasy from it; within the N. T. revelation of religion, except in such references as Matt. xxvi. 24, it is absolutely impossible without apostasy from it, or without rejection of its fundamental meaning. Ver. 2. Still more in the spirit of the N. T. (cf eg. Luke vi. 25) are these words of this singular book which stands on the border of both Testaments: “ It is better to go into a house of mourning than to there is sorrow on account of a death; the lamentation continued for seven days (Sirach xxii. 10), and extended sometimes, as in the case of the death of Aaron and Moses, to thirty days; the later practice distinguished the lamentations (22%) for the dead till the time of burial, and the mournings for the dead (52x), which were divided into seven and twenty-three days of greater and lesser mourning; on the return from carrying away the corpse, there was a Trostmahl (a comforting repast), to which, according as it appears to an ancient custom, those who were to be partakers of it contributed (Jer. xvi. 7; Hos. ix. 4; Job iv. 17, funde vinum tuum εἰ panem tuum super sepulchra justorum).’ This feast of sorrow the above proverb leaves out of view, although also in reference to it the contrast between the “ house of carousal” and “house of mourning” remains, that in the latter the drinking must be in moderation, and not to drunkenness. The going into the house of mourning is certainly thought of as a visit for the purpose of showing sympathy and of imparting consolation during the first seven days of mourning (John xi. 31). Thus to go into the house of sorrow, and to show one’s sympathy with the mourners there, is better than to go into a house of drinking, where all is festivity and merriment; Viz. because the former (that he is mourned over as dead) is the end of every man, and the survivor takes it to heart, viz. this, that he too must die. sw follows attractionally the gender of mid (cf. Job χχχὶ 11, Kerf). What is said at iii. 13 regarding "72 is appropriate to the passage before us. ‘nn is rightly vocalised; regarding the
1 « ‘The reflections of the Preacher,” says Hitzig (Siid. deut. ev. protest. Woch. Blatt, 1864, No. 2), ‘ present the picture of a time in which men, participating in the recollection of a mighty religious past, and become sceptical by reason of the sadness of the present time, grasping here and there in uncertainty, were in danger of abandoning that stedfastness of faith which was the first mark of the religion of the prophets.”
form ‘7, vid. Baer in the critical remarks of our ed. of Jsaiah under ili, 22. The phrase 37-8 10) here and at ix. 1 is synon. with pry, soy DY (eg, Isa. lvii. 1) and 23 OY, How this saying agrees with Koheleth’s ultimatum: There is nothing better than to eat and drink, ete. (ii. 24, etc.), the Talmudists have been utterly perplexed to discover; Manasse ben-Israel in his Conciliador (1632) loses himself in much useless discussion. The solution of the difficulty is easy. The ultimatum does not relate to an unconditional enjoyment of life, but to an enjoyment conditioned by the fear of God. When man looks death in the face, the two things occur to him, that he should make use of his brief life, but make use of it in view of the end, thus in a manner for which he is responsible before God.
Vers. 3, 4. The joy of life must thus be not riot and tumult, but a joy tempered with seriousness: “ Better is sorrow than laughter: for with a sad countenance it is well with the heart. The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning, and the heart of fools in the house of mirth.” Grief and sorrow, 0¥Y2, whether for ourselves or occasioned by others, is better, viz. morally better, than extravagant merriment; the heart is with Β 5 (inf. as ΡῈ, Jer. vii. 6; cf. ‘7 ‘38, Gen. xl. 7; Neh. ii. 2), a sorrowful countenance, better than with laughter, which only masks the feeling of disquiet peculiar to man, Prov. xiv. 13. Elsewhere 2? 20" = “ the heart is (may be) of good cheer,” e.g. Ruth iii. 7, Judg. xix. 6; here also joyful experience is meant, but well becoming man as a religious moral being. With a sad countenance it may be far better as regards the heart than with a merry countenance in boisterous company. Luther, in the main correct, after Jerome, who on his part follows Symmachus: “ The heart is made better by sorrow.” The well-being is here meant as the reflex of a moral: bene se habere.
Sorrow penetrates the heart, draws the thought upwards, purifies, transforms. Therefore is the heart of the wise in the house of sorrow; and, on the other hand, the heart of fools is in the house of joy, z.c. the impulse of their heart goes thither, there they feel themselves at home; a house of joy is one where there are continual feasts, or where there is at the time a revelling in joy. That ver. 4 is divided not by Athnach, but by Zakef, has its reason in this, that of the words following bax, none consists of three syllables; cf. on the contrary, vii. 7,027. From this point forward the internal relation of the contents is broken up, according to which this series of sayings as a concluding section hangs together with that containing the observations going before in ch. vi.
Vers. 5, 6. A fourth proverb of that which is better (jo 31») presents, like the third, the fools and the wise over against each other: “ Better to hear the reproof of a wise man, than that one should hear the song of fools. For like the crackling of Nesseln (nettles) under the Kessel (kettle), so the laughter of the fool: also this is vain.” As at Prov. xiii. 1, xvii. 10, 7p) is the earnest and severe words of the wise, which impressively reprove, emphatically warn, and salutarily alarm. 7¥ in itself means only song, to the exclusion, however, of the plaintive song; the song of fools is, if not immoral, yet morally and spiritually hollow, senseless, and unbridled madness. Instead of YowD, the words “δ᾽ XD are used, for the twofold act of hearing is divided between different subjects. A fire of thorn-twigs flickers up quickly and crackles merrily, but also exhausts itself quickly (Ps. cxviii. 12), without sufficiently boiling the flesh in the pot; whilst a log of wood, without making any noise, accomplishes this quietly and surely. We agree with Knobel and Vaihinger in copying the paronomasia [Nessel—Kessel]. When, on the other hand, Zéckler remarks that a fire of nettles could scarcely crackle, we advise our friend to try it for once in the end of summer with a bundle of stalks of tall dty nettles. They yield a clear blaze, a quickly expiring fire, to which here, as he well remarks, the empty laughter of foolish men is compared, who are devoid of all earnestness, and of all deep moral principles of life. This laughter is vain, like that crackling. There is a hiatus between vers. 6 and 7. For how ver. 7 can be related to ver. 6 as furnishing evidence, no interpreter has as yet been able to say. Hitzig regards 6a as assigning a reason for ver. 5, but 68 as a reply (as ver. 7 containing its motive shows) to the assertion of ver. 5,—a piece of ingenious thinking which no one imitates. Elster translates: “ Yet injustice befools a wise man,” being prudently silent about this “yet.” Zockler finds, as Knobel and Ewald do, the mediating thought in this, that the vanity of fools infects and also easily befools the wise. But the subject spoken of is not the folly of fools in general, but of their singing and laughter, to which ver. 7 has not the most remote reference. Otherwise Hengst.: “In ver. 7, the reason is given why the happiness of fools is so brief; first, the mens sana is lost, and then destruction follows.” But in that case the words ought to have been So> Sam; the remark, that 23m here denotes one who ought to be and might be such, is a pure volte. Ginsburg thinks that the two verses are co-ordinated by ‘3; that ver. 6 gives the reason for
56, and ver. 7 that for 5a, since here, by way of example, one accessible to bribery is introduced, who would act prudently in letting himself therefore be directed by a wise man. But if he had wished to be thus understood, the author would have used another word instead of o5n, 7a, and not designated both him who reproves and him who merits reproof by the one word—the former directly, the latter at least indirectly. We do not further continue the account of the many vain attempts that have been made to bring ver. 7 into connection with vers. 6 and 5, Our opinion is, that ver. 7 is the second half of a tetrastich, the first half of which is lost, which began, as is to be supposed, with tov. The first half was almost the same as Ps. xxxvii. 16, or better still, as Prov. xvi. 8, and the whole proverb stood thus:
[and then follows ver. 7 as it lies before us in the text, formed into a distich, the first line of which terminates with 037], We go still further, and suppose that after the first half of the tetrastich was lost, that expression, “also this is vain,’ added to ver. 6 by the punctuation, was inserted for the purpose of forming a connection for pwy ‘3: Also this is vain, that, etc. (5, like asher, viii. 14).
