fatigantur; the word means, becoming wearied, or perfectly feeble, or also: wearying oneself (cf. x. 15, xii. 12), working with a strain on one’s strength, fatiguing oneself (cf. 2, that which is gained by labour, work). This is just what these four examples are meant to show, viz. that a restless activity reaching no visible conclusion and end, always beginning again anew, pervades the whole world—all things, he says, summarizing, are in labour, t+. are restless, hastening on, giving the impression of fatigue. Thus also in strict sequence of thought that which follows; this unrest in the outer world reflects itself in man, when he contemplates that which is done around him; human language cannot exhaust this coming and going, this growth and decay in constant circle, and the quodlibet is so great, that the eye cannot be satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; to the unrest of things without corresponds the unrest of the mind, which through this course, in these ever repeated variations, always bringing back the old again to view, is kept in ceaseless activity. The »bject to dabbér is the totality of things. No words can compreh nd this, no sensible perception exhaust it That which is prop tly aimed at here is not the unsatisfiedness of the eyes (Prov. xxvii, 20), and generally of the mind, thus not the ever-new attractive power which appertains to the eye and the ear of him who observes, but the force with which the restless activity which surrounds us lays hold of and communicates itself to us, so that we also find no rest and contentment. With ¥2t, to be satisfied, of the eye, there is appropriately interchanged 722, used of the funnel-shaped ear, to be filled, ie. to be satisfied (as at vi 7). The min connected with this latter word is explained by Zock. after Hitz., “away from hearing,” ic. so that it may hear no more. This is not necessary. As sdva’ with its min may signify to be satisfied with anything, eg. vi. 3, Job xix. 22, Ps. civ. 13; so also nimla, with its min, to be full of anything, Ezek. xxxii 6; cf. Kal, Isa ii 6, Pih. Jer. li. 34, Ps. exxvii. 5. Thus mishsh’moa’ is understood by all the old translators (eg. Targ. 30¥DSD), and thus also, perhaps, the author meant it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, and the ear is not filled (satisfied) with hearing; or yet more in accordance with the Heb. expression: there is not an eye, ie. no eye is satisfied, etc., restlessly hastening, giving him who looks no rest, the world goes on in its circling course without revealing anything that is in reality new.
Ver. 9. “That which hath been is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is nothing new under the sun.”—The older form of the language uses only Wwe instead of BMD, in the sense of id guod, and in the sense of guidquid, Wht >> (vi. 10, vii. 24); but mah is also used by it with the extinct force of an interrogative, in the sense of quodcwngue, Job xiii. 13, aliquid (quidquam), Gen. xxxix. 8, Prov. ix. 13; and mi or mt asher,in the sense of quisquis, Ex. xxiv. 14, xxxii, 33. In v win (cf. Gen. xlii. 14) are combined the meanings 7d (est) guod and idem (est) quod; hw is often the expression of the equality of two things, Job iii. 19, or of self-sameness, Ps. cii. 28. The double clause, quod fuit... quod factum est, comprehends that which is done in the world of nature and of men,—the natural and the historical. The bold clause, neque est quidquam novi sud sole, challenges contradiction; the author feels this, as the next verse shows.
Ver. 10. “Is there anything whereof it may be said: See, this is new?—it was long ago through the ages (aeons) which have been before us.” The Semit. substantive verb ὃν (Assyr. zsw) has here the force of a hypothetical antecedent: supposing that there is a thing of which one might say, etc. The ΠῚ, with Makkeph, belongs as subject, as at vil. 27, 29 as object, to that which follows. 23 (vid. List, p. 193) properly denotes length or greatness of time (as 1723, length of way). The 5 of 'y? is that of measure: this “long ago” measured (Hitz.) after infinitely long periods of time. 30, ante nos, follows the usage of ‘pdn, Isa. xli. 26, and ‘BD, Judg. 1. 10, etc.; the past time is spoken of as that which was before, for it is thought of as the beginning of the succession of time (vid. Orelli, Synon. der Zeit u. Ewigkeit, p. 14 f.). The singular "7 may also be viewed as pred. of a plur. inhwmanus in order; but in connection, ii. 7, 9 (Gesen. ὃ 147, An. 2), it is more probable that it is taken as a neut. verb. That which newly appears has already been, but had been forgotten; for generations come and generations go, and the one forgets the other.
Ver. 11. “There is no remembrance of ancestors; and also of the later ones who shall come into existence, there will be no remembrance for them with those who shall come into existence after them.” With 02? (with Kametz) there is also, the more common form by our author, in accordance with the usage of his age; Gesen., Elst., and others regard it here and at ii 16 as constr., and thus ‘x as virtually object-gen. (Jerome, non est priorum memoria); but such refinements of the old syntazis ornata are not to be expected in our author: he changes (according to the traditional punctuation) here the initial sound, as at i. 17 the final sound, to oth and wth. δ PX is the contrast of ὃ m1: to attribute to one, to become partaker of. The use of the expression, “for them,” gives emphasis to the statement. “With those who shall come after,’ points from the generation that is future to a remoter future, cf. Gen. xxxill. 2. The
Kametz of the prep. is that of the recompens. art.; cf. Num. ii. 31, where it denotes “the last” among the four hosts; for there “ΜΠ is meant of the last in order, as here it is meant of the remotely future time.
KOHELETH’S EXPERIENCES AND THEIR RESULTS,—I. 12-IV. 16. The Unsatisfactoriness of striving after Wisdom, i, 12-18.
After this prelude regarding the everlasting sameness of all that is done under the sun, Koheleth-Solomon unfolds the treasure of his life-experience as king.
Ver. 12. “I, Koheleth, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem.” That of the two possible interpretations of ‘M7, “I have become” and “I have been,” not the former (Gritz), but the latter, is to be here adopted, has been already shown (p. 205). We translate better by “I have been ”—for the verb here used is a pure perfect —than by “T was” (Ew., Elst., Hengst., Zock.), with which Bullock (Speaker's Comm., vol. IV., 1873) compares the expression Quand jétois roi! which was often used by Louis x1v. towards the end of his life. But here the expression is not a cry of complaint, like the “fuimus Troes,” but a simple historical statement, by which the Preacher of the vanity of all earthly things here introduces himself,—it is Solomon, resuscitated by the author of the book, who here looks back on his life as king. “Israel” is the whole of Israel, and points to a period before the division of the kingdom; a king over Judah alone would not so describe himself. Instead of “king >y (over) Israel,” the old form of the language uses frequently simply “king of Israel,” although also the former expression is sometimes found; cf 1 Sam. xv. 26; 2 Sam. xix. 23; 1 Kings xi 37. He has been king— king over a great, peaceful, united people; king in Jerusalem, the celebrated, populous, highly-cultivated city,—and thus placed on an elevation having the widest survey, and having at his disposal whatever can make a man happy; endowed, in particular, with all the means of gaining knowledge, which accorded with the disposition of his heart searching after wisdom (cf. 1 Kings iii 9-11, v. 9).
But in his search after worldly knowledge he found no satisfaction.
Ver. 13. “ And I gave my heart to seek and to hold survey with wisdom over all that is done under the sun: a sore trouble it is which God has given to the children of men to be exercised therewith.” The synonyms 71 (to seek) and "wn (to hold survey over) do not represent a lower and a higher degree of search (Zock.), but two kinds of searching: one penetrating in depth, the other going out in extent - for the former of these verbs (from the root-idea of grinding, testing) signifies to investigate an object which one already has in hand, to penetrate into it, to search into it thoroughly; and the latter verb (from the root-idea of moving round about)! signifies to hold a survey,— look round in order to bring that which is unknown, or not comprehensively known, within the sphere of knowledge, and thus has the meaning of bakkésh, one going the rounds. It is the usual word for the exploring of a country, ie. the acquiring personal knowledge of its as yet unknown condition; the passing over to an intellectual search is peculiar to the Book of Koheleth, as it has the phrase }n3
2, animum advertere, or applicare ad aliquid, in common only with Dan. x. 12. The beth of bahhoch*mah is that of the instrument; wisdom must be the means (organon) of knowledge in this searching and inquiry. With >Y is introduced the sphere into which it extends. Grotius paraphrases: Historiam animalium et satorwm diligentissime inguisivt. But ΠΟ) does not refer to the world of nature, but to the world of men; only within this can anything be said of actions, only this has a proper history. But that which offers itself for research and observation there, brings neither joy nor contentment. Hitzig refers x17 to human activity; but it relates to the research which has this activity as its object, and is here, on that account, called “a sore trouble,” because the attainment and result gained by the laborious effort are of so unsatisfactory a nature. Regarding [2y, which here goes back to 3 739, to fatigue oneself, to trouble oneself with anything, and then to be engaged with it, vid. p.194. The words 39 Ὁ» would mean trouble of an evil nature (vid. at Ps. xxviii. 49; Prov. vi. 24); but better attested is the reading 39 [2y, “a sore trouble.” xin is the subj., as at 11, 1 and elsewhere; the author uses it also in expressions where it is pred. And as frequently as he uses asher and δ᾽, so also, when form and matter commend it, he uses the scheme of the attributive clause (elliptical relative clause), as here (cf. iii. 16), where certainly, in conformity with the old style, 129) was to be used.
Ver. 14. He adduces proof of the wearisomeness of this work of research: “I saw all the works that are done under the sun; and, behold, all is vanity and striving after the wind.” The point of the sentence lies in 737) = “ΠῚ 818), so that thus raith is the expression of the parallel fact (circumst. perfect). The result of his seeing,
1 Vid. the investigation of these roots (Assyr. utir, he brought back) in Ethé’s Schlafgemach der Phantasie, pp. 86-89.
and that, as he has said ver. 13, of a by no means superficial and limited seeing, was a discovery of the fleeting, unsubstantial, fruitless nature of all human actions and endeavours. They had, as hevel expresses, no reality in them; and also, as denoted by ruth ruahh (the LXX. render well by προαίρεσις πνεύματος), they had no actual consequences, no real issue. Hos, xii. 2 also says: “ Ephraim feedeth on wind,” ἐπ. follows after, as the result of effort obtains, the wind, roeh ruahh; but only in the Book of Koheleth is this sentence transformed into an abstract terminus technicus (vid. under Ruth, p. 195).
Ver. 15. The judgment contained in the words, “vanity and a striving after the wind,” is confirmed: “ That which is crooked cannot become straight; and a deficit cannot be numerable,” 1. cannot be taken into account (thus Theod., after the Syro-Hex.), as if as much were present as is actually wanting; for, according to the proverb, “Where there is nothing, nothing further is to be counted.” Hitzig thinks, by that which is crooked and wanting, according to vii. 13, of the divine order of the world: that which is unjust in it, man cannot alter; its wants he cannot complete. But the preceding statement refers only to labour under the sun, and to before the eyes of the observer irregularities and wants, brings such irregularities and wants to his consciousness,—which are certainly partly brought about and destined by God, but for the most part are due to the transgressions of man himself,—and what avails the observer the discovery and investigation?—he has only lamentation over it, for with all his wisdom he can bring no help. Instead of pnd (vid. under jpn, p. 196), 1M was to be expected. However, the old language also formed intransitive infinitives with transitive modification of the final vowels, eg. 82", etc. (cf. ft, v. 11).
Having now gained such a result in his investigation and research by means of wisdom, he reaches the conclusion that wisdom itself is nothing.