Ver. 7. Without further trying to explain the mystery of the "5, we translate this verse: “... For oppression maketh wise men mad, and corruption destroyeth the understanding.” From the lost first half of the verse, it appears that the subject here treated of is the duties of a judge, including those of aruler into whose hands his subjects, with their property and life, are given. The second half is like an echo of Ex. xxiii. 8, Deut. xvi. 19. That which nv there means is here, as at Prov. xv. 27, denoted by 2D; and PYY is accordingly oppression as it is exercised by one who constrains others who need legal aid and help generally to purchase it by means of presents. Such oppression for the sake of gain, even if it does not proceed to the perversion of justice, but only aims at courting and paying for favour, makes a wise man mad (obin, as at Job xii, 17; Isa. xliv. 25), 16. it hurries him forth, since the greed of gold increases more and more, to the most blinding immorality and regardlessness; and such presents for the purpose of swaying the judgment, and of bribery, destroys the heart, 1.06. the understanding (cf. Hos. iv. 11, Bereschith rabba, ch. lvi.), for they obscure the judgment, blunt the conscience, and make a man the slave of his passion. The conjecture WY" (riches) instead of the word the parallelism against it, and thus generally used gives an untrue thought. The word Yan does not mean “ gives lustre” (Desvoeux), angry: for anger lieth down in the bosom of fools.” The clause 8a is first thus to be objectively understood as it stands. It is not without limitation true; for of a matter in itself evil, the very contrary is true, Prov. v. 4, xxiii. 32. But if a thing is not in itself evil, the end of its progress, the reaching to its goal, the completion of its destination, is always better than its beginning, which leaves it uncertain whether it will lead to a prosperous issue. An example of this is Solon’s saying to Croesus, that only he is to be pronounced happy whose good fortune it is to end his life well in the possession of his wealth (27Zerod. i. 32).
The proverb 8d will stand in some kind of connection with 8a, since what it says is further continued in ver. 9. In itself, the frequently long and tedious development between the beginning and the end of a thing requires expectant patience. But if it is in the interest of a man to see the matter brought to an issue, an ‘BY ΤᾺ will, notwithstanding, wait with self-control in all quietness for the end; while it lies in the nature of the ™ 72, the haughty, to fret at the delay, and to seek to reach the end by violent means; for the haughty man thinks that everything must at once be to his wish, and he measures what others should do by his own measureless self-complacency. We may with Hitzig translate: “ Better is patience (77% =X) than haughtiness” (723, inf, as tov} xii. 4; Prov. xvi. 19). But there exists no reason for this; m2 is not to be held, as at Prov. xvi. 5, and elsewhere generally, as the connecting form of 333, and so ΤΣ for that of ΤῊΣ; it amounts to the same thing whether the two properties (characters) or the possessing them are compared.
Ver. 9. In this verse the author warns against this pride which, when everything does not go according to its mind, falls into passionate excitement, and thoughtlessly judges, or with a violent rude hand anticipates the end. A-OK do not overturn, hasten not, rush not, as atv. 1. Why the word 773, and not ἼΦΈ)3 or 425s, is used, vid. Psychol. pp. 197-199: passionate excitements overcome a man according to the biblical representation of his spirit, Prov. xxv. 28, and in the proving of the spirit that which is in the heart comes forth in the mood and disposition, Prov, xv. 13. Diy? is an infin., like ie, v.11. The warning has its reason in this, that anger or (Oya, taken more potentially than actually) fretfulness rests in the bosom of fools, ¢e. is cherished and nourished, and thus is at home, and, as it were (thought of personally, as if it were a wicked demon), feels itself at home (ΠΣ, as at Prov. xiv. 33). The haughty impetuous person, and one speaking out rashly, thus acts like afool. In fact, it is folly to let oneself be impelled by contradictions to anger, which disturbs the brightness of the soul, takes away the considerateness of judgment, and undermines the health, instead of maintaining oneself with equanimity, ὁ.6. without stormy excitement, and losing the equilibrium of the soul under every opposition to our wish.
From this point the proverb loses the form “ better than,’ but tov still remains the catchword of the following proverbs. The proverb here first following is so far cogn., as it is directed against a particular kind of ka’as (anger), viz. discontentment with the present.
Ver. 10. “Say not: How comes it that the former times were better than these now? for thou dost not, from wisdom, ask after this.” Cf. these lines from Horace (Poet. 173, 4):
“ Difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti Se puero, censor castigatorque minorum.”
Such an one finds the earlier days—not only the old days described in history (Deut. iv. 32), but also those he lived in before the present time (cf. e.g. 2 Chron. ix. 29)—thus by contrast so much better than the present ones, that in astonishment he asks: “ What is it = how comes it that?” etc. The author designates this question as one not proceeding from wisdom: ΠΡ, like the Mishnic 759N 7\A, and oy OND, as at Neh. i 2; ’al-zeh refers to that question, after the ground of the contrast, which is at the same time an exclamation of wonder. The ‘>, assigning a reason for the dissuasion, does not mean that the cause of the difference between the present and the good old times is easily seen; but it denotes that the supposition of this difference is foolish, because in truth every age has its bright and its dark sides; and this division of light and shadow between the past and the present betrays a want of understanding of the signs of the times and of the ways of God. This proverb ‘oes not furnish any point of support for the determination of the date of the authorship of the Book of Koheleth (vid. above, p. 213). But if it was composed in the last century of the Persian domina-
Vers. 11, 12. Externally connecting itself with “ from wisdom,” there now follows another proverb, which declares that wisdom along ‘ith an inheritance is good, but that wisdom is nevertheless of itself advantage of knowledge is this, that wisdom preserveth life to i translator, till the Venet. and Lather, nor to the Syr.,, which translates: “better is wisdom than weapons (x2? xxD),” in a singular way making 116 a duplette of ix. 18a; (2) instead of “ wisdom is as good as wealth,” would much rather be said: “ wisdom is better than wealth,” as ἐφ. Prov. viii. 11; (3) the proverb is formed like Aboth ii. 2, “ good is study connected with a citizen-like occupation,” and similar proverbs; (4) one may indeed say: “the wise man dieth with (together with) the fool” = just as well as the fool; but “ good is wisdom with wealth” can neither be equivalent to “as well as wealth,” nor: “in comparison with wealth” (Ewald, Elster), but only: “in connection with wealth (possessions);” acque ac may be suffering, but not in ἃ substantival clause consisting of 8. subst. as subject and an adj. as pred., having the form of a categorical judgment. noma denotes a possession inherited and hereditary (cf. Prov. xx. 21); and this is evidence in favour of the view that tp is meant not of comparison, but of connection; the expression would otherwise be Wray, ὍΝ is now also explained. It is not to be rendered: “and better still” (than wealth), as Herzf, Hitz, and Hengst. render it; in spite of Hengst., who decides in his own way, advantage, gain,” it denotes a prevailing good, avantage (vid. above, p. 192); and it is explained also why men are here named “ those who see the sun "—certainly not merely thus describing them poetically, as in Homer fwew is described and coloured by ὁρᾶν φάος ἠελίοιο. To see the sun, is = to have entered upon this earthly life, in which, along with wisdom, also no inheritance is to be despised. For wisdom affords protection as well as money, but the former still more than the latter. So far, the general meaning of ver. 12 is undisputed. But how is 12a to be construed? Knobel, Hitz., and others regard 3 as the so-called beth essentiae: a shadow (protection) is wisdom, a shadow is money,—very expressive, yet out of harmony, if not with the language of that period, yet with the style of Koheleth; and how useless and misleading would this doubled 3 be here! Hengstenberg translates: in the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of silver; and Zickler introduces between the two clauses “it is as.” But (1) here the shadow of wisdom, at least according to our understanding _ of ver. 11, is not likened to the shadow of silver; but in conformity _ with that oy, it must be said that wisdom, and also that money, affords a shadow; (2) but that interpretation goes quite beyond the limits of gnomic brachyology. We explain: for in the shadow ΟΥ̓, like °33, Jonah iv. 5) is wisdom, in the shadow, money; by which, without any particularly bold poetic licence, is meant that he who possesses wisdom, he who possesses money, finds himself in a shadow, ze. of pleasant security; to be in the shadow, spoken of wisdom and money, is = to sit in the shadow of the persons who possess both. Ver. 12d. The exposition of this clause is agreed upon. It is to be construed according to the accentuation: and the advantage of knowledge is this, that “wisdom preserveth life to its possessors.” The Targ. regards mp2nn nyt as connected genit.; that might be possible (cf. i. 17, viii. 16), but yet is improbable. Wherever the author uses ΓΡῚ as subst., it is an independent conception placed beside ‘pn, i. 16, ii. 26, etc. We now translate, not: wisdom gives life (LXX., Jerome, Venet., Luther) to its possessors; for 7h always means only either to revive (thus Hengst., after Ps. cxix. 25» of, ixxi: 20) or to keep in life; and this latter meaning is more appropriate to this book than the former—thus (cf. Prov. iii. 18): wisdom preserves in life—since, after Hitzig, it accomplishes this, not by rash ‘utterances of denunciation,—a thought lying far behind ver. 10, and altogether too mean,—but since it secures it against self-destruction by vice and passions and emotions, eg. anger (ver. 9), which consume life. The shadow in which wisdom (the wise man) sits keeps 1t and sound,—a result which the shadow in which money (the capitalist) sits does not afford: it has frequently the directly contrary effect.