Vv. 16-18. “I have communed with mine own heart, saying: Lo, I have gained great and always greater wisdom above all who were before me over Jerusalem; and my heart hath seen wisdom and knowledge in fulness. And I gave my heart to know what was in wisdom and knowledge, madness and folly—I have perceived that this also is a grasping after the wind.” The evidence in which he bears witness to himself that striving after wisdom and knowledge brings with it no true satisfaction, reaches down to the close of ver. 17; ‘AYT is the conclusion which is aimed at. The manner of
2, occurring only here in the Book of Koheleth, brings it near that the following oratio directa is directed to the heart, as it also directly assumes the form of an address, ii. 1, after "252. The expression, ‘27 ‘37, “ to make one’s wisdom great,” 1.6. “to gain great wisdom,” is without a parallel; for the words, ‘in ’3n, Isa. xxviii, 29, quoted by Hitzig, signify to show and attest truly useful (beneficial) knowledge in a noble way. The annexed ἽΠῚ refers to the continued increase made to the great treasure already possessed (cf. ii. 9 and 1 Kings x. 7). The αἱ connected therewith signifies, “above” (Gen. xlix. 26) all those who were over Jerusalem before me. This is like the sarrdni dlik mahrija, “the kings who were my predecessors,” which was frequently used by the Assyrian kings. The Targumist seeks to accommodate the words to the actual Solomon by thus distorting them: “above all the wise men who have been in Jerusalem before me,” as if the word in the text were purrs! as it is indeed found in several Codd., and according to which also the LXX., Syr., Jerome, and the Venet. translate. Rather than think of the wise (82°30), we are led to think of all those who from of old stood at the head of the Israelitish community. But there must have been well-known great men with whom Solomon measures
* In F the following note is added: ‘Several Codd. have, erroneously, birushalam instead of al-yerushalam.” Kennicott counts about 60 such Codd. Tt stands thus also in J; and at first it thus stood in H, but was afterwards corrected to al-ytrushalam. Cf. Elias Levita’s Masoreth hamasoreth, 11. 8, at the end.
himself, and these could not be such dissimilarly great men as the Canaanitish kings to the time of Melchizedek; and since the Jebusites, even under Saul, were in possession of Zion, and Jerusalem was for the first time completely subdued by David (2 Sam. v. 7, cf. Josh. xv. 63), it is evident that only one predecessor of Solomon in the office of ruler over Jerusalem can be spoken of, and that here an anachronism lies before us, occasioned by the circumstance that the Salomo redivivus, who has behind him the long list of kings whom in truth he had before him, here speaks. Regarding nn ον, qu'il y eut, for yn Tee, qui furent, vid. at i. 106. The seeing here ascribed to the heart (here = νοῦς, Psychol. p. 249) is meant of intellectual observation and apprehension; for “all perception, whether it be mediated by the organs of sense or not (as prophetic observing and contemplating), comprehends all, from mental discernment down to suffering, which veils itself in unconsciousness, and the Scripture designates it as a seeing” (Psychol. 234); the Book of Koheleth also uses the word mx. of every kind of human experience, bodily or mental, ii. 24, v. 17, vi. 6, ix. 9. It is commonly translated: “My heart saw much wisdom and knowledge” (thus ¢g. Ewald); but that
Baumgarten-Crusius remarks that σοφία refers to the general ordering of things, γνῶσις to the determination of individual things; and Harless, that σοφία is knowledge which proposes the right aim, and γνῶσις that which finds the right means thereto. In general, we may say that chokma is the fact of a powerful knowledge of the true and the right, and the property which arises out of this intellectual possession; but dadth is knowledge penetrating into the depth of the essence of things, by which wisdom is acquired and in which wisdom establishes itself.
Ver. 17. By the consecutive modus 727% (aor. with ah, like Gen. xxxii. 6, xli 11, and particularly in more modern writings; vid. p. 198, regarding the rare occurrence of the aorist form in the Book of Koheleth) he bears evidence to himself as to the end which, thus equipped with wisdom and knowledge, he gave his heart to attain unto (cf. 132), i. toward which he directed the concentration of his intellectual strength. He wished to be clear regarding the real worth of wisdom and knowledge in their contrasts: he wished to become conscious of this, and to have joy in Inowing what he had in wisdom and knowledge as distinguished from madness and folly. After the statement of the object ladaath, stands v'daath, briefly for ΠΡ. Ginsburg wishes to get rid of the words holéloth v'sikluth, or at least would read in their stead mda’ ninom (rendering them “intelligence and prudence”); Gritz, after the LXX. παραβολὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμην, reads Morn nirvin, But the text can remain as it is: the object of Koheleth is, on the one hand, to become acquainted with wisdom and knowledge; and, on the other, with their contraries, and to hold these opposite to each other in their operations and consequences. The LXX., Targ., Venet., and Luther err when they render sikluth here by ἐπιστήμη, etc. As stkluth, insight, intelligence, is in the Aram. written with the letter samek (instead of sin), so here, according to the Masora mbsp, madness is for once written with », being everywhere else in the book written with D; the word is an ἐναντιόφωνον, and has, whether written in the one way or in the other, a verb, sakal (5 Ψ, bsp), which signifies “to twist together,” as its root, and is referred partly to a complication and partly to a confusion of ideas. niodh, from $m, in the sense of “to cry out,” “to rage,” always in this book terminates in dth, and only at x. 13 in daith (vid. p. 191); the termination «th is that of the abstr. sing.; but 6th, as we think we have shown at Prov. i. 20, is that of a fem. plur., meant intensively, like bogdoth, Zeph. ii. 4; binoth, chokmoth, ef. bogdim, Prov. xxiii. 28; hhovlim, Zech. xi. 7,14; togim, Prov. xi. 15 (Bottch. ὃ 700g E). Twice v'sikluth presents what, speaking to his own heart, he bears testimony to before himself. By yadd’ti, which is connected with dibbarti (ver. 16) in the same rank, he shows the facit. Mt refers to the striving to become conscious of the superiority of secular wisdom and science to the love of pleasure and to ignorance. He perceived that this striving also was a grasping after the wind; with My}, 140, is here interchanged fi"!1 (vid. p. 195). He proves to himself that nothing showed itself to be real, 1.6. firm and enduring, unimpeachable and imperishable. And why not?
Ver. 18. “For in much wisdom is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.” The German proverb: “Much wisdom causeth headache,” is compared, xii. 120, but not here, where DY? and 2iN2) express not merely bodily suffering, but also mental grief. Spinoza hits one side of the matter in his Ethics, ΤΥ. 17, where he remarks: “Veram boni et mali cognitionem saepe non satis valere ad cupiditates coercendas, quo facto homo imbecillitatem swam animadvertens cogitur exclamare: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.” In every reference, not merely in that which is moral, there is connected with knowledge the shadow of a sorrowful consciousness, in spite of every effort to drive it away. The wise man gains an insight into the thousand-fold woes of the natural world, and of the world of human beings, and this reflects itself in him without his being able to change it; hence the more numerous the observed forms of evil, suffering, and discord, so much greater the sadness (O¥2, R. 03, cogn. ὉΠ, perstringe?e) and the heart-sorrow (21X29, créve-cour) which the inutility of knowledge occasions. The form of 18a is like v. 6, and that of 188 like eg. Prov. xviii. 22a. We change the clause v‘yosiph daath into an antecedent, but in reality the two clauses stand together as the two members of a comparison: if one increaseth knowledge, he increaseth (at the same time) sorrow. “ἢ, Isa. xxix. 14, xxxviii. 5, Eccles. ii. 18,” says Ewald, § 169a, “stands alone as a part. act., from the stem reverting from Hiph. to Kal with *~ instead of —” But this is not unparalleled; in AO! ‘37 the verb ov is fin, in the same manner as 70°, Isa. xxviii. 16; TIA, Ps. xvi. 5, is Hiph., in the sense of amplificas, from 9); ΠῈΣ, Prov. vi. 19 (vid. 1.2), is an attribut. clause, gui efict, used as an adj.; and, at least, we need to suppose in the passage before us the confusion that the ὃ of katél (from katil, originally katal), which is only long, has somehow passed over into f. Béttcher’s remark to the contrary, “An impersonal jiens thus repeated is elsewhere altogether without a parallel,” is set aside by the proverb formed exactly thus: “ He that breathes the love of truth says what is right,” Prov. xii. 17.
After having proved that secular wisdom has no superiority to folly in bringing true happiness to man, he seeks his happiness in a different way, and gives himself up to cheerful enjoyment.
ii. 1. “I have said in mine heart: Up then, I will prove thee with mirth, and enjoy thou the good! And, lo, this also is vain.” Speaking in the heart is not here merely, as at i. 16, 17a, speaking to the heart, but the words are formed into a direct address of the heart. The Targ. and Midrash obliterate this by interpreting as if the word were 73028, “T will try it” (vii. 23). Jerome also, in rendering by vadam et afluam delictis et fruar bonis, proceeds contrary to the usual reading of ‘38 (Wiph. of 403, vid. at Ps. ἢ. 6), as if this could mean, “I will pour over myself.” It is an address of the heart, and 3 is, as at 1 Kings x. 1, that of the means: I will try thee with mirth, to see whether thy hunger after satisfaction can be appeased with mirth. ANT also is an address; Gritz sees here, contrary to the Gramm., an infin. continuing the W2: dreh, Job x. 15, is the connect. form of the particip. adj. raeh; and if veh could be the inf. after the forms naggéh, hinnaqgeh, it would be the inf. absol., instead of which Ninv was to be expected. It is the imper.: See good, sinking thyself therein, ic, enjoy a cheerful life. Elsewhere the author connects mx less significantly with the accus.- obj., v. 17, vi. 6, ii. 24.
This was his intention; but this experiment also to find out the summum bonum proves itself a failure: he found a life of pleasure to be a hollow life; that also, viz. devotedness to mirth, was to him manifestly vanity.
Ver. 2. “To laughter I said: It is mad; and to mirth: What doth it issue in?” Laughter and mirth are personified; m*holal is thus not neut. (Hitz. a foolish matter), but mas. The judgment which is pronounced regarding both has not the form of an address; we do not need to supply 778 and AX, it is objectively like an oratio obliqua: that it is mad; cf. Ps. xlix. 12. In the midst of the laughter and revelling in sensual delight, the feeling came over him that this was not the way to true happiness, and he was compelled to say to laughter, It has become mad (part. Poal, as at Ps. cil. 9), it is like one who is raving mad, who finds his pleasure in self-destruction; and to joy (mirth), which disregards the earnestness of life and all due bounds, he is constrained to say, What does it result in?=that it produces nothing, 1.6. that it brings forth no real fruit; that it produces only the opposite of true satisfaction; that instead of filling, it only enlarges the inner void. Others, eg. Luther, “ What doest thou?” 6. How foolish is thy undertaking! Even if we thus explain, the point in any case lies in the inability of mirth to make man truly and lastingly happy,—in the inappropriateness of the means for the end aimed at. Therefore is thus meant just as in 5 ΠΩ (Hitz.), and nwyn, effect, Isa. xxxil. 17. Thus Mendelssohn: What profit dost thou bring to me? Regarding Af, vid. p. 198; HAD is = mah-zoth, Gen. 111, 13, where it is shown that the demonstrative pronoun serves here to sharpen the interrogative: What then, what in all the world!
After this revelling in sensual enjoyment has been proved to be a fruitless experiment, he searches whether wisdom and folly cannot be bound together in a way leading to the object aimed at.