Vers. 13, 14. There now follows a proverb of devout submission to the providence of God, connecting itself with the contents of ver. 10: “Consider the work of God: for who can make that straight which He hath made crooked! In the good day be of good cheer, and in the day of misfortune observe: God hath also made this equal to that, to the end that man need not experience anything (further) after his death.” While ©, i. 10, vii. 27, 29, is not different from 735, and in ix. 9 has the meaning of “ enjoy,” here the meaning of contemplative observation, mental seeing, connects itself both times with it. ‘> before Ὁ can as little mean quod, as asher, vi. 12, before mi can mean quoniam. “Consider God's work” means: recognise in all that is done the government of God, which has its motive in this, that, as the question leads us to suppose, no creature is able (cf. vi. 10 and i. 15) to put right God’s work in cases where it seems to contradict that which is right (Job viii. 3, xxxiv. 12), or to make straight that which He has made crooked (Ps. exlvi. 9).
Ver. 14a a. The call here expressed is parallel to Sir. xiv. 14 (Fritz.): “ Withdraw not thyself from a good day, and let not thyself lose participation in a right enjoyment.” The 3 of 3152 is, as little as that of 9¥2, the beth essentiae—it is not a designation of quality, but of condition: in good, ie. cheerful mood. He who is, Jer. xliv. 17, personally tov, cheerful (= tov ler), is U'tov (cf. Ps. xxv. 13, also Job xxi. 13). The reverse side of the call, 14a8, is of course not to be translated: and suffer or bear the bad day (Ewald, Heiligst.), for in this sense we use the expression 197 "9, Jer. xliv. 17, but not M3 48), which much rather, Obad. 13, means a malicious contemplation of the misfortune of a stranger, although once, Gen. xxi. 16, 2 7% also occurs in the sense of a compassionate, sympathizing look, and, moreover, the parall. shows that myn ors is not the obj., but the adv. designation of time. Also not: look to=be attentive to (Salomon), or bear it patiently (Burger), for 7 cannot of itself have that meaning.’ But: in the day of misfortune observe, ic. perceive and reflect: God has also made (cf. Job ii. 10) the latter M2¥> corresponding, parallel, like to (cf. under v. 15) the former.
So much the more difficult is the statement of the object of this mingling by God of good and evil in the life of man. It is translated: that man may find nothing behind him; this is literal, but it is meaningless. The meaning, according to most interpreters, is
1 Similarly also Sobar (Par. ΣῊ): 121 ὙΠ, ie. cave et circumspice, viz. that thou mayest not incur the judgment which is pronounced.
this: that man may investigate nothing that lies behind his present time,—thus, that belongs to the future; in other words: that man may never know what is before him. But aharav is never (not at vi. 12) = in the future, lying out from the present of aman; but always = after his present life. Accordingly, Ewald explains, and Heiligst. with him: that he may find nothing which, dying, he could take with him. But this rendering (cf. ν. 14) is here unsuitable. Better, Hitzig: because God wills it that man shall be rid of all things after his death, He puts evil into the period of his life, and lets it alternate with good, instead of visiting him therewith after his death. This explanation proceeds from a right interpretation of the words: ideirco ut (cf. 111, 18) non inveniat homo post se quidquam, scil. quod non expertus sit, but gives a meaning to the expression which the author would reject as unworthy of his conception of God. What is meant is much more this, that God causes man to experience good and evil that he may pass through the whole school of life, and when he departs hence that nothing may be outstanding (in arrears) which he has not experienced.
The Injuriousness of Excesses, vii. 15-18.
The concluding section, vil. 1-14, is now followed by /-sections, 1.6. advices in the form of actually experienced facts, in which again the J of the author comes into the foreground.
Vers. 15-18. The first of these counsels warns against extremes, on the side of good as well as on that of evil: “All have I seen in the days of my vanity: there are righteous men who perish by their righteousness, and there are wicked men who continue long by their wickedness. Be not righteous over-much, and show not thyself wise beyond measure: why wilt thou ruin thyself? Be not wicked overmuch, and be no fool: why wilt thou die before thy time is? It is good that thou holdest thyself to the one, and also from the other withdrawest not thine hand: for he that feareth God accomplisheth it all.” One of the most original English interpreters of the Book of Koheleth, T. Tyler (1874), finds in the thoughts of the book—composed, according to his view, about 200 B.c.—and in their expression, references to the post-Aristotelian philosophy, particularly to the Stoic, variously interwoven with orientalism. But here, in vers. 15-18, we perceive, not so much the principle of the Stoical ethics—r9 φύσει ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν—ἃθ that of the Aristotelian, according to which virtue consists in the art μέσως ἔχειν, the art of holding the middle between extremes.’ Also, we do not find here a reference to the contrasts between Pharisaism and Sadduceeism such a predilection for Epicurism,—as, according to Josephus (Vit. c. 2), “the doctrine of the Pharisees is of kin to that of the Stoies,” __yet npry and AFP? are not apportioned between these two parties, especially since the overstraining of conformity to the law by the Pharisees related not to the moral, but to the ceremonial law. We derive nothing for the right understanding of the passage from referring the wisdom of life here recommended to the tendencies of the time. The author proceeds from observation, over against which
San " (pid. vi. 12) he so designates the long, but for the most part nsclessly spent life lying behind him. 277M is not “everything possible” (Zéck1.), but “all, of all kinds” (Luth.), which is detined by 154 πα of two kinds; for 15a is the introduction of the following experience relative to the righteous and the unrighteous, and thus to the two classes into which all men are divided. We do not translate: there are the righteous, who by their righteousness, etc. (Umbr., Hitzig, and others); for if the author should thus commence, it would appear as if he wished to give unrighteousness the preference to righteousness, which, however, was far from him. To perish in or by his righteousness, to live long in or by his wickedness (TD, scil, DC, viii 13, as at Prov. xxviii. 2), is=to die in spite of righteousness, to live in spite of wickedness, as ἐφ. Deut. i. 32: “in this thing" =in spite of, ete. Righteousness has the promise of long life as its reward; but if this is the rule, it has yet its exceptions, and the author thence deduces the doctrine that one should not exaggerate righteousness; for if it occurs that a righteous man; in spite of his righteousness, perishes, this happens, at earliest, in the case in which, in the practice of righteousness, he goes beyond the right measure and limit. The relative conceptions "24? and ΤῊ have here, since they are referred to the idea of the right measure, the meaning of nimis. o>nnn could mean, “to play the wise man;” but that, whether more or less done, is objectionable. It means, as at Ex. i. 10, to act wisely (of. Pa ον. 25, 0, to act cunningly). And ‘ti, which is elsewhere used of being inwardly torpid, ἐε. being. astonished, obstupescere, has here the meaning of placing oneself ine benumbed, disordered state, or also, passively, of becoming disconcerted; not of becoming desolate or being deserted (Hitz., Ginsburg, and others), which it could only mean in highly poetic discourse (Isa. liv. 1). The form 187 is syncop., like ‘27, Num. xxi. 27; and the question, with md, here and at 174, is of the same kind as v. i Luther, weakening it: “that thou mayest not destroy thyself.”
. Ver. 17. Up to this point all is clear: righteousness and wisdom are good and wholesome, and worth striving for; but even in these a transgressing of the right measure is possible (Luther remembers the swmmum jus summa injuria), which has as a consequence, that they become destructive to man, because he thereby becomes a caricature, and either perishes rushing from one extreme into another, or is removed out of the way by others whose hatred he provokes. But it is strange that the author now warns against an excess in wickedness, so that he seems to find wickedness, up to a certain degree, praiseworthy and advisable. So much the stranger, since “be no fool” stands as contrast to “show not thyself wise,” etc.; so that “but also be no wicked person” was much rather to be expected as contrast to “be not righteous over-much.” Zockler seeks to get over this difficulty with the remark: “ Koheleth does not recommend a certain moderation in wickedness as if he considered it allowable, but only because he recognises the fact as established, that every man is by nature somewhat wicked.” The meaning would then be: man’s life is not free from wickedness, but be only not too wicked! The offensiveness of the advice is not thus removed; and besides, 18a demands, in a certain sense, an intentional wickedness,—indeed, as 18) shows, a wickedness in union with the fear of God. The correct meaning of “be not wicked over-much” may be found if for ywnn we substitute ROMA; in this form the good counsel at once appears as impossible, for it would be immoral, since “sinning,” in all circumstances, is an act which carries in itself its own sentence of condemnation. Thus yw must here be a setting oneself free from the severity of the law, which, although sin in the eyes of the over-righteous, is yet no ‘sin in itself; and the author here thinks, in accordance with the spirit of his book, principally of that fresh, free, joyous life to which he called the young, that joy of life in its fulness which appeared to him as the best and fairest reality in this present time; but along with that, perhaps also of transgressions of the letter of the law, f shaking off the scruples of conscience which conformity to Godordained circumstances brings along with it. He means to say: be t a narrow rigorist,—enjoy life, accommodate thyself to life; but not the reins be too loose; and be no fool whe wantonly places himself above law and discipline: Why wilt thou destroy thy life before the time by suffering vice to kill thee (Ps. xxxiv. 22), and by want of understanding ruin thyself (Prov. x. 21) 1"
Ver. 18. “It is good that thou holdest fast to the one,"—viz. other—viz. a wickedness which renounces over-righteousness and over-wisdom, or an unrestrained life;—for he who fears God accomplishes all, i. both, the one as well as the other. Luther, against the Vulg.: “for he who fears God escapes all” But what
But that he does not destroy himself and does not die before his mediately precedes, this ought to have the preference. Ginsburg, with Hitzig: “ Whoso feareth God will make his way with both;” but what an improbable phrase! Jerome, with his vague nihil negligit, is right as to the meaning. In the Bible, the phrase ‘1... *¥, eqressus est urbem, Gen. xliv. 4, ef Jer. x. 20, is used; and in the Mishna, ‘n2in τς KF, ie he has discharged his duty, he is quit of it by fulfilling it. For the most part, xx merely is used: he has satisfied his duty; and xx νῷ, he has not satisfied it, eg. Berachoth ii. 1. Accordingly *¥—since éth-kullam relates to, “these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone,” Matt. xxiii, 23— here means: he who fears God will set himself free from all, will acquit himself of the one as well as of the other, will perform both, and thus preserve the golden via media.
What protects him who with all his Righteousness is not free from Sin, and what becomes him, vii. 19-22.
The thought with which the following sentence is introduced is not incongruous to that going before. But each one of these moral proverbs and aphorisms is in itself a little whole, and the deeper connections, in the discovery of which interpreters vie with each other,
1 An old proverb, Sota 3a, says: “ A man commits no trangression unless there rules in him previously the spirit of folly.”
are destitute of exegetical value. One must not seek to be overwise; but the possession of wisdom deserves to be highly valued.
Ver, 19. “ Wisdom affords strong protection to the wise man more than ten mighty men who are in the city.” We have to distinguish, as is shown under Ps. xxxi. 3, the verbs NY, to be strong, and ny, to flee for refuge; "97 is the fut. of the former, whence 19, stronghold, safe retreat, protection, and with 5 since ny means not only to be strong, but also to show oneself strong, as at ix. 20, to feel and act as one strong; it has also the trans. meaning, to strengthen, as shown in Ps. xviii. 29, but here the intrans. suffices: wisdom proves itself strong for the wise man. The ten shallithim are not, with Ginsburg, to be multiplied indefinitely into “many mighty men.” And it is not necessary, with Desvoeux, Hitz., Zéckl., and others, to think of ten chiefs (commanders of forces), including the portions of the city garrison which they commanded. The author probably in this refers to some definite political arrangement (vid. above, p. 216), perhaps to the ten archons, like those Assyrian saat, vice-regents, after whom as eponyms the year was named by the Greeks. 3¥, in the Asiatic kingdom, was not properly a military title. And did a town then need protection only in the time of war, and not also at other times, against injury threatening its trade, against encroachments on its order, against the spread of infectious diseases, against the force of the elements? As the Deutero-Isaiah (lx. 17) says of Jerusalem: “J will make thy officers peace, and thine exactors righteousness,” sv Koheleth says here that wisdom affords a wise man as strong a protection as a powerful decemvirate a city; cf Prov. xxiv. 5a: “ A wise man is ba’oz,” 1.6. mighty.
Ver. 20. “ For among men there is not a righteous man on the earth, who doeth good, and sinneth not.” The original passage, found in Solomon’s prayer at the consecration of the temple, is briefer, 1 Kings viii. 46: “ There is no man who sinneth not.” Here the words might be ‘13) PY DIN PS, there is no righteous man... Adam stands here as representing the species, as when we say in Germ.: Menschen gibt es keine gerechten auf Hrden [men, there are none righteous on earth]; cf. Ex. v. 16: “ Straw, none was given.” The verification of ver. 19 by reference to the fact of the common sinfulness from which even the most righteous cannot free himself, does not contradict all expectation to the same degree as the / in vi. 7; but yet it surprises us, so that Mercer and Gritz, with Aben Ezra, take ver. 20 as the verification of ver. 16, here first adduced, and Knobel and Heiligst. and others connect it with vers. 21, 22, translating: “Because there is not a just man..., therefore it 15 also the part of wisdom to take no heed unto all words,” ete. But these are all forced interpretations; instead of the latter, we would rather suppose that ver. 20 originally stood after ver. 22, and is separated from its correct place. But yet the sequence of thought lying before us may be conceived, and that not merely as of necessity, but as that which was intended by the author, On the whole, Hitzig is correct: “ For every one, even the wise man, sins; in which case virtue, which has forsaken him, does not protect him, but wisdom proves itself as his means of defence.” Zockler adds: “ against the judicial justice of God;” but one escapes from this by a penitent appeal to grace, for which there is no need for the personal property of wisdom; there is thus reason rather for thinking on the dangerous consequences which often a single false step has fora man in other respects moral; in the threatening complications in which he is thereby involved, it is wisdom which then protects him and delivers him. Otherwise Tyler, who by the ty, which the wise has in wisdom, understands power over evil, which is always moving itself even in the righteous. Bat the sinning spoken of in ver. 20 is that which is unavoidable, which even wisdom cannot prevent or make inefficacious. On the contrary, it knows how to prevent the destruction which threatens man from his transgressions, and to remove the difficulties and derange- by gam with the foregoing. The exhortation to strive after wisdom, contained in ver. 19, which affords protection against the evil effects of the failures which ran through the life of the righteous, is followed by the exhortation, that one conscious that he himself is not free from transgression, should take heed to avoid that tale-bearing
Vers. 21, 22. “ Also give not thy heart to all the words which one speaketh, lest thou shouldest hear thy servant curse thee. For thy heart knoweth in many cases that thou also hast cursed others.” The talk of the people, who are the indef. subj. of M37, (LXX, wanting; and why should a servant be zealous to utter impreca- ip. expression of the pred. obj. follows the analogy of Gen. xxi. 9, Ewald, δ 284%, and is not a Graecism; for since in this place hearing is meant, not immediately, but mediated throuch others, the expression would not in good Greek be with the LXX,... τοῦ δούλου σου καταρωμένου ce, but τὸν δοῦλόν σου καταρᾶσθαι ge. The warning has its motive in this, that by such roundabout hearing one generally hears most unpleasant things; and on hearsay no reliance can be placed. Such gossiping one should ignore, should not listen to it at all; and if, nevertheless, something so bad is reported as that our own servant has spoken words of imprecation against us, yet we ought to pass that by unheeded, well knowing that we ourselves have often spoken harsh words against others. The expression 12 YT, “thou art conscious to thyself that,” is like Ὃ 'Y®, 1 Kings ii. 44, not the obj. accus. dependent on y? (Hitz.), “many cases where also thou...,” but the adv. accus. of time to nodD; the words are inverted (Ewald, § 336d), the style of Koheleth being fond of thus giving prominence to the chief conception (ver. 20, v. 18, iii. 13). The first gam, although it belongs to “thine, thy,” as at 22) it is also connected with “thou,”! stands at the beginning of the sentence, after such syntactical examples as Hos. vi. 11; Zech. ix. 11; and even with a two-membered sentence, Job ii. 10,
The not-found, and the found the bitterest —a Woman, vii. 23-29.
The author makes here a pause, looks back at the teaching regarding prudence, already given particularly from ver. 15, and acknowledges wisdom as the goal of his effort, especially, however, that for him this goal does not lie behind him, but before him in the remote distance.