Ver. 3. “I searched in my heart, (henceforth) to nourish my body with wine, while my heart had the direction by means of wisdom; and to lay hold on folly, till I might see what it was good for the children of men that they should do, all the number of the days of their life.” After he became conscious that unbridled sensual intoxication does not lead to the wished-for end, he looked around him farther, and examined into the following receipt for happiness. Inappropriately, Zéckl., with Hengst.: “I essayed in my heart to nourish...” ‘2 does not mean prodare, but explorare, to spy out, Num. x. 33, and frequently in the Book of Koheleth ee and at i. 13, vii. 25) of mental searching and discovery (Targ. 2%). With πλοῖο there then follows the new thing that is contrived. If we read 7v® and 393 in connection, then the idea of drawing a carriage, Isa. v. 18, cf. Deut. xxi. 3, and of driving a carriage, 2 Sam. vi. 3, lies near; according to which Hitzig explains: “ Wine is compared to a draught beast such as a horse, and he places wisdom as the driver on the box, that his horse may not throw him into a ditch or a morass.” But moshék is not the wine, but the person himself who makes the trial; and nohég is not the wisdom, but the heart,—the former thus only the means of guidance; no man expresses himself thus: I draw the carriage by means of a horse, and I guide it by means of a driver. Rightly the Syr.: “To delight (jop2n5, from 002, oblectare) my flesh with wine.” Thus also the Targ. and the Venet., by “drawing the flesh.” The metaphor does not accord with the Germ. ziehen = to nourish by caring for (for which 73° is used); it is more natural, with Gesen., to compare the passing of trahere into tractare, e.g. in the expression se benignius tractare (Horace, Ep. i. 17); but apart from the fact that ¢rahere is a word of doubtful etymology,’ tractare perhaps attains the meaning of attending to, using, managing, through the intermediate idea of moving hither and thither, which is foreign to the Heb. qv, which means only to draw,—to draw to oneself, and hold fast (attractum sive prehensum tenere). As the Talm. qv occurs in the sense of “to refresh,” e.g. Chagiga 14a: “The Haggadists (in contradistinction to the Halachists) refresh the heart of a man as with water” (vid. p. 193); so here, “to draw the flesh” = to bring it into willing obedience by means of pleasant attractions.’
1 Vid. Corssen’s Nachtr. zur lat. Formenlehre, pp. 107-109. 3 Gratz translates: to embrocate my body with wine, and remarks that in
The phrase which follows: vidbi nohég bahhochmah, is conditioning: While my heart had the direction by means of wisdom: or perhaps in accordance with the more modern usus log. (vid. Ῥ. 194): While my heart guided, demeaned, behaved itself with wisdom. Then the inf. limshok, depending on tarti as its obj., is carried forward with v‘léehhoz b'sichluth. Plainly the subject treated of is an intermediate thing (Bardach: ΡΣ). He wished to have enjoyment, but in measure, without losing himself in enjoyment, and thereby destroying himself. He wished to give himself over to sweet desipere, but yet with wise self-possession (because it: is sadly true that whi mel ibi fel) to lick the honey and avoid the gall There are drinkers who know how to guide themselves so that they do not end in drunken madness; and there are habitual pleasure-seekers who yet know how so far to control themselves, that they do not at length become roués. Koheleth thus gave himself to a foolish life, yet tempered by wisdom, till there dawned upon him a better light upon the way to true happiness.
The expression of the donec viderem is old Heb. Instead of 78 31D, guidnam sit bonum in indirect interrog. (as xi. 6, ef. Jer. vi. 16), the old form 217M (vi. 12) would lie at least nearer. Asher yddsu may be rendered: guod faciant or ut faciant; after 11. 24, 111. 22, v. 4, vii 18, the latter is to be assumed. The accus. designation of time, “through the number of the days of their life,” is like v. 17, vi. 12. We have not, indeed, to translate with Knobel: “the few days of their life,” but yet there certainly lies in 1BDD the idea that the days of man’s life are numbered, and that thus even if they are not few but many (vi. 3), they yet do not endure for ever.
The king now, in the verse following, relates his undertakings for the purpose of gaining the joys of life in fellowship with wisdom, and first, how he made architecture and gardening serviceable to this new style of life.
Vv. 4—6. “I undertook great works, built me houses, planted me vineyards. I made me gardens and parks, and planted therein all kinds of fruit-trees. I made me water-pools to water therewith a forest bringing forth trees.” The expression, “I made great my works,” is like i. 16; the verb contains the adj. as its obj. The love of wisdom, a sense of the beautiful in nature and art, a striving after splendour and dignity, are fundamental traits in Solomon's character. this lies a raffinement. But why does he not rather say, “to bathe in wine”? If nv can mean ‘to embrocate,”’ it may also mean ‘‘to bathe,” and for }"3 may be read "»}»: in Grecian, i.e. Falernian, Chian, wine.
His reign was a period of undisturbed and assured peace. The nations far and near stood in manifold friendly relations with him. Solomon was “the man of rest,” 1 Chron. xxii. 9; his whole appearance was as it were the embodied glory itself that had blossomed from out of the evils and wars of the reign of David. The Israelitish commonwealth hovered on a pinnacle of worldly glory till then unattained, but with the danger of falling and being lost in the world. The whole tendency of the time followed, as it were, a secular course, and it was Solomon first of all whom the danger of the love of the world, and of worldly conformity to which he was exposed, brought to ruin, and who, like so many of the O. T. worthies, began in the spirit and ended in the flesh. Regarding his buildings,—the house of the forest of Lebanon, the pillared hall (porch), the hall of judgment, the palace intended for himself and the daughter of Pharaoh,—vid. the description in 1 Kings vii. 1-12, gathered from the annals of the kingdom; 1 Kings ix. 15-22 = 2 Chron. viii. 3—6, gives an account of Solomon's separate buildings (to which also the city of Millo belongs), and of the cities which he built; the temple, store-cities, treasure-cities, etc., are naturally not in view in the passage before us, where it is not so much useful buildings, as rather buildings for pleasure (1 Kings ix. 19), that are referred to. Vineyards, according to 1 Chron. xxvii. 27, belonged to David’s royal domain; a vineyard in Baal-hamon which Solomon possessed, but appears at a later period to have given up, is mentioned at the close of the Song. That he was fond of gardening, appears from manifold expressions in the Song; delight in the life and movements of the natural world, and particularly in plants, is a prominent feature in Solomon’s character, in which he agrees with Shulamith. The Song, vi. 2, represents him in the garden at the palace. We have spoken under the Song, vi. 11 f, of the gardens and parks at Etam, on the south-west of Bethlehem. Regarding the originally Persian word pardés (plur. pardesim, Mishnic pardesoth), vid. under Song iv. 13; regarding the primary meaning of b‘réchah (plur. const. b‘réchoth, in contradistinetion to birchoth, blessings), the necessary information is found under Song vil. 5. These Solomonic pools are at the present day to be seen near old Etam, and the clause here denoting a purpose, “to water from them a forest which sprouted trees, ic. brought forth sprouting trees,” is suitable to these; for verbs of flowing and swarming, also verbs of growing, thought of transitively, may be connected with obj.-accus., Ewald, ὃ 2810; cf. under Isa. v. 6. Thus, as he gave himself to the building of houses, the care of gardens, and the erection of pools, so also to the cultivation of forests, with the raising of new trees.
Another means, wisely considered as productive of happiness, was a large household and great flocks of cattle, which he procured for himself.
Ver. 7. “I procured servants and maidens, and also I obtained servants born in the house; also the possession of flocks; I obtained many horned and small cattle before all who were in Jerusalem before me.” The obtaining of these possessions is, according to Gen. xvii. 12 Ε΄, to be understood of purchase. There is a distinction between the slaves, male and female (mancipia), obtained by purchase, and those who were home-born (vernae), the n'2 ("2") 23, who were regarded as the chief support of the house (Gen. xiv. 14), on account of their attachment to it, and to this day are called (Arab.) fada wayyt, as those who offer themselves a sacrifice for it, if need be. Regarding Ὁ mn, in the sense of increasing possession, vid. Song, p. 155; and regarding 7 for ὙΠ, vid. at 110,16; at all events, the sing. of the pred. may be explained from this, that the persons and things named are thought of in the mass, as at Zech. xi. 5, Joel i. 20 (although the idea there may be also individualizing); but in the use of the pass., as at Gen. xxxv. 26, Dan. ix. 24, the Semite custom is different, inasmuch as for it the passive has the force of an active without a definite subject, and thus with the most general subject; and as to the case lying before us in ver. 7, we see from Ex. xii. 49, cf. Gen. xv. 17, that m7 (7m) in such instances is thought of as neut. According to Gen. xxvi. 14 and the passage before us, 72?2 lay nearer than mp, but the primary form instead of the connecting form is here the traditional reading; we have thus apposition (Mebenordnung) instead of subordination (Annexion), as in evahim sh‘lamim, Ex. xxiv. 5, and in habbagar hann‘hhosheth, 2 Kings xvi. 17, although vagar vatson may also be interpreted as the accus. of the more accurate definition: the possession of flocks consisting in cattle and sheep. But this manner of construction is, for a book of so late an origin, too artificial. What it represents Solomon as saying 1s consistent with historical fact; at the consecration of the temple he sacrificed hecatombs, 1 Kings viii. 63; and the daily supply for the royal kitchen, which will at the same time serve to show the extent of the royal household, was, according to 1 Kings v. 2 ἢ, enormous.
There now follows the enumeration of riches and jewels which were a delight to the eye; and finally, the large provision made for revelling in the pleasures of music and of sensual love.