Ver. 23. “ All this have I proved by wisdom: I thought, Wise I will become; but it remained far from me.” The 3 in 313 is, as at i. 13, that designating the organon, the means of knowledge. Thus he possessed wisdom up to a certain degree, and in part; but his purpose, comprehended in the one word 793N8 (vid. above, p. 1 oT. § 2), was to possess it fully and completely; zc. not merely to be able to record observations and communicate advices, but to adjust the contradictions of life, to expound the mysteries of time and eternity, and generally to solve the most weighty and important questions which perplex men. But this wisdom was for him stillin the remote distance. It is the wisdom after which Job, chap. xxviii, made
FINDS, on account of the half pause, accented on the penult. according to the fs = inquiry in all regions of the world and at all creatures, at last to discover that God has appointed to man only a limited share of wisdom. Koheleth briefly condenses Job xxviii. 12-22 in the words following:
Ver. 24. “ For that which is, is far off, and deep,—yes, deep; who can reach it?” Knobel, Hitz, Vaih, and Bullock translate: for what is remote and deep, deep, who can find it? i investigate it; but mah-shehayah is everywhere an idea by itself, and means either has not come into existence. In this way it is also not to be translated: For it is far off what it (wisdom) is (ZéckL) [= what wisdom is lies far off from human knowledge], or: what it is (the historical, he here says of the world of things: this (in its essence and its grounds) remains far off from man; it is for him, and also in itself and for all creatures, far too deep (PO? poy, the ancient expression for the superlative): Who can intelligibly reach (TO, from *¥P, foundation of things: “I turned myself, and my heart was there to discern, and to explore, and to seek wisdom, and the account, and to perceive wickedness as folly, and folly as madness.” Regarding sabbothi, vid. under ii. 20: a turning is meant to the theme as given in what follows, which, as we have to suppose, was connected with — a turning away from superficiality and frivolity. Almost all inalso the accentuation does—connect the two words ‘x7 ‘2; but “I and my heart” is so unpsychological an expression, without example, that many Codd. (28 of Kennicott, 44 of de Rossi) read ‘373 [with my heart]. The erasure of the vav (as ey. Luther: “I applied my heart”) would at the same time require the change of ΩΣ into ‘M200. The Targ., Jerome, and the Venet. render the word ‘253; the LXX. and Syr., on the contrary, ‘251; and this also is allowable, if we place the disjunctive on ‘8 and take ah as consequent: my heart, ie. my striving and effort, was to discern (Aben Ezra, Herzf., Stuart),—a substantival clause instead of the verbal ΤΙΝ 'AND,i. 13,117. Regarding tur in an intellectual sense, vid. i.13. Hheshbon (vid. above, p. 192), with Ahochmah, we have translated by “ Rechenschaft” [account, ratio]; for we understand by it a knowledge well grounded and exact, and able to be established,—the facit of a calculation of all the facts and circumstances relating thereto; »av’n jn) is Mishnic, and = the N. T. λόγον ἀποδιδόναι. Of the two accus. 25) following ΠΡῚΡ, the first, as may be supposed, and as the determination in the second member shows, is that of the obj., the second that of the pred. (Ewald, δ 2845): that ¥e>, ie. conduct separating from God and from the law of that which is good, is kesel, Thorheit, folly (since, as Socrates also taught, all sinning rests on a false calculation, to the sinner’s own injury); and that hassichluth, Narrheit, foolishness, stultitia (vid. sachal, p. 194, and i. 17), is to be thus translated (in contradistinction to 50>), i.e. an intellectual and moral obtuseness, living for the day, rising up into foolery, not different from holeloth, fury, madness, and thus like a physical malady, under which men are out of themselves, rage, andaremad. CKoheleth’s striving after wisdom thus, at least in the second instance (nyt), with a renunciation of the transcendental, went towards a practical end. And now he expresses by xyipi one of the experiences he had reached in this way of research. How much value he attaches to this experience is evident from the long preface, by means of which it is as it were distilled. We see him there on the way to wisdom, to metaphysical wisdom, if we may so speak—it remains as far off from him as he seeks to come near to it. We then see him, yet not renouncing the effort after wisdom, on the way toward practical wisdom, which exercises itself in searching into the good and the bad; and that which has presented itself to him as the bitterest of the bitter is— ἃ woman.
Ver. 26. “And I found woman more bitter than death; she is like hunting-nets, and like snares is her heart, her hands are bands: he who pleaseth God will escape from her; but the sinner is caught by them.” As δ ‘tA, iv. 2, so here ὁ ‘ (vid. above, p. 197, 1, and
198, 3) gains by the preceding “3% ‘M201 a past sense;* the particip. clause stands frequently thus, not only as a circumstantial clause, Gen. xiv. 12 ἢ, but also as principal clause, Gen. ii. 10, in an historical connection. The preceding pred. Ἴ9, in the mas. ground-form, follows the rule, Gesen. § 147. Regarding the constructien of the relative clause, Hitzig judges quite correctly: “®7 is copula between subj. and pred., and precedes for the sake of the contrast, giving emphasis to the pred. It cannot be a nomin., which would be taken up by the suff. in 429, since if this latter were subject also to '¥o, τ πὶ would not certainly be found. Also asker here is not a conj.” This aw (XA), which in relative substantival clauses represents the copula, for the most part stands separated from asher, eg. Gen. vii. 2, xvii. 12, Num. xvii. 5, Deut. xvii. 15; less frequently immediately with it, Num. xxxv. 31; 1 Sam. x. 19; 2 Kings xxv. 19; Lev. xi. 26; Deut. xx. 20. But this asher Au (Ai) never represents the subj., placed foremost and again resumed by the reflex. pronoun, so as to be construed as the accentuation requires; quae quidem retia et laquet cor ejus=cujus quidem cor sunt retia εἰ laquei (Heiligst.). WO is the means of searching, ἐς. either of hunting: hunting-net (mitsodah, ix. 12), or of blockading: siege-work, ponte apes ix. 14; here it is the plur. of the word in the former meaning. OV, Hab. i. 14, plur. Ezek. xxvi. 5, etc. (perhaps from ΟΠ, to pierce, bore through), is one of the many synon. for fishing-net. S°)0x, fetters, the hands (arms) of voluptuous embrace (cf. above, p. 191). The primary form, after Jer. xxxvii. 15, is WOR, WOR; οἵ, ORM, ‘OK, Job xxxix. 9. Of the three clauses following asher, ταν is found in the second and is wanting to the third, as at Deut. xxix. 22, Job xlii 9, Ps. xlv. 9, Isa. i 13; ef. on the other hand, Isa. xxxiii. 6. Similar in their import are these Leonine verses:
** Femina praeclara facie quasi pestis amara, Et quasi fermentum corrumpit cor sapientum.”
That the author is in full earnest in this harsh judgment regarding woman, is shown by 26): he who appears to God as good (cf. ii. 26) escapes from her (the fut. of the consequence of this his relation to God); but the sinner (REI, ef. above, p. 254, note) is caught by her, or, properly, i in her, viz. the net-like woman, or the net to which she is compared (Ps. ix. 16; Isa. xxiv. 18). The harsh judgment is, however, not applicable to woman as such, but
2 With reference to this passage and Prov. xviii. 22, it was common in
Palestine when ove was married to ask N¥YID IN ΚΥΌ = happy or unhappy? Jebamoth 630, to woman as she is, with only rare exceptions; among a thousand women he has not found one corresponding to the idea of a woman.
Vers. 27, 28. “Behold what I have found, saith Koheleth, adding one thing to another, to find out the account: What my soul hath still sought, and I have not found, (is this): one man among a thousand have I found; and a woman among all these have I not found.” It is the ascertained result, “one man, etc.,” which is solemnly introduced by the words preceding. Instead of TP ὌΝ, the words P79 7D are to be read, after xii. 8, as is now generally acknowledged; errors of transcription of a similar kind are found aj 2 Sam. v. 2; Job xxxviii. 12. Ginsburg in vain disputes this, maintaining that the name Koheleth, as denoting wisdom personified, may be regarded as fem. as well as mas.; here, where the female sex is so much depreciated, was the fem. self-designation of the stern judge specially unsuitable (cf. above, p. 204). Hengst. supposes that Koheleth is purposely fem. in this one passage, since true wisdom, represented by Solomon, stands opposite to false philosophy. But this reason for the fem. rests on the false opinion that woman here is heresy personified; he further remarks that it is significant for this fem. personification, that there is “no writing of female authorship in the whole canon of the O. and N. Τ᾽ But what of Deborah’s triumphal song, the song of Hannah, the magnificat of Mary? We hand this absurdity over to the Clementines! The woman here was flesh and blood, but pulchra quamvis pellis est mens tamen plena procellis; and Koheleth is not incarnate wisdom, but the official name of a preacher, as in Assyr., for ὉΠ, curators, overseers, hazandti* is used. ΠῚ, 27a, points, as at i. 10, to what follows. ° nn&, one thing to another (cf. Isa. xxvii. 12), must have been, like summa summarum and the like, a common arithmetical and dialectical formula, which is here subordinate to '%?, since an adv. inf. such as nipe is to be supplemented: taking one thing to another to find out the ji2N, 1.2. the balance of the account, and thus to reach a facit, a resultat.