Ver. 8. “I heaped up for myself also silver and gold, and the peculiar property of kings and of countries; I gat me men singers and women singers, and the delights of the children of men: mistress and mistresses.” The verb 023 23, συνάγειν, is common to all Semitic dialects (also to the Assyr.), and especially peculiar to the more recent Heb., which forms from it the name of the religious community συναγωγή, ND22; it is used here of that which is brought together merely for the purpose of possession. S‘gillah (from sagal, Targ., to make oneself possess), properly possession, and that something which specially and peculiarly belongs to one as his property; the word is here meant collect., as at 1 Chron. xxix. 3: that which only kings and individual countries possess. The interchange of m'lachim, which is without the article, with the determ. hamm‘dinoth, is arbitrary: something special, such as that which a king possesses, the specialities which countries possess,—one country this, and another that. The hamm‘dinoth are certainly not exclusively the regions embraced within the dominion of Solomon (Zoéckl.), as, according to Esth. i. 1, the Persian kingdom was divided into 127 m*dinoth. Solomon had a fleet which went to Ophir, was in a friendly relation with the royal house of Tyre, the metropolis of many colonies, and ruled over a widely-extended kingdom, bound by commerce with Central Asia and Africa——His desires had thus ample opportunity fo stretch beyond the limits of his own kingdom, and facilities enough for procuring the peculiar natural and artistic productions which other lands could boast of. M‘dinah is, first of all, a country, not as a territory, but as under one government (cf. v. 7); in the later philosophical language it is the Heb. word for the Greek πολιτεία; in the passage before us, m‘dinoth is, however, not different from Misi,
From the singing men and singing women who come into view here, not as appertaining to the temple service (vid. the Targ.), with which no singing women were connected, but as connected with the festivities of the court (2 Sam. xix. 36; cf. Isa. v. 12), advance is made to shiddah v'shiddoth; and since these are designated by the preceding i32YN) (not M2YN)) b'ne hdddam, especially as objects and means of earthly pleasure, and since, according to vii 7, sexual love is the fairest and the most pleasant, in a word, the most attractive of all earthly delights (Solomon’s /uzus, also here contradicting the law of the king, Deut. xvii. 17, came to a height, according to 1 Kings xi. 3, after the example of Oriental rulers, in a harem of not fewer than one thousand women, princesses and concubines), of necessity, the expression shiddah v‘shiddoth must denote a mul-
CHAP. IL 8, 239 titude of women whom the king possessed for his own pleasure. Cup-bearers, male and female (Syr., LXX.), cannot at all be understood, for although it may be said that the enumeration thus connects itself with the before-named 33, yet this class of female attendants are not numbered among the highest human pleasures; besides, with such an explanation one must read nist MY, and, in addition, 81¥ (to throw, to pour to, or pour out), to which this Heb. m1’ may correspond, is nowhere used of the pouring out of wine. Rather might mv, like sw, hydria, be the name of a vessel from which one pours out anything, according to which Aq. translates by κυλέκιον καὶ κυλίκια, Symmachus, after Jerome, by mensurarum (read mensarum’) species et appositiones, and Jerome, scyphos et urceos in ministerio ad vina fundenda; but this word for klé mashkéh, 1 Kings x. 21 (=2 Chron. ix. 20), is not found. Also the Targ., which translates by dimasaya uvé v'navan, public baths (δημόσια), and balneae, vindicates this translation by referring the word to the verb ἐδ δ᾽, “with pipes which pour out (1%) tepid water, and pipes which pour out hot water.” But this explanation is imaginary; ΠῚ occurs in the Mishna, Mikwaoth (of plunge-baths) vi. 5, but there it denotes a chest which, when it swims in the water, makes the plunge-bath unsuitable. Such an untenable conceit also is the translation suggested by Kimchi, Ἴ᾽ ‘9, according to which the Venet. σύστημα καὶ συστήματα (in a musical sense: concentus), and Luther: “all kinds of musical instruments;” the word has not this meaning; Orelli, Sanchuniathon, p. 33, combines therewith Σ᾿ ἰδών, according to the Phoenician myth, the inventress of the artistic song. The explanation by Kimchi is headed, “Splendour of every kind;” Ewald, Elster, and Zockler find therein a general expression, following taanugoth: great heap and heaps=in great abundance [die Hiille und Fille]. But the synon. of 1133, “ splendour,” is not 3, but ty; and that Tw, like oyy, is referred to a great number, is without proof. Thus shiddah v‘shiddoth will denote something definite; besides, “a large number” finds its expression in the climactic union of words. In the Jerus. Talm. Zaanith iv. 5, shiddah must, according to the gloss, be the name of a chariot, although the subject there is not that of motion forward, or moving quickly; it is there announced that Stchtn, not far from Sepphoris, a place famed also for its pottery, formerly possessed 80 such shiddoth wholly of metal. The very same word is explained by Rashi, Baba kamma ix, 3, Shabbath 120a, Erubin 30b, Gittin 80, 68a, Chagiga 25a, and elsewhere, of a carriage of wood, and especially of a chariot for 1 Thus, according to Vallarsi, a Cod. Vat. and Cod. Palat, of the first hand.
women and distinguished persons. The combination of the synonyms, shiddah uthivah umigdal, does not in itself mean more than a chest; and Rashi himself explains, Kethuboth 65a, quolphi dashidah of the lock of a chest (argaz); and the author of Aruch knows no other meaning than that of a repository such as a chest. But in passages such as Gittin 8b, the shiddah is mentioned as a means of transport; it is to all appearance a chest going on wheels, moved forward by means of wheels, but on that very account not a state-chariot. Rashi's tradition cannot be verified. Béttcher, in the Neue Achrenlese, adduces for comparison the Syr. Shydlo, which, according to Castelli, signifies navis magna, corbita, arca; but from a merchant ship and a portable chest, it is a great way to a lady's palanquin. He translates: palanquin and palinquins = one consignment to the harem after another. Gesen., according to Rodiger, Thes. 13650, thinks that women are to be understood; for he compares the Arab. z'ynat, which signifies a women's carriage, and then the woman herself (cf. our Frauenzimmer, women's apartment, women, like Odaliske, from the Turk. oda, apartment). But this all stands or falls with that gloss of Rashi's: ‘agalah lmerkavoth nashim usarim. Meanwhile, of all the explanations as yet advanced, this last [of splendid coaches, palanquins] is the best; for it may certainly be supposed that the words shiddah v‘shiddoth are meant of women. Aben Ezra explains on this supposition, shiddoth =sh‘vuyoth, females captured in war; but unwarrantably, because as yet Solomon had not been engaged in war; others (vid. Pinsker’s Zur Gesch. des Karaismus, p. 296), recently Bullock, connect it with shaddim, in the sense of (Arab.) nahidah (a2 maiden with swelling breast); Knobel explains after shadad, to barricade, to shut up, occlusa, the female held in custody (cf. Uthulah, the separated one, virgin, from bathal, cogn. badal); Hitzig, “cushions,” “ bolsters,” from shanad, which, like (Arab.) firash, λέχος, is then transferred to the juncta toro. Nothing of all that is satisfactory. The Babyl. Gemara, Gittin 68a, glosses ὋΝ 29M) by “reservoirs and baths,’ and then further says that in the west (Palestine) they say xv, chests (according to Rashi: chariots); but that here in this country (te.
in Babylon) they translate shiddah v'shiddoth by shédah v‘shédathin, which | is then explained, “demons and demonesses,” which Solomon had made subservient to him.’ This haggadic-mytholog. interpreta- tion is, linguistically at least, on the right track. A demon is not so named from fluttering or moving to and fro (Levy, Schonhak), for there is no evidence in the Semitic language of the existence of a verb iv’, to flee; also not from a verb sadad, which must correspond to the Heb. minnvin, in the sense of to adore (Oppert’s Inscription du palais de Khorsabad, 1863, p. 96); for this meaning is more than doubtful, and, besides, Ἴδ is an active, and not a passive idea,— much rather TW, Assyr. std, Arab. sayyid, signifies the mighty, from WW, to force, Ps. xci. 6." In the Arab. (cf. the Spanish Cid) it is uniformly the name of a lord, as subduing, ruling, mastering (sabid), and the fem. sayyidat, of a lady, whence the vulgar Arab. siti = my lady, and sfdi=my lord. Since 77% means the same as Ww, and in Heb. is more commonly used than it, so also the fem. form ΠΡ is possible, so much the more as it may have originated from T}Y, v. =" W, by a sharpening contraction, like D's, from OD (Olsh. ὃ 83c), perhaps intentionally to make mW, a demoness, and the name of a lady (donna = domina) unlike. Accordingly we translate, with Gesen. and Meyer in their Handwort.: “lady and ladies;” for we take shiddoth as a name of the ladies of the harem, like sheglath (Assyr. sakldti) and I‘hhenath in the book of Daniel, on which Ahron b. Joseph the Karaite remarks: shedah hingaroth shagal.
The connection expressing an innumerable quantity, and at the same time the greatest diversity, is different from the genitival dor dorim, generation of generations, 1.6. lasting through all generations, Ps. Ixxii. 5, from the permutative heightening the idea: rahham rahhamathaim, one damsel, two damsels, Judg. v. 30, and from that formed by placing together the two gram. genders, comprehending every species of the generic conception: mash’én wmash’enah, Isa. iii. 3 (vid. comm. /.c., and Ewald, § 1720). Also the words cited by Ewald (Syr.), rogo urdgo, “ all possible pleasures” (Cureton’s ϑρίοιϊ. Ρ. 10), do not altogether accord with this passage, for they heighten, like m‘od m‘od, by the repetition of the same expression. But similar is the Arab. scheme, mal wamuwal, “ possession and possessions,” 1.6. exceeding great riches, where the collective idea, in itself affording by its indetermination free scope to the imagination, is multiplied by the plur. being further added.
After Koheleth has enumerated all that he had provided for the purpose of gratifying his lusts, but without losing himself therein, he draws the conclusion, which on this occasion also shows a perceptible deficit.
Vy. 9-11. “ And I became great, and was always greater than all that were before me in Jerusalem: also my wisdom remained with me. And all that mine eyes desired I kept not from them, I refused not any kind of joy to my heart; for my heart had joy of all my labour: and this was my portion of all my labour. And I turned myself to all the works which my hands had done, and to the-labour which I had laboured to accomplish: and, behold, all was vain, and windy effort, and there was no true profit under the sun.” In v‘hosaphti there is here no obj. as at i, 16; the obj. is the 7dullah, the greatness, to be concluded and thought of from v‘gadalti, “ and I became great.” To the impers. ™) for "9, 74, cf. 7a, i 16, 10. He became great, and always greater, viz. in the possession of all the good things, the possession of which seemed to make a man happy on this earth, And what he resolved upon, in the midst of this dulcis insania, viz. to deport himself as a wise man, he succeeded in doing: his wisdom forsook him not, viz. the means adapted to the end, and ruling over this colossal apparatus of sensual lust; 4X, as eg. at Ps. xvi. 6, belongs to the whole clause; and ‘oy, with $ does not mean here to stand by, sustain (Herzfeld, Ewald, Elster), which it might mean as well as > ἼΟΡ, Dan. xii. 1, but to continue (vid. p. 194), as Jerome, and after him, Luther, translates: sapientia quoque perseveravit mecum; the Targ. connects the ideas of continuance (LXX., Syr., Venet.) and of help; but the idea intended is that of continuance, for 372, ¢g., does not refer to helping, but selfmaintaining.
Ver. 10, Thus become great and also continuing wise, he was not only in a condition to procure for himself every enjoyment, but he also indulged himself in everything; all that his eyes desired, i+, all that they saw, and after which they made him lust (Deut. xiv. 26) (cf. 1 John ii. 16), that he did not refuse to them (73%, subtra~ here), and he kept not back his heart from any kind of joy (020, with min of the thing refused, as at Num. xxiv. 11, οἷο, oftener with min, of him to whom it is refused, eg. Gen. xxx. 2), for (here, after the foregoing negations, coinciding with immo) his heart had joy of all his work; and this, viz. this enjoyment in full measure, was his part of all his work. The palindromic form is like i 6, iv. 1; ef. Isa. p. 411. We say in Heb. as well as in German: to have joy in (an, 3) anything, joy over (aber, Sy) anything, or joy of (von, 10) anything; Koheleth here purposely uses min, for he wishes to express not that the work itself was to him an object and reason of joy, but that it became to him a well of joy (cf. Prov. v. 18; 2 Chron. xx. 27). Falsely, Hahn and others: after my work (min, as eg.
Ps. Ixxiii, 20), for thereby the causative connection is obliterated: min is the expression of the mediate cause, as the concluding sentence says: Joy was that which he had of all his work—this itself brought care and toil to him; joy, made possible to him thereby, was the share which came to him from it.
Ver. 11. But was this pon a }iN!—was this gain that fell to him a true, satisfying, pure gain? With the words upnanithi ani (vid. p. 198) he proposes this question, and answers it. 2B (to turn to) is elsewhere followed by expressions of motion to an end; here, as at Jab vi. 28, by 3, by virtue of a constructio praegnans: I turned myself, fixing my attention on all my works which my hands accomplished. La’asoth is,as at Gen. ii. 3 (vid. l.c.), equivalent to perficiendo, carrying out, viz. such works of art and of all his labour. The exclamation “behold” introduces the swmma summarum. Regarding fim, vid.i. 3. Also this way of finding out that which was truly good showed itself to be false. Of all this enjoyment, there remained nothing but the feeling of emptiness. What he strove after appeared to him as the wind; the satisfaction he sought to obtain at such an expense was nothing else than a momentary delusion. And since in this search after the true happiness of life he was in a position more favourable for such a purpose than almost any other man, he is constrained to draw the conclusion that there is no jn, ze. no real enduring and true happiness, from all labour under the sun.
The End of the Wise Man the same as that of the Fool, ii. 12-17.
After Koheleth has shown, i. 12 ff., that the striving after wisdom does not satisfy, inasmuch as, far from making men happy, its possession only increases their inward conflicts, he proposes to himself the question, whether or not there is a difference between wisdom and folly, whether the former does not far excel the latter. He proceeds to consider this question, for it is more appropriate to him, the old much-experienced king, than to others.
Ver. 12. “ And I turned myself to examine wisdom, and madness, and folly: for what is the man who could come after the king, him whom they have made so long ago!” Mendelssohn’s translation, 12a: “I abandoned my design of seeking to connect wisdom with folly and madness,” is impossible, because for such a rendering we should have had at least nix7}o instead of nist? Hitzig, otherwise followed by Stuart: “I turned myself to examine me wisdom, and, lo, it was madness as well as folly.” This rendering is impossible also, for in such a case 727) ought to have stood as the result, after moon. The passage, Zech. xiv. 6, cited by Hitz., does not prove the possibility of such a brachyology, for there we read not t‘garoth v‘geppayon, but ‘garoth ig'ppaiin (the splendid ones, i. the stars, will draw themselves together, tc. will become dark bodies). The two vavs are not correlative, which is without example in the usage of this book, but copulative: he wishes to contemplate (Zéckler and others) wisdom on the one side, and madness and folly on the other, in their relation to each other, viz. in their relative worth. Hitzig’s ingenuity goes yet further astray in 12): “For what will the man do who comes after the king? (He shall do) what was long ago his (own) doing, ic. inheriting from the king the throne, he will not also inherit his wisdom.” Instead of dsiAd, he reads dsdhd, after Ex. xviii. 18; but the more modern author, whose work we have here before us, would, instead of this anomalous form, use the regular form inivy; but, besides, the expression δίλ asher-K’var ‘asotho, “ (he will do) what long ago was his doing,” is not Heb.; the words ought to have been Masotho Kvar khen daah, or at least ‘asdhd. If we compare 126 with 18), the man who comes after the king appears certainly to be his successor.’ But by this supposition it is impossible to give just effect to the relation (assigning a reason or motive) of 12) to 12a expressed by ‘2. When I considered, Knobel regards Koheleth as saying, that a fool would be heir to me a wise man, it appeared strange to me, and I was led to compare wisdom and folly to see whether or not the wise man has a superiority to the fool, or whether his labour and his fate are vanity, like those of the fool. This is in point of style absurd, but it is much more absurd logically. And who then gave the interpreter the mght to stamp as a fool the man who comes after the king? In the answer: “That which has long ago been done,” must lie its justification; for this that was done long ago naturally consists, as Zockler remarks, in foolish and perverse undertakings, certainly in the destruction of that which was done by the wise predecessor, in the lavish squandering of the treasures and goods collected by him. More briefly, but in the same sense, Burger: Nihil quod a solita hominum agendi ratione recedit. But in ver. 19, Koheleth places it as a question whether his successor will be a wise man or a fool, while here he would presuppose that “ naturally,” or as a matter of course, he will be a fool. In the matter of style, we have nothing to object to the translation on which Zéckler, with Ramb., Rosenm., Knobel, Hengst.,
' The LXX. and Symm, by hammélék think of melak, counsel, βουλή, instead of mélzk, king; and as Jerome, so also Bardach understands by the king the rex factor, ie. God the Creator.
and others, proceeds; the supplying of the verb NYY to meh haadam {= what can the man do 1] is possible (cf. Mal. ii. 15), and the neut. interpret. of the suffix of YY is, after vii. 13, Amos i 3, Job xxxi. 11, admissible; but the reference to a successor is not connected with the course of the thoughts, even although one attaches to the plain words a meaning which is foreign tothem. The words wy... NX are accordingly not the answer to the question proposed, but a component part of the question itself. Thus Ewald, and with him Elster, Heiligst., construes: “ How will the man be who will follow the king, compared with him whom they made (a king) long ago, 1.6. with his predecessor?” But MX, in this pregnant sense, “ compared with,” is without example, at least in the Book of Koheleth, which generally does not use it as a prep.; and, besides, this rendering, by introducing the successor on the throne, offends against the logic of the relation of 125 to 12a. The motive of Koheleth’s purpose, to weigh wisdom and folly against each other as to their worth, consists in this, that a king, especially such an one as Solomon was, has in the means at his disposal and in the extent of his observation so much more than every other, that no one who comes after him will reach a different experience. This motive would be satisfactorily expressed on the supposition that the answer begins with nx, if one should read YY for vy: he will be able to do (accomplish) nothing but what he (the king) has long ago done, 1.6. he will only repeat, only be able to confirm, the king’s report. But if we take the text as it here stands, the meaning is the same; and, besides, we get rid of the harsh ellipsis meh haddam for méh yddseh haddam. We translate: for what is the man who might come after the king, him whom they have made so long ago! The king whom they made so long ago is Solomon, who has a richer experience, a more comprehensive knowledge, the longer the time (viz. from the present time backwards) since he occupied the throne. Regarding the expression eth asher = quem, instead of the asher simply, vid. Kohler under Zech. xii. 10. ‘%¥Y, with the most general subj., is not different from ΠΟ), which, particularly in the Book of Daniel (eg. iv. 28 f.), has frequently an active construction, with the subject unnamed, instead of the passive (Gesen. § 137, margin). The author of the Book of Koheleth, alienated from the theocratic side of the kingdom of Israel, makes use of it perhaps not unintentionally; besides, Solomon’s elevation to the throne was, according to 1 Kings 1, brought about very much by human agency; and one may, if he will, think of the people in the word ’aswhu also, according to 1 Kings i. 39, who at last decided the matter. Meh before the letters Aheth and ayin commonly occurs: according to the Masora, twenty-four times; before other initial letters than these, eight times, and three of these in the Book of Koheleth before the letter Ae, ii 12, 22, vii. 10. The words are more an exclamation than a question; the exclamation means: What kind of a man is that who could come after the king! cf. “ What wickedness is this!” etc., Judg. xx. 12, Josh. xxii. 16, Ex. xviii, 14, 1 Kings ix. 13, ἐξ as standing behind with reference to me—the same figure of extenuatio, as mah adam, Ps. cxliv. 3; ef. viii. δ.
There now follows an account of what, on the one side, happened to him thus placed on a lofty watch-tower, such as no other occupied.
Vv. 13, 14a. “ And I saw that wisdom has the advantage over folly, as light has the advantage over darkness. The wise man has eyes in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness.” In the sacred Scriptures, “light” is generally the symbol of grace, Ps. xliii. 3, but also the contrast of an intellectually and morally darkened state, Isa. li. 4. To know a thing is equivalent to having light on it, and seeing it in its true light (Ps. xxxvi. 10); wisdom is thus compared to light; folly is once, Job xxxviii 19, directly called “ darkness.” Thus wisdom stands so much higher than folly, as light stands above darkness. [7", which hitherto denoted actual result, enduring gain, signifies here preference (vid. p. 192); along with ΠΡ ἢ there is also found the form ἤ 9 ἦ (vid. Prov. xxx. 17). The fool walks in darkness: he is blind although he has eyes (Isa. xliii. 8), and thus has as good as none,—he wants the spiritual eye of understanding (x. 3); the wise man, on the other hand, his eyes are in his head, or, as we also say: he has eyes in his head,—eyes truly seeing, looking at and examining persons and things. That is the one side of the relation of wisdom to folly as put to the test.
The other side of the relation is the sameness of the result in which the elevation of wisdom above folly terminates.
Vv. 140, 15. “And I myself perceived that one experience happeneth to them all. And I said in my heart, As it will happen to the fool, it will happen also to me; and why have I then been specially wise? Thus I spake then in my heart, that this also is vain.” Zéckler gives to 03 an adversative sense; but this gam (= ὅμως, stmiliter) stands always at the beginning of the clause, Ewald, ὃ 354a. Gam-ani corresponds to the Lat. ego idem, which gives two predicates to one subject; while εἰ ipse predicates the same of the one of two subjects as it does of the other (Zumpt, § 697). The second gam- ani serves for the giving of prominence to the object, and here precedes, after the manner of a substantival clause (cf. Isa. xly. 12: Ezek. xxxiii. 17; 2 Chron. xxviii. 10), as at Gen. xxiv. 27: cf. Gesen. δ 121. 8. AMigreh (from ΠΡ, to happen, to befall) is guiquid alicui accidit (in the later philosoph. terminol. accidens; Venet, συμβε- βηκός); but here, as the connection shows, that which finally puts an end to life, the final event of death. By the word “1 the author expresses what he had observed on reflection; by 2... ‘OX, what he said inwardly to himself regarding it; and by 3 ‘37, what sentence he passed thereon with himself. Zammah asks for the design, as maddw'a for the reason. ‘8 is either understood temporally: then when it is finally not better with me than with the fool (Hitz. from the standpoint of the dying hour), or logically: if yet one and the same event happeneth to the wise man and to the fool (Elst.); in the consciousness of the author both are taken together. The ΠῚ of the conclusion refers, not, as at i. 17, to the endeavouring after and the possession of wisdom, but to this final result making no difference between wise men and fools. This fate, happening to all alike, is 237, a vanity rendering all vain, a nullity levelling down all to nothing, something full of contradictions, irrational. Paul also (Rom. viii. 20) speaks of this destruction, which at last comes upon all, as a ματαιότης.
The author now assigns the reason for this discouraging result.
Ver. 16. “ For no remembrance of the wise, as of the fool, remains for ever; since in the days that are to come they are all forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? as the fool!” As ini. 11,50 here {13} is the principal form, not different from {73!. Having no remembrance for ever, is equivalent to having no eternal endurance, having simply no onward existence (ix. 6). OY is both times the comparat. combin., as at vii. 11; Job ix. 26, xxxvii. 18; cf. 70}, Ps. xlix. 11. There are, indeed, individual historically great men, the memory of whom is perpetuated from generation to generation in words and in monuments; but these are exceptions, which do not always show that posterity is able to distinguish between wise men and fools. As a rule, men have a long appreciating recollection of the wise as little as they have of the fools, for long ago (wd. b’shekvar, p. 196) in the coming days (31 °%, accus. of the time, like the ellipt. ‘an, Isa. xxvii. 6) all are forgotten; 230 is, as at Ps. xiv. 3, meant personally: the one as the other; and "2¥/ 18 rendered by the Masora, like ix. 6, ‘2 ‘32, as the pausal form of the finite; but is perhaps thought of as part., denoting that which only in the coming days will become too soon a completed fact, since those who survive go from the burial of the one, as well as from that of the other, to the ordinary duties of the day. Death thus sinks the wise man, as it does the fool, in eternal oblivion; it comes to both, and brings the same to both, which extorted from the author the cry: How dieth the wise man? as the fool! Why is the fate which awaits both thus the same! This is the pointed, sarcastic 7 (how ἢ of the satirical Mashal, eg. Isa. xiv. 4, Ezek. xxvi. 17; and Mo is = moriendum. est, as at 2 Sam. iii. 3, moriendum erat. Rambach well: yx est h. l. particula admirationis super rei indignitate.