That which presented itself to him in this way now follows. It was, in relation to woman, a negative experience: “ What my soul sought on and on, and I found not, (is this)” The words are like the superscription of the following result, in which finally the δι of 27a terminates. Ginsburg, incorrectly: “what my soul is still seeking,” which would have required nYp2>. The pret. 1¥P2 (with p without Dagesh, as at ver. 29) is retrospective; and Ἣν, from a woman such as she ought to be: a man, one of a thousand, 1 have found, etc. With right, the accentuation gives Garshayim to adam; it stands forth, as at ver. 20, as ἃ general denominator—the sequence of accents, Geresh, Pashta, Zakef, is as at Gen. i. 9. “One among a thousand” reminds us of Job xxxiii, 23, of. ix. 3; the old interpreters (vid. Dachselt’s Bibi. Accentuata), with reference to these parallels, connect with the one man among a thousand all kinds of incongruous christological thoughts. Only, here adam, like the Romanic [homme and the like, means man in sexual contrast to woman. It is thus ideally meant, like ish, 1 Sam. iv. 9, xlvi. 15, and accordingly also the parall. MY™. For it is not to be supposed woman,” is a useless evasion. Man has the name adam κατ᾽ ἐξ. by primitive hist. right: “for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man,” 1 Cor. xi. 8. The meaning, besides, is not that among a thousand human beings he found one upright man, but not ἃ good woman (Hitz),—for then the thousand ought to have had its proper denominator, 1% "%3,—but that among a thousand persons of the male sex he found only one man such as he ought to be, and among a thousand of the female sex not one woman such as she ought to be; “among all these” is thus = among an equal number. Gince he thus actually found the ideal of man only seldom, and that of woman still seldomer (for more than this is not denoted by the round numbers), the more surely does he resign himself to the following resultat, which he introduces by the word 12> (only, alone), as the clear gain of his searching:
Ver. 29. “Lo, this only have I found, that God created man upright; but they seek many arts.” Also here the order of the words is inverted, since πὶ, belonging as obj. to ὙΦ (have I found), which is restricted by 729 (vid. above, p. 193), is amalgamated with TW (Lo! see ἢ. The author means to say: Only this (solummodo hocce) have I found, that...; the 7 is an interjected nota bene. The expression: God has made man 7%, is dogmatically significant. Man, as he came from the Creator’s hand, was not placed in the state of moral decision,
1 As generally the Piel forms of the root Up3, Masor. all have Raphe on the p, except the imper. ΕΣ vid. Luzzatto’s Gramm. § 417.
nor yet in the state of absolute indifference between good and evil; he was not neither good nor bad, but he was 3, or, which is the same thing, 7v*; te. in every respect normal, so that he could normally develope himself from this positively good foundation. But by the expression W* nvy, Koheleth has certainly not exclusively his origin in view, but at the same time his relative continuation in the propagation of himself, not without the concurrence of the Creator; also of man after the fall the words are true, νη πῶ, in so far as man still possesses the moral ability not to indulge sinful affections within him, nor suffer them to become sinful actions. But the sinful affections in the inborn nature of weak sinful man have derived so strong a support from his freedom, that the power of the will over against this power of nature is for the most part as weakness; the dominance of sin, where it is not counteracted by the grace of God, has always shown itself so powerful, that Koheleth has to complain of men of all times and in all circles of life: they seek many arts (as Luther well renders it), or properly, calculations, inventions, devices (hhishsh*vonoth,' as at 2 Chron. xxvi. 15, from hhishsh‘von, which is as little distinguished from the formation hhéshbon, as hhizeayon from hhézyon), viz. of means and ways, by which they go astray from the normal natural development into abnormities. In other words: inventive refined degeneracy has come into the place of moral simplicity, ἁπλότης (2 Chron. xi. 3). As to the opinion that caricatures of true human nature, contrasts between the actual and that which ought to be (the ideal), are common, particularly among the female sex, the author has testimonies in support of it from all nations. It is confirmed by the primitive history itself, in which the woman appears as the first that was led astray, and as the seducer (cf. Psychol. pp. 103-106). With reference to this an old proverb says: “Women carry in themselves a frivolous mind,” Kiddushin 800.’ And because a woman, when she has fallen into evil, surpasses a man 1Π fiendish superiority therein, the Midrash reckons under this passage before us fifteen things of which the one is worse than the other; the thirteenth is death, and the fourteenth a bad woman.’ Hitzig supposes that the author has before him as his model Agathoclea, the mistress of the fourth Ptolemy Philopator. But also the history of the Persian Court affords dreadful examples of the truth of the proverb: “ Woe to the age whose leader is a woman; 4 ond generally the harem is a den of female wickedness.
Wise Conduct towards the King and under Despotic Oppression, viii. 1-9.
If now the sentence first following sings the praise of wisdom, it does not stand out of connection with the striving after wisdom, which the author, vii. 23 f, has confessed, and with the experiences announced in vii. 25 ff, which have presented themselves to him in the way of the search after wisdom, so far as wisdom was attainable. It is the incomparable superiority of the wise man which the first verse here announces and verifies.
viii. 1. “ Who is like the wise? and who understandeth the interpretation of things? The wisdom of a man maketh his face bright, and the rudeness of his face is changed.” Unlike this saying: “ Who is like the wise?” are the formulas 037 Ὁ, Hos. xiv. 10, Jer. xi. 11, Ps. cvii. 43, which are compared by Hitzig and others. “ Who is like the wise?” means: Who is equal to him? and this question, after the scheme nob3~», Ex. xv. 11, presents him as one who has not his like among men. Instead of ΠΣ the word 0272 might be used, after 0279, ii 16, etc. The syncope is, as at Ezek. xl 25, omitted, which frequently occurs, particularly in the more modern books, Ezek. xlvii. 22; 2 Chron x. 7, xxv. 10, xxix. 27; Neh. ix. 19, xii. 38. The regular giving of Dagesh to 3 after Ὅ, with Jethib, not Mahpach, is as at ver. 7 after ‘>; Jethid is a disjunctive. The second question is not ΚΣ ὍΝ, but ΚΙ, and thus does not mean: who is like the man of understanding, but: who understands, viz. as the wise man does; thus it characterizes the incomparably excellent as such. Many interpreters (Ocetinger, Ewald, Hitz, Heiligst., Burg., Elst., Zick.) persuade themselves that 133 7¥8 is meant of the understanding of the proverb, 8b. The absence of the art., says Hitzig, does not mislead us: of a proverb, viz. the following; but in this manner determinate ideas may be made from all indeterminate ones. Rightly, Gesenius: explicationem ullius rei; better, as at vii 8: cujusvis ret. Ginsburg compares 737 #22, 1 Sam. xvi. 18, which, however, does not mean him who has the knowledge of things, but who is well acquainted with words. It is true that here also the chief idea we first leads to the meaning rerbum (according to which the LXX., Jer., the Targ., and Syr. translate; the Venet.: ἑρμηνείαν λόγου); but since the unfolding or explaining (péshér) refers to the actual contents of the thing spoken, verbi and rei coincide. The wise man knows how to explain difficult things, to unfold mysterious things; in short, he understands how to go to the foundation of things.