What happened to the author from this sorrowful discovery he now states.
Ver. 17. “Then life became hateful to me; for the work which man accomplishes under the sun was grievous to me: because all is vain and windy effort.” He hated life; and the labour which is done under the sun, iz. the efforts of men, including the fate that befalls men, appeared to him to be evil (repugnant). The LXX. translate: πονηρὸν ἐπ᾽ ἐμέ; the Venet.: κακὸν ἐπὶ ἐμοί; and thus Hitzig: as a woful burden lying on me. But ὧν In is to be understood after tov al, Esth. iii. 9, ete., ef. Ps. xvi. 6, and as synon. with ‘v2 or ‘285 (cf. Dan. iii. 32), according to which Symmachus: κακὸν γάρ μοι ἐφάνη. This al belongs to the more modern usus log., cf. Ewald, § 217% The end of the song was also again the grievous celerum censeo: Vanity, and a labour which has wind as its goal, wind as its fruit.
The Vanity of Wealth gathered with Care and Privation, ii. 18-23.
In view of death, which snatches away the wise man equally with the fool, and of the night of death, which comes to the one as to the other, deep dejection came upon him from another side.
Ver. 18. “And I hated all my labour with which I laboured under the sun, that I should leave it to the man who shall be after me;” ie. not: who shall come into existence after me, but: who shall occupy my place after me. The fiction discovers itself here in the expression: “The king,” who would not thus express himself indefinitely and unsympathetically regarding his son and successor on the throne, is stripped of his historical individuality. The first and third Οὐ are relat. pron. (quem, after the schema etymologicum Sop Spy, ver. 11, ix. 9, and qui), the second is relat. conj. (e0) quod. The suffix of ‘38 refers to the labour in the sense of that which is obtained by wearisome labour, accomplished or collected with
How this man will be circumstanced who will have at his disposal that for which he has not laboured, is uncertain.
Ver. 19. “And who knoweth whether he shall be wise or foolish? and he will have power over all my labour with which I had wearied myself, and had acted wisely, under the sun: this also is vain.” %&%...4, instead of DX...4, in the double question, as at Job xvi. 3. What kind of a man he will be no one can previously know, and yet this person will have free control (ef. poy, p. 196) over all the labour that the testator has wisely gained by labour—a hendiadys, for 020 with the obj. accus, is only in such a connection possible: “ my labour which I, acting wisely, gained by labour.”
In view of this doubtful future of that which was with pains and wisely gained by him, his spirit sank within him.
Ver. 20. “Then I turned to give up my heart on account of [= to despair of] all the labour with which I wearied myself under the sun.” As at 1 Sam. xxii. 17f., Song ii. 17, Jer. xli. 14, 220 has here the intrans. meaning, to turn about (LXX. ἐπέστρεψα = ἐπεστρεψάμην). Hitzig remarks that m5 and 2 signify, “to turn round in order to see,” and 33D, on the contrary, “to turn round in order to do.” But 725 can also mean, “to turn round in order to do,” eg. Lev. xxvi. 9; and 33D, “to turn in order to examine more narrowly,” vii. 25. The distinction lies in this, that 25 signifies a clear turning round; 230, a turning away from one thing to another, a turning in the direction of something new that presents itself (iv. 1, 7, ix. 11). The phrase, i27-n8 wx’, closely corresponds to the Lat. despondet animum, he gives up his spirits, lets them sink, i.e. he despairs. The old language knows only xi}, to give oneself up, ze. to give up hope in regard to anything; and xi), given up, having no prospect, in despair. The Talm., however, uses along with nithydésh (vid. p. 192) not only nodsh, but also Ws’, in the sense of despair, or the giving up of all hope (subst. WAN), Mezta 210, from which it is at once evident that WX’ is not to be thought of as causative (like the Arab. ajjasa and aiasa), but as simply transitive, with which, after the passage before us, 125 is to be thought of as connected. He turned round to give up all heart. He had no more any heart to labour.
1 With Pathach under the yod in the text in Biblia Rabb. and the note ὃ. Thus also in the Ms. Parva Masora, and e.g. Uod. P.
Ver. 21. “For there is a man who labours with wisdom, and knowledge, and ability; and to a man who has not laboured for it, must he leave it as his portion: also that is vain, and a great evil.” Ewald renders: whose labour aims after wisdom. But ‘ 'n2 do not denote obj. (for the obj. of Sey is certainly the portion which is to be inherited), but are particular designations of the way and manner of the labour. Instead of Sop’, there is used the more emphatic form of the noun: ye, who had his labour, and performed it; 1 Sam. vii. 17, cf Jer. ix. 5, “Thine habitation is in the midst of skilfulness conducting to the end (vid. p. 193). {2 refers to the object, and ὩΣ to the result of the work; {P99 is the second obj.-accus., or, as we rather say, pred.-accus.: as his portion, viz inheritance. That what one has gained by skill and good fortune thus falls question literally is: What is (comes forth, results) to a man from all his labour; for “to become, to be, to fall to, happen to,” is the fundamental idea of mm (whence here ™), γενόμενον, as at Neh. vi. 6, γενησόμενος) or MH, the root signification of which is deorsum ferri, cadere, and then accidere, fieri, whence ΤᾺΣ, eagerness precipitating itself upon anything (vid. under Prov. x. 3), or object.: fall, catastrophe, destruction. Instead of ™W, there is here to be written xv! as at iii, 18 Om, The question looks forward to a negative answer. What comes out of his labour for man? Nothing comes of it, nothing but disagreeableness. This negative contained in the question is established by 3, 23a. The form of the clause, “ all his days are sorrows,” viz. as to their condition, follows the scheme, “the porch was 20 cubits,” 2 Chron. iii 4, viz in measurement; or, “their feast is music and wine,” Isa. v. 12, viz in its combination (vid. Philippi’s Stat. Const. p. 90 ff). The parallel clause is OY? ὍΣ, not ‘21; for the final syllable, or that having the accent on the penult., immediately preceding the Athnach-word, takes Kametz, as 1 Thus according to tradition, in H, J, P, vid. Micklol 476, 215b, 216a; vid. also orzi.
eg. Ley. xviii. 5; Prov. xxv. 3; Isa. lxv. 17 (cf. Olsh. § 224, p. 440)2 Many interpreters falsely explain: at aegritudo est velut quotidiana occupatio ejus. For the sake of the parallelism, 1y (from my, to weary oneself with labour, or also to strive, aim; vid. Psalmen, ii. 390) is subj. not pred.: his endeavour is grief, i.e. brings only grief or vexation with it. Even in the night he has no rest; for even then, though he is not labouring, yet he is inwardly engaged about his labour and his plans. And this possession, acquired with such labour and restlessness, he must leave to others; for equally with the fool he falls under the stroke of death: he himself has no enjoyment, others have it; dying, he must leave all behind him,—a threefold San, vv. 17, 21, 23, and thus mbar 5an.
The Condition of Pure Enjoyment, τὶ. 24—26.
Is it not then foolish thus restlessly and with so much selftorment to labour for nothing? In view of the night of darkness which awaits man, and the uncertain destiny of our possessions, it 18 better to make use of the present in a way as pleasant to ourselves as possible.
Ver. 24. “ There is nothing better among men, than that one eat and drink, and that he should pamper his soul by his labour: this also have I seen, that it is in the hand of God.” The LXX.,, as well as the other Greek transl., and Jerome, had before them the words 5 ptx2. The former translates: “Man has not the good which he shall eat and drink,” ie. also this that he eats...is for him no true good; but the direct contrary of this is what Koheleth says. Jerome seeks to bring the thought which the text presents into the right track, by using the form of a question: nonne melius est comedere...; against this iii. 12, 22, viii. 15, are not to be cited where 2:0 Νὴ: stands in the dependent sentence; the thought is not thus to be improved; its form is not this, for 2), beginning a sentence, is never interrog., but affirm.; thus 210 PX 15 not = 2) xbn, but is a negative statement. It is above all doubt, that instead of “Οὐ DIN we must read 8 DIND, after iii. 12, 22, vill. 19; for, as at Job xxxiii, 17, the initial letter mem after the terminal mem has dropped out. Codd. of the LXX. have accordingly corrected ὃ into πλὴν ὃ or εἰ μὴ ὃ (thus the Compl. Ald.), and the Syr. and Targ. render w here by 7 xox and 777% [unless that he eat];
Jerome also has non est bonum homini nisi quod in his Comm.; only the Venet. seeks to accommodate itself to the traditional text. Besides, only Ὁ is to be inserted, not DX ‘>; for the phrase 55¥> DY *D is used, but not & ox 5. Instead of bdddam, the form ἰᾶδαπι would be more agreeable, as at vi. 12, viii. 15. Hitzig remarks, without proof, that bddddm is in accordance with later grammatical forms, which admit 3 = “for” before the object. 3, x. 17, is neither prep. of the object, nor is ὧν, Sir. iii. 7, the exponent of the dative (vid. Grimm). Βαδαᾶπι signifies, as at 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, and as ἐν ἀνθ Sir. xi. 14, inter homines; also iii. 12 designates by 03 2© what among them (men) has to be regarded as good. It is interesting to see how here the ancient and the modern forms of the language run together, without the former wholly passing over into the latter; ‘vp, quam τῷ edat, is followed by norm. perfects, in accordance with that comprehensive peculiarity of the old syntax which Ewald, by an excellent figure, calls the dissolution of that which is coloured into grey. aio... "M1 is equivalent to {> “πὶ Ps. xlix. 19, the causative rendering of the phrase 310 7, iii, 13, or 73D 5, v. 17, vi. 6. It is well to attend to ‘py2 [by his labour], which forms an essential component part of that which is approved of as good. Not a useless sluggardlife, but a life which connects together enjoyment and labour, is that which Koheleth thinks the best in the world. But this enjoyment, lightening, embellishing, seasoning labour, has also its But; etiam hoc vidi ¢ manu Dei esse (pendere). The order of the words harmonizes with this Lat.; it follows the scheme referred to at Gen. i 4; cf. on the contrary, iii. 6. Instead of "103, neut. by attraction, there is here the immediately neut. "03; the book uniformly makes use of this fem. form instead of τιν (vid. p. 198). This or that is “in the hand of God,” dz. it is His gift, iii, 13, v. 18, and it is thus conditioned by Him, since man cannot give it to himself; cf. minni, Isa. xxx. 1; mimmeénni, Hos. viii. 4; mimmeénnu, 1 Kings xx. 33.
This dependence of the enjoyment of life on God is established.
Ver. 25. “For who can eat, and who can have enjoyment, without [=except from] Him?” Also here the traditional text is untenable: we have to read won pon, after the LXX. (which Jerome follows in his Comm.) and the Syr. If we adopt the text as it lies before us, then the meaning would be, as given by Gumpel,’ and thus translated by Jerome: Quis ita devorabit εἰ deliciis effluet ut ego? But (1) the question thus understood would require 389 ΓΝ, which Gumpel and others silently substitute in place of Ὃ pin;
\ Vid. regarding his noteworthy Comm. on Koheleth, my Jesurun, pp. 183 and 195, The author bears the name among Christians of Professor Levisohn.
(2) this question, in which the king adjudicates to himself an unparalleled right to eat and to enjoy himself, would stand out of connection with that which precedes and follows. Even though with Ginsburg, after Rashi, Aben Ezra, and Rashbam, we find i ver. 25 the thought that the labourer has the first and nearest title to the enjoyment of the fruit of his labour (Ὁ yin thus exemplif. as iv. 8,’y... 5), the continuation with 3, ver. 26, is unsuitable; for the natural sequence of the thoughts would then be this: But the enjoyment, far from being connected with the labour as its selfconsequence and fruit, is a gift of God, which He gives to one and withholds from another. If we read 312, then the sequence of the thoughts wants nothing in syllogistic exactness, van here has nothing in common with wan= (lb, to proceed with a violent, impetuous motion, but, as at Job xx. 2, is =.»»»-» stringere (whence hiss, a sensible impression); the experience (vid. p. 191) here meant is one mediated by means of a pleasant external enjoyment. The LXX., Theod., and Syr. translate: (and who can) drink, which Ewald approves of, for he compares (Arab.) hasa (inf. hasy), to drink, to sip. But this Arab. verb is unheard of in Heb.; with right, Heiligst. adheres to the Arab., and at the same time the modern Heb. hass, van, sentire, according to which Schultens, quis sensibus indulserit. yan won is not = Ὃ xh, “ except from him” (Hitz., ZockL), but jo yin together mean “except;” cf. e.g. the Mishnic nd ym mand pan, beyond the time and place suitable for the thank-offering, nan tnx» pin, excepting one of the same, Menachoth vii. 3, for which the old Heb. would in the first case use x53, and in the second ΠΟΥ or [Ὁ 72) (= Aram. 2 13) (vid. p.191). Accordingly 1» yin means practer eum (Deum), i.e. unless he will it and make it possible, Old Heb. '39, Gen. xli. 44.
In enjoyment man is not free, it depends not on his own will: labour and the enjoyment of it do not stand in a necessary connection; but enjoyment is a gift which God imparts, according as He regards man as good, or as a sinner.
Ver. 26. “ For to a man who appears to Him as good, He gave wisdom, and knowledge, and joy; but to the sinner He gave the work of gathering and heaping up, in order to give it to him who appears to Him as good: this also is vain, and grasping after the wind;” viz. this striving after enjoyment in and of the labour—it is “vain,” for the purpose and the issue lie far apart; and “striving after the wind,” because that which is striven for, when one thinks that he has it, only too often cannot be grasped, but vanishes into nothing. If we refer this sentence to a collecting and heaping up
ἐν mi (Hitz.); and perfectly inadmissible the reference to the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and joy (Bullock), for referred to these the sentence gains a meaning only by introducing all kinds of things into the text which here lie out of the connection. Besides, what is here said has indeed a deterministic character, and yx, especially if it is thought of in connection with ‘r,' sounds as if to the good and the bad their objective worth and distinction should be adjudicated; but this sinner, not merely such before God, but really such; here te) has a different signification than when joined with ©: one who sins in the sight of God, ἐε. without regarding Him (Luke xv. 18, ἐνώ- my), serves sin. Regarding ΤΡ, wid. under 23a: it denotes a nected with wise, intelligent activity, is, like wisdom and themselves, a gift of God. The obj. of MN? (that He may give it) is the store gathered together by the sinner; the thought is the same as that at Prov. xiii. 22, xxviii. 8, Job xxvii. 16 f. The perfect we have so translated, for that which is constantly repeating itself is here designated by the general expression of a thing thus once for all ordained, and thus always continued.
The Short-sightedness and Impotence of Man over against God the All-conditioning, iii 1-15.
As pure enjoyment stands not in the power of man, much rather is a gift of God which He bestows or denies to man according to His own will, so in general all happens when and how God wills, according to a world-plan, comprehending all things which man can
? Written with segol under Ὁ in P, Biblia Radb., and elsewhere. Thus correctly after the Masora, according to which this form of the word has throughout the book segol under δ, with the single exception of vii. 26. Cf. Michlol 1240, 1408.
neither wholly understand, nor in any respect change,—feeling himself in all things dependent on God, he ought to learn to fear Him.
All that is done here below is ordered by God at a time appointed, and is done without any dependence on man’s approbation, according to God's ordinance, arrangement, and providence.
iii. 1. “ Everything has its time, and every purpose under the heavens its hour.” The Germ. language is poor in synonyms of time. Zéckler translates: Everything has its Frist..., but by Frist we think only of a fixed term of duration, not of a period of beginning, which, though not exclusively, is yet here primarily meant; we have therefore adopted Luther's excellent translation. Certainly PO? (from ΠΡ, cogn. 7, signare), belonging to the more modern Heb. (vid. p. 191), means a Frist (eg. Dan. ii. 16) as well as a Zeitpunkt, point of time; in the Semit. (also Assyr. simmu, simanu, with D) it is the most common designation of the idea of time. ΠΡ is abbreviated either from M7Y (131, to determine) or from MY (from My, cogn. ΠΝ, to go towards, to meet). In the first case it stands connected with 73D on the one side, and with MY (from 7'Y, to count) on the other; in the latter case, with ΠΟ», Ex. xxi. 10 (perhaps also ¥ and M2Y in 193, M2V2). It is difficult to decide this point; proportionally more, however, can be said for the original my (Palest.-Aram: 872Y), as also the prep. of participation MX is derived from ΓΟ ἢ (meeting, coming together). The author means to say, if we have regard to the root signification of the second conception of time—(1) that everything has its fore-determined time, in which there lies both a determined point of time when it happens, and a determined period of time during which it shall continue; and (2) that every matter has a time appointed for it, or one appropriate, suitable for it. The Greeks were guided by the right feeling when they rendered jm? by χρόνος, and ny by καιρός. Olympiodorus distinguishes too sharply when he understands the former of duration of time, and the latter of a point of time; while the state of the matter is this, that by χρόνος the idea comprehends the termint a quo and ad quem, while by καιρός it is limited to the terminus a quo. Regarding 75M, which proceeds from the ground-idea of being inclined to, and intention, and thus, like πρᾶγμα and χρῆμα, to the general signification of design, undertaking, res gesta, res, vid. p. 1 92:
The illustration commences with the beginning and the ending
1 i’: on. der Zeit u. Ewigkeit, 1871. He decides for ste ἃς ce te = nin, sic pi Chald, W.B. ΤΙ. 572) for the derivation from my, the higher power of TIN; whence (Arab.) inan, right time. We have, under Job xxiv. 1, maintained the former derivation.
of the life of man and (in near-lying connection of thought) of plants.
Ver. 2.! “To be born has its time, and to die has its time; to plant has its time, and to root up that which is planted has its time.” The inf, 9799 signifies nothing else than to bring forth; but when that which is brought forth comes more into view than she who brings forth, it is used in the sense of being born (cf. Jer. xxv, 34, ὋΣ = nan); ledah, Hos. ix. 11, is the birth; and in the Assyr., li-id-tu, li-i-tu, li-da-a-tu, designates posterity, progenies. Since now lalédeth has here lamuth as contrast, and thus does not denote the birth-throes of the mother, but the child’s beginning of life, the translation, “to be born has its time,” is more appropriate to what is designed than “to bring forth has its time.” What Zockler, after Hitzig, objects that by /edeth a yon [an undertaking], and thus a conscious, intended act must be named, is not applicable; for 55> standing at the beginning comprehends doing and suffering, and:leath also (apart from suicide) is certainly not an intended act, frequently even an unconscious suffering. Instead of nyo? (for whic: the form nyw>? is found, οἵ, bid, Ps, Ixvi. 9), the older language uses yx, Jer. i. 10. In still more modern Heb. the expression used would be yor, ic. 98? (Shebtith ii. 1). PY has here its nearest signification: to root up (denom. of PY, root), like 1?¥, 2 Kings iii, 25, where it is the Targ. word for SBN (to fell trees).
From out-rooting, which puts an end to the life of plants, the transition is now made to putting to death.
Ver. 3. “To put to death has its time, and to heal has its time; to pull down has its time, and to build has its time.” That harog (to kill) is placed over against “to heal,” Hitzig explains by the remark that harog does not here include the full consequences of the act, and is fitly rendered by “to wound.” But “to put to death ” is nowhere =“ nearly to put to death,”—one who is harug
1 These seven verses, 2-8, are in Codd and Edd., like Josh. xii. 9 ff., and Esth. ix. 7 ff., arranged in the form of a song, 80 that one ny (time) always stands under another, after the scheme described in Megilla 16b, Massecheth Sofrim xiii. 3, but without any express reference to this passage in Koheleth. J has a different manner of arranging the words, the first four lines of which we here adduce [read from right to left]:— "eth lamoth veeth lalédéth "éth "eth nathu’d ἰὰ dgor veeth lathd ath th lirpd veeth lahdrog "eth livnoth vteth liphrots
3 This Abulwalid found in a correct Damascus ms., Michlol 81.
is not otherwise to be healed than by resurrection from the dead, Ezek. xxxvii. 6. The contrast has no need for such ingenuity to justify it. The striking down of a sound life stands in contrast to the salvation of an endangered life by healing, and this in many situations of life, particularly in war, in the administration of justice, and in the defence of innocence against murder or injury, may be fitting. Since the author does not present these details from a moral point of view, the time here is not that which is morally right, but that which, be it morally right or not, has been determined by God, the Governor of the world and Former of history, who makes even that which is evil subservient to His plan. With the two pairs of γένεσις καὶ φθορά there are two others associated in ver. 3; with that, having reference, 2b, to the vegetable world, there here corresponds one referring to buildings; to 7B (synon. D195, Jer. i. 10) stands opposed 123 (which is more than 173), as at 2 Chron. xxxii. 5.
These contrasts between existence and non-existence are followed by contrasts within the limits of existence itself:—
Ver. 4. “To weep has its time, and to laugh has its time; to mourn has its time, and to dance has its time.” It is possible that the author was led by the consonance from livnoth to livkoth, which immediately follows it; but the sequence of the thoughts is at the same time inwardly mediated, for sorrow kills and joy enlivens, Sir. Xxxli. 21-24, ‘NSD is particularly lamentation for the dead, Zech. xii. 10; and 7)P9, dancing (in the more modern language the usual word for hholél, kirkér, hhagdg) at a marriage festival and on other festal occasions.
It is more difficult to say what leads the author to the two following pairs of contrasts:—
Ver. 5. “To throw stones has its time, and to gather tozether stones has its time; to embrace has its time, and to refrain from embracing has its time.” Did the old Jewish custom exist at the time of the author, of throwing three shovelfuls of earth into the grave, and did this lead him to use the phrase ‘a8 ‘wn? But we do not need so incidental a connection of the thought, for the first pair accords with the specific idea of life and death; by the throwing of stones a field is destroyed, 2 Kings ili. 30, or as expressed at ver. 19, is marred; and by gathering the stones together and removing them (which is called bpd), it is brought under cultivation. Does ‘nd, to embrace, now follow because it is done with the arms and hands? Scarcely; but the loving action of embracing stands beside the hostile, purposely injurious throwing of stones into a field, not exclusively (2 Kings iv. 16), but yet chiefly (as ἐν. at Prov. v. 20) as referring to love for women; the intensive in the second member is introduced perhaps only for the purpose of avoiding the paronomasia lirhhog mahhavog.