What now follows, 15, might be introduced by the confirming
‘2, but after the manner of synonymous parallelism it places itself in the same rank with la, since, that the wise man stands so high, and no one like him looks through the centre of things, is repeated in another form: “Wisdom maketh his face bright” is thus to be understood after Ps. cxix. 130 and xix. 9, wisdom draws the veil from his countenance, and makes it clear; for wisdom is related to folly as light is to darkness, ii. 13. The contrast, δὴ... ἢ (“and the rudeness of his face is changed”), shows, however, that not merely the brightening of the countenance, but in general that intellectual and ethical transfiguration of the countenance is meant, in which at once, even though it should not in itself be beautiful, we discover the educated man rising above the commonrank. To translate, with Ewald: and the brightness of his countenance is doubled, is untenable; even supposing that 82% can mean, like the Arab. yuthattay, duplicatur, still ty, in the meaning of brightness, is in itself, and especially with 28, impossible, along with which it is, without doubt, to be understood after az panim, Deut. xxviii. 50, Dan. viii. 23, and hé’éz panim, Prov. vii. 13, or b’phanim, Prov. xxi. 29, so that thus 0°25 ty has the same meaning as the post-bib]. 0°25 nwy, stiffness, hardness, rudeness of countenance = boldness, want of bashfulness, regardlessness, e.g. Shabbath 30b, where we find a prayer in these words: O keep me this day from 05 “y and from ‘5 my (that I may not incur the former or the latter). The Talm. Taanith 70, thus explaining, says: “ Every man to whom ‘5 my belongs, him one may hate, as the scripture says, 82... 1 (do not read §2¥”).” The LXX. translates μισηθήσεται [will be hated], and thus also the Syr.; both have thus read as the Talm. has done, which, however, bears witness in favour of 830 as the traditional reading. It 15 not at all necessary, with Hitzig, after Zirkel, to read 83¥": but boldness disfigureth his countenance; ty in itself alone, in the meaning of boldness, would, it is true, along with 15 as the obj. of the verb, be tenable; but the change is unnecessary, the passive affords a perfectly intelligible meaning: the boldness, or rudeness, of his visage is changed, viz. by wisdom (Béttch., Ginsb., Zockl.). The verb lv (sv, Lam. iv. 1) means, Mal. iii. 6, merely “to change, to become different;” the Pih. 73¥, Jer. lii, 33, 832, 2 Kings xxv. 29, denotes in these two passages a change in melius, and the proverb of the Greek, Sir. xiii. 24,— Καρδία ἀνθρώπου ἀλλοιοῖ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ, ἐάν τε εἰς ἀγαθὰ ἐάν τε εἰς κακά, is preserved to us in its original form thus:
tolerably falls in with what is here said of wisdom: Wisdom gives bright eyes to ἃ man, 8 gentle countenance, a noble expression; it refines and dignifies his external appearance and his demeanour; the hitherto rude external, and the regardless, selfish, and bold deportment, are changed into their contraries, If, now, ver. 1 is not to be regarded as an independent proverb, it will bear somewhat the relation of a prologue to what follows. Luther and others regard la as of the nature of an epilogue to what goes before; parallels, such as Hos. xiv. 10, make that appear probable; but it cannot be yielded, because the words are not 02m‘, but 'ππῷ Ὁ. But that which follows easily subordinates itself to ver. 1, in as far as fidelity to duty and thoughtfulness amid critical social relations are proofs of that wisdom which sets a man free from impetuous rudeness, and fits him intelligently and with a clear mind to accommodate himself to the time.
Ver. 2. The faithfulness of subjects, Koheleth says, is a religious duty: “I say: Observe well the king’s command, and that because of the oath of God.” The author cannot have written 2a as it here besides, this distribution of the expressions of the Book of Koheleth sible, although Hengst. it as possible; for (1) “ the oath of God” he understands, against all usage, of the oath which is taken to God; and (2) he maintains that in the O. T. scarcely any passage is to be found where obedience to a heathen master is set forth as a religious duty. But the prophets show themselves as morally great men, without a stain, just in this, that they decidedly condemn and unhesitatingly chastise any breach of faith committed acainst the Assyrian or Chaldean oppressor, ¢.g. Isa. xxviii. 15, xxx, 1; Ezek. xvii. 15; cf. Jer. xxvii. 12. However, although we understand mélek not of the heavenly, but of an earthly king, yet OY does not recommend itself, for Koheleth records his experience, and derives therefrom warnings and admonitions; but he never in this manner presents himself as an example of virtue. The paraenetic imper. YoY is thus not to be touched. Can we then use ani elliptically, as equivalent to “I say as follows”? Passages such as Jer. xx. 10 (Elst.), where oN? is omitted, are not at all the same. Also Ezek. xxxiv. 11, where ‘227 is strengthened by ani, and the expression is not elliptical, is not in point here. And Isa. v. 9 also does not apply to the case of the supposed ellipsis here. In an ingenious bold manner the Midrash helps itself in Lev. xviii. and Num. xiv., for with reference to the self-introduction of royal words like ΠΡῚΒ 2K it explains: “Observe the J from the mouth of the king.” This explanation is worthy of mention, but it has little need of refutation; it is also contrary to the accentuation, which gives Pashta to ani, as since this elliptical Z, after which we would place a colon, is insufferably harsh, and since also it does not recommend itself to omit it, as is done by the LXX., the Targ., and Syr.—for the words must then have a different order, 1207 Β ov’ — it is most advisable to supply ‘AION, and to write ‘OX ‘IN or WN ‘OX, after 11. 1, iii. 17,18. We find ourselves here, besides, within an J section, consisting of sentences interwoven in a Mashal form. The admonition is solemnly introduced, since Koheleth, himself a king, and a wise man in addition, gives it the support of the authority of his person, in which it is to be observed that the religious motive introduced by 1 explic. (vid. Ewald, ὃ 340d) is not merely an appendix, but the very point of the admonition. Kleinert, incorrectly: “Direct thyself according to the mouth of the king, and that, too, as according to an oath of God.” Were this the meaning, then we might certainly wish that it were a servile Alexandrian court-Jew who said it. But why should that be the meaning? The meaning “wegen” [because of], which is usually attributed to the word-connection ΠΣ ΠΡ here and at iii. 18, vii. 14, Kleinert maintains to be an arbitrary invention. But it alone fits these three passages, and why an arbitrary invention? If 727, Ps. xlv. 5, Ixxix. 9, etc., means “von wegen” [on account of], then also nin->y will signify “propter rationem, naturam,” as well as (Ps. cx. 4) ad rationem. ON ‘WW is, as elsewhere ‘1 ‘av, eg. Ex. xxii. 10, a promise given under an appeal to God, 6 declaration or promise strengthened by an oath. Here it is the oath of obedience which is meant, which the covenant between a king and his people includes, though it is not expressly entered into by individuals. The king is designated neither as belonging to the nation, nor as a foreigner; that which is said is valid also in the case of the latter. Daniel, Nehemiah, Mordecai, etc., acted in conformity with the words of Koheleth, and the oath of vassalage which the kings of Israel and Judah swore to the kings of Assyria and of Babylon is regarded by the prophets of both kingdoms as binding on king and people (vid. above, p. 213).
Ver, 3. The warning, corresponding to the exhortation, now follows: One must not thoughtlessly avoid the duty of service and homage due to the king: “Hasten not to go away from him: join not in an evil matter; for he executeth all that he desireth.” Re- ing the connection, of two verbs with one idea, lying before us in Ton... DR, as eg. at Zech. viii 15, Hos. i 6, vid. Gesen. § 142. 8). Instead of this sentence, we might use ὍΣΟ n> Snan Se, as eg. Aboth v. 8: “The wise man does not interrupt another, and hastens not to answer.” ἐξ is not too hasty in answering. As with OP, to be with the king, iv. 15 =to hold with him, so here yxno pn means to take oneself away from him, or, a8 it is expressed in x. 4, to leave one’s station; ef. Hos. xi. 2: “ They (the prophets of Jahve) called to them, forthwith they betook themselves away from them.” It is possible that in the choice of the expression, the phrase "360 ὅΠ2), “to be put into a state of alarm before any one,” Job xxiii. 15, was not without influence. The indef. 9 134, Deut. xvii. 1, xxiii. 10, of. xiii, 12, xix. 20, 2 Kings iv. 41, ete, is to be referred (with Rosenm., Knobel, Bullock, and others) to undertakings which aim at resisting the will of the king, and reach their climax in conspiracy against the king’s throne and life (Prov. xxiv. 216). 3 Opn eR might mean: persist not in it; but the warning does not presuppose that the entrance thereon had already taken place, but seeks to prevent it, thus: enter not, go not, engage not, like ‘amad Uderck, Pa i 1; ’amad babrith, 2 Kings xxiii. 3; ef. Ps. evi. 23; Jer. xxiii. 18, Also the Arab. ’amada li=intendit, proposwit sibi rem, is compared; it is used in the general sense of “to make toward something, to stretch to something.” Otherwise Ewald, Elst., Ginsb., and Zockl.: stand not at an evil word (of the king), provoking him to anger thereby still more,—against ver. 5, where 37 735, as generally (cf. Ps. cxli. 4), means an evil thing, and against the close connection of 3 30Y, which is to be presupposed. Hitzig even: stand not at an evil command, ve. hesitate not to do even that which is evil, which the king commands, with the remark that here a servilismus is introduced as speaking, who, in saying of the king, “ All that pleaseth him he doeth,” uses words which are used only of God the Almighty, John i. 14, Ps. xxxiii. 9, etc. Hengst., Hahn, Dale, and others therefore dream of the heavenly King in the text. But proverbs of the earthly king, such as Prov. xx. 2, say the very same thing; and if the Mishna Sanhedrin ii. 2, to which Tyler refers, says of the king, “ The king cannot himself be a judge, nor can any one judge him; he does not give evidence, and no evidence can be given against him,” a sovereignty is thus attributed to the king, which is formulated in 3d and established in the verse following.