The following pair of contrasts is connected with the avoiding or refraining from the embrace of love:-—
Ver. 6. “To seek has its time, and to lose has its time; to lay up has its time, and to throw away has its time.” Vaihinger and others translate 72%, to give up as lost, which the Pid. signifies first wasting (Prov. xxix. 3). But in the more modern language, 73%, like the Lat. perdere, in the sense of “to lose,” is the trans. to the intrans. 13%, eg. Tahoroth viii. 3, “if one loses (ἼΒΚΌΠ) anything,” ete.; Sifri, at Deut. xxiv. 19, “he who has lost (13%D) a shekel,” etc. In this sense the Palest.-Aram. uses the Aphel 13M, eg. Jer. Mecta ii. δ, “ the queen had lost (met) her ornament.” The intentional giving up, throwing away from oneself, finds its expres-
Ver. 7a. “ To rend has its time, and to sew has its time.” When evil tidings come, when the tidings of death come, then is the time for rending the garments (2 Sam. xiii 31), whether as a spontaneous outbreak of sorrow, or merely as a traditionary custom. —The tempest of the affections, however, passes by, and that which was torn is again sewed together.
Perhaps it is the recollection of great calamities which leads to the following contrasts:-—.
Ver. 7). “ To keep silence has its time, and to speak has its time.” Severe strokes of adversity turn the mind in quietness back upon itself; and the demeanour most befitting such adversity is silent resignation (cf. 2 Kings ii 3, δ). This mediation of the thought is so much the more probable, as in all these contrasts it is not so much the spontaneity of man that comes into view, as the predetermination and providence of God.
The following contrasts proceed on the view that God has placed us in relations in which it is permitted to us to love, or in which our hatred is stirred up:>—
Ver. 8. “To love has its time, and to hate has its time; war has its time, and peace has its time.” In the two pairs of contrasts here, the contents of the first are, not exclusively indeed (Ps. cxx. 7), but yet chiefly referred to the mutual relations of peoples. It is the result of thoughtful intention that the quodlibet of 2x7 pairs terminates this for and against in “ peace;” and, besides, the author has made the termination emphatic by this, that here “instead of infinitives, he introduces proper nouns” (Hitz.).
Ver. 9. Since, then, everything has its time depending not on human influence, but on the determination and providence of God, the question arises: “What gain hath he that worketh in that wherewith he wearieth himself?” It is the complaint of i. 3 which is here repeated. From all the labour there comes forth nothing which carries in it the security of its continuance; but in all he does man is conditioned by the change of times and circumstances and relations over which he has no control. And the converse of this his weakness is short-sightedness,
Vers. 10, 11. “ I saw the travail, which God gave to the children of men to fatigue themselves with it—: He hath well arranged everything beautiful in its appointed time; He hath also put eternity in their heart, so that man cannot indeed wholly search through from beginning to end the work which God accomplisheth.” As at i. 14, ὌΝ is here seeing in the way of research, as elsewhere, eg. at ii. 24, it is as the result of research. In ver. 10 the author says that he closely considered the labour of men, and in ver. 11 he states the result. It is impossible to render the word xy everywhere by the same German (or English) word: i. 13, wearisome trouble; ii. 26, business; here: Geschaftigkeit,—the idea is in all the three places the same, viz. an occupation which causes trouble, costs effort. What presented itself to the beholder was—(1) that He (viz. God, cf. ver. 10 and ver. 11) has made everything beautiful in its time. The author uses 5) as synon. of 210 (v. 17); also in other languages the idea of the beautiful is gradually more and more generalized. The suffix in AY does not refer to God, but to that which is in the time; this word is = ἐν καιρῷ ἰδίῳ (Symm.), at its proper time (vid. Ps. i. 3, civ. 27; Jer. v. 24, etc.), since, as with ὙΠ) (together with) and iba (every one), the suffix is no longer thought of as such. Like 75", iny3 as pred. conception belongs to the verb: He has made everything beautiful; He has made everything (falling out) at its appointed time.—The beauty consists in this, that what is done is not done sooner or later than it ought to be, so as to connect itself as a constituent part to the whole of God’s work. The pret. MWY is to be also interpreted as such: He “has made,” viz. in His world-plan, all things beautiful, falling out at the appointed time; for that which i i f history has a previous ideal acquires an actual form in the course o y Ρ existence in the knowledge and will of God (vid. under Isa. xxii. 11, xxxvil. 26).
That which presented itself to the beholder was—(2) the fact that He (God) had put O?yn-ne in their hearts (i, the hearts of men). Gaab and Spohn interpret 'olam in the sense of the Arab. ‘lam, knowledge, understanding; and Hitz., pointing the word accordingly 09Y, translates: “He has also placed ἃ ing in their heart, without which man,” ete. The translation of WW ‘72D is not to be objected to; ‘30 is, however, only seldom a conjunction, and is then to be translated by co quod, Ex. xiv. 11, 2 Kings i. 3, 6, 16, which is not appropriate here; it will thus be here also a prep., and with asker following may mean “ without which,” as well as “without this, that” = “ besides that" (Venet. ἄνευ τοῦ ὅτι, “ except that”), as frequently Ὁ OB&%, eg. at Amos ix. 8. But that Arab. "ilam is quite foreign to the Heb., which has no word ΡΨ in the sense of “ to rise up, to be visible, knowable,” which is now also referred ' to for the Assyr. as the stem-word of O?y = highland. It is true Hitzig believes that he has found the Heb. 05 = wisdom, in Sir. vi. 21, where there is a play on the word with pbs, “concealed:" σοφία yap κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς ἐστι, καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς ἐστι φανερά. Drusius and Eichhorn have here already taken notice of the Arab. 't/am; but Fritzsche with right asks, “Shall this word as Heb. be regarded as traceable only here and falsely pointed only at Eccles. iii. 11, and shall no trace of it whatever be found in the Chald., Syr., and Rabbin.?” We have also no need of it. That Ben- Sira has etymologically investigated the word moan as going back to oan, R. 3n,“ to be firm, shut up, dark ” (vid. at Ps. x. 8), is certainly very improbable, but so much the more probable (as already suggested by Drusius) that he has introduced? into nnsn, after the Aram. 028, nigrescere, the idea of making dark. Does eth-ha’olam in this passage before us then mean “the world” (Jerome, Luther, Ewald), or “ desire after the knowledge of the world” (Rashi), or “ worldly-mindedness ” (Gesen., Knobel)? The answer to this has been already given in my Psychol. p. 406 (2d ed.): “ In post-bibl. Heb. ’olam denotes not only ‘eternity’ backwards and forwards as
1 Vid. Fried. Delitzsch’s Assyr. Stud. (1874), p.59. Otherwise Fleischer, who connects ‘alima, ‘* to know,” with ‘alam, "ὁ to conceal,” so that to know = to be concealed, sunk deep, initiated in something (with ba of the obj., as sh’ar, whence sh@ir, the poet as ‘* one who marks ’’).
3 Gritz translates eth-ha’olam by “‘ ignorance ” (vid. Orelli, p. 83). R. Achwa in the Midrash bas added here the scriptio defectiva with the remark, "Ὁ. pon, ‘for the mysterious name of God is concealed fror them.”
infinite duration, but also ‘the world’ as that which endures for ever (αἰών, seculum); the world in this latter sense is, however, not yet known’ to the bibl. language, and we will thus not be able to interpret the words of Koheleth of the impulse of man to reflect on the whole world.” In itself, the thought that God has placed the whole world in man's heart is not untrue: man is, indeed, a microcosmos, in which the macrocosmos mirrors itself (Elster), but the connection does not favour it; for the discussion does not proceed from this, that man is only a member in the great universe, and that God has given to each being its appointed place, but that in all his experience he is conditioned by time, and that in the course of history all that comes to him, according to God’s world-plan, happens at its appointed time. But the idea by which that of time, ΠΝ (151), is surpassed is not the world, but eternity, to which time is related as part is to the whole (Cicero, Jnv. i. 26. 39, tempus est pars quaedam aeternitatis). The Mishna language contains, along with the meaning of world, also this older meaning of ’olam, and has formed from it an adv. mph y, acterne. The author means to say that God has not only assigned to each individually his appointed place in history, thereby bringing to the consciousness of man the fact of his being conditioned, but that He has also established in man an impulse leading him beyond that which is temporal toward the eternal: it lies in his nature not to be contented with the temporal, but to break through the limits which it draws around him, to escape from the bondage and the disquietude within which he is held, and amid the ceaseless changes of time to console himself by directing his thoughts to eternity.
This saying regarding the desiderium aeternitatis being planted in the heart of man, is one of the profoundest utterances of Koheleth. In fact, the impulse of man shows that his innermost wants cannot be satisfied by that which is temporal. He isa being limited by time, but as to his innermost nature he is related to eternity. That which is transient yields him no support, it carries him on like a rushing stream, and constrains him to save himself by laying hold on eternity. But it is not so much the practical as the intellectual side of this endowment and this peculiar dignity of human nature which Koheleth brings here to view.
It is not enough for man to know that everything that happens has its divinely-ordained time. There is an instinct peculiar to his
1 In the Phoen. also, ’olam, down to a late period, denotes not the world, but nature impelling him to pass beyond this fragmentary knowledge and to comprehend eternity; but his effort is in vain, for (3) “ man is unable to reach unto the work which God accomplisheth from the beginning to the end.” The work of God is that which is completing itself in the history of the world, of which the life of individual men is a fragment. Of this work he says, that God has wrought it ΠΡ; because, before it is wrought out in its separate “time,” it is already completed in God's plan. Eternity and this work are related to each other as the accomplished and the being accomplished, they are interchangeably the πλήρωμα to each other. Ky is potential, and the same in conception as at viii 17, Job xi. 7, xxxvii. 23; a knowledge is meant which reaches to the object, and lays hold of it. A laying hold of this work is an impossibility, because eternity, as its name ‘olam denotes, is the concealed, ic, is both forwards and backwards immeasurable. The desiderium acternitatis inherent in man thus remains under the sun unappeased. He would raise himself above the limits within which he is confined, and instead of being under the necessity of limiting his attention to isolated matters, gain a view of the whole of God's work which becomes manifest in time; but this all-embracing view is for him unattainable.
If Koheleth had known of a future life—which proves that as no instinct in the natural world is an illusion, so also the impulse toward the eternal, which is natural to man, is no illusion—he would have reached a better ultimatum than the following:—
Ver. 12. “Thus I then perceived that among them (men) there is nothing better than to enjoy themselves, and indulge in their life” The resignation would acquire a reality if ‘> sim meant “to do good,” ἐκ right (LXX. Targ. Syr. Jer. Venet.); and this appears of necessity to be its meaning according to vii. 20. But, with right, Ginsburg remarks that nowhere else—neither at ii. 24, nor iii. 22, v. 17, viii. 15, ix. 7—is this moral rendering given to the ultimatum; also 30 “Ἢ, 13a, presupposes for 310 Ὁ a eudemonistic sense. On the other hand, Zéckler is right in saying that for the meaning of 51 mvy, in the sense of “to be of good cheer” (Luth.), there is no example. Zirkel compares εὖ πράττειν, and regards it asa Graecism. But it either stands ellipt. for no ἢ Ὁ (Ξ xen), or, with Gritz, we have to read 20 MW; in any case, an ethical signification is here excluded by the nearest connection, as well as by the parallels; it is not contrary to the view of Koheleth, but this is not the place to express it. Bam is to be understood after baadam, ii. 24. The plur., comprehending men,