Ver. 4. “ Inasmuch as the word of aking is powerful; and who can say tohim: What doest thou?” The same thing is said of God, Job ix. 12, Isa. xlv. 9, Dan. iv. 32, Wisd. xii. 12, but also of the king, especially of the unlimited monarch of a despotic state. Baasher verifies as U3 at ii. 16; cf. Gen. xxxix. 9, 23; Greek, ἐν ᾧ and ἐφ᾽ 6 Burger arbitrarily: quae divit (131 for 122), rex, in ea potestatem habet. The adjectival impers. use of the noun shilton= potestatem habens, is peculiar; in the Talm. and Midrash, shilton, like the Assyr. siltannu,' means the ruler (vid. under v. 8). That which now follows is not, as Hitzig supposes, an opposing voice which makes itself heard, but as ver. 2 is compared with Rom. xiii. 5, so is ver. 5 with Rom. xiii. 3.
Ver. 5. “ Whoso remaineth true to the commandment will experience nothing evil; and the heart of the wise man will know a time and judicial decision.” That by ΓΝ is here to be understood not the commandment of God, at least not immediately, as at Prov. xix. 16 (Ewald), but that of the king, and generally an injunction and appointment of the superior authority, is seen from the context, which treats not of God, but of the ruler over a state. Knobel and others explain: He who observeth the commandment engageth not with an evil thing, and the wise mind knoweth time and right. But yt is never thus used (the author uses for this, 3 7¥), and the same meaning is to be supposed for the repeated YT): it means to arrive at the knowledge of; in the first instance: to suffer, Ezek. xxv. 14; ef. Isa. ix. 8; Hos. ix. 7; in the second, to experience, Josh. xxiv. 31; Ps. xvi. 11. It may also, indeed, be translated after ix. 12: a wise heart knoweth time and judgment, viz. that they will not fail; but why should we not render 51) both times fut., since nothing stands in the way? We do not translate: ἃ wise heart, a wise mind (Knobel), although this is possible, 1 Kings iii. 12 (οἵ. Ps, xo, 12), but: the heart of a wise man, which is made more natural by x. 2, Prov. xvi. 23. The heart of a wise man, which is not hurried forward by dynastic oppression to a selfish forgetfulness of duty, but in quietness and hope (Lam. iii. 26) awaits the interposition of God, will come to the knowledge that there is an eth, a time, when oppression has an end, and a mishpat, when it suffers punishment. Well adapted to the sense in which eh is here used is the remark of Elia Levita in his 7ishdi, that 9] corresponds to the German Zeit and the Romanic tempo, but MY to the German Ziel and the Romanic termino. The LXX. translates καιρὸν κρίσεως; and, in fact, 'D) ny is a hendidays, which, however, consists in the division of one conception into two. The heart of the wise man remaining true to duty will come to learn that there is a terminus and judicial decision, for everything has an end when it falls under the fate for which it is ing too free a space for understanding the *2 as confirming, or as hypothetical, and for co-ordinating or subordinating to each other the clauses with ‘>. Presupposing the correctness of our exposition of 5a, the clause 6a with ‘> may be rendered parenthetically, and that with ‘> in 6b hypothetically: “an end and decision the heart of the wise man will come to experience (because for everything there is an end and decision), supposing that the wickedness of man has become great upon him, ie. his burden of guilt has reached its full measure.” We suppose thereby (1) that "39, which appears from the accent on the ult. to be an adj., can also be the 3d pret., since before Y the tone has gone back to ἀλ (cf. Gen. xxvi 10; Isa. xi 1), to protect it from being put aside; but generally the accenting of such forms of py hovers between the penult. and the ult., eg. Ps. Lxix. 5, ly. 22; Prov. xiv.19. Then (2) that Τὴν goes back to O77, without distinction of persons, which has a support in vi. 1, and that thus a great MY is meant lying upon man, which finally finds its punishment. But this view of the relation of the clauses fails, in that it affords no connection for ver. 7. It appears to be best to co-ordinate all the four ‘> as members of one chain of proof, which reaches its point in 8b, viz. in the following manner: the heart of a wise man will see the time and the judgment of the ruler, laying to his heart the temptation to rebellion; for (1) as the author has already said, iii. 17: “ God will judge the righteous as well as the wicked, for there is with Him a time for every purpose and for every act;” (2) the wickedness of man (by which, as ver. 9 shows, despots are aimed at) which he has committed, becomes great upon him, so that suddenly at once the judgment of God will break in upon him; (3) he knows not what will be done; (4) no one can tell him how (quomodo) it, the future, will be, so that he might in any way anticipate it—the judgment will overwhelm him unexpectedly and irretrievably: wickedness does not save its possessor.
Vers. 7 and 8 thus continue the For and For: “For he knoweth not that which shall be; for who can tell him how it will be? There is no man who has power over the wind, to restrain the wind; and no one has authority over the day of death; and there is no discharge in the war; and wickedness does not save its possessor.” The actor has the sin upon himself, and bears it; if it reaches the terminus of full measure, it suddenly overwhelms him in punishment, and the too great burden oppresses its bearer (Hitzig, under Isa. xxiv. 20). This 'vin) ny comes unforeseen, for he (the man who heaps up sins) knoweth not id quod fiet; it arrives unforeseen, for quomodo fiet, who can show it to him? Thus, ¢.g., the tyrant knows not that he will die by assassination, and no one can say to him how that will happen, so that he might make arrangements for his protection. Rightly the LXX. καθὼς ἔσται; on the contrary, the Targ., Hitzig, and Ginsburg: when it will be;' but W832 signifies guwm, iv. 17, v. 3, viii. 16, but not guando, which must be expressed by ND (Mishnic ‘NY, NDS).
Now follows the concluding thought of the four ‘3, whereby 5b is established. There are four impossibilities enumerated; the fourth is the point of the enumeration constructed in the form of a numerical proverb. (1) No man has power over the wind, to check the wind. Ewald, Hengst., ZéckL, and others understand 4, with the Targ., Jerome, and Luther, of the Spirit (a"n nm); but man can limit this physically when he puts a violent termination to life, and must restrain it morally by ruling it, Prov. xvi. 32, xxv. 28. On the contrary, the wind mn is, after xi. 5, incalculable, and to rule over it is the exclusive prerogative of Divine Omnipotence, Prov. xxx. 4.
The transition to the second impossibility is mediated by this, that in mm, according to the wsus log., the ideas of the breath of animal life, and of wind as the breath as it were of the life of the whole of nature, are interwoven. (2) No one has power over the day of death: death, viz. natural death, comes to a man without his being able to see it before, to determine it, or to change it. With mdz’ there here interchanges 10?#, which is rendered by the LXX. and Venet. as abstr., also by the Syr. But as at Dan. iii. 2, so also the abstr, which is 1>¥, after the forms M3, 27, etc, eg. Bereshith rabba, c. 85 extr.: “Every king and ruler po>y who had not ἃ roe’, a command (government, sway) in the land, said that that did not satisfy him, the king of Babylon had to place an under-Caesar in Jericho,” etc.’ Thus: no man possesses rule or is a ruler...
dispensation, whether for a time merely (missio), or a full discharge (dimissio), in war, which in its fearful rigour (vid. on the contrary, Deut, xx. 5-8) was the Persian law (cf. above, p. 214). Even 80, every possibility of escape is cut off by the law of the divine requital; (4) wickedness will not save (Ὁ Ὁ, causative, as always) its lord (ef. the proverb: “ Unfaithfulness strikes its own master”) or possessor; ἐξ. the wicked person, when the ‘1 ny comes, is hopelessly lost, Gritz would adopt the reading ΡΨ instead of yen; but the fate of the 3€9 Sy2, or of the DP), is certainly that to which the concatenation of thought from ver. 6 leads, as also the disjunctive accent at the end of the three first clauses of ver. 8 denotes. But that in the words ba’al resha’ (not 92) a despotic king is thought of (woya, as at v. 10, 12, vii. 12; Prov. iii. 27; ef. under Prov. i. 19), is placed beyond a doubt by the epilogistic verse: