When James (iii. 17) says that the “ wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy,” his words most excellently designate the nature and the contents of the discourse of wisdom in the Solomonic proverbs, and one is almost inclined to think that the apostolic brother of the Lord, when he delineates wisdom, has before his eyes the Book of the Proverbs, which raises to purity by the most impressive admonitions Next to its admonitions to purity are those especially to peacefulness, to gentle resignation (xiv. 30), quietness of mind (xiv. 33) and humility (xi. 2, xv. 33, xvi. 5, 18), to mercy (even toward beasts, xii. 10), to firmness and sincerity of conviction, to the furtherance of one’s neighbour by means of wise discourse and kind help. What is done in the Book of Deuteronomy with reference to the law is continued here. As in Deuteronomy, so here, love is at the bottom of its admonitions, the love of God to men, and the love of men to one another in their diverse relations (xii. 2, xv. 9); the conception of ΠΡῚΝ gives way to that of charity, of almsgiving (δικαιοσύνη = ἐλεημοσύνη). Forgiving, suffering love (x. 12), love which does good even to enemies (xxv. 21 f.), rejoices not over the misfortune that befalls an enemy (xxiv. 17 f.), retaliates not (xxiv. 28 f.), but commits all to God (xx. 22),—love in its manifold forms, as that of husband and wife, of children, of friends,—is here recommended with New Testament distinctness and with deepest feeling. Living in the fear of God (xxviii. 14), the Omniscient (xv. 3, 11, xvi. 2, xxi. 2, xxiv. 11 2, to whom as the final Cause all is referred (xx. 12, 24, xiv. 31, xxii. 2), and whose universal plan all must subserve (xvi. 4, xix. 21, xxi. 30), and on the other side active pure love to man—these are the hinges on which all the teachings of wisdom in the Proverbs turn. Frederick Schlegel, in the fourteenth of his Lectures on the History of Literature, distinguishes, not without deep truth, between the historico-prophetic books of the Old Testament, or books of the history of redemption, and the Book of Job, the Psalms, and the Solomonic writings, as books of aspiration, corresponding to the triple chord of faith, hope, charity as the three stages of the inner spiritual life. The Book of Job is designed to support faith amid trials; the Psalms breathe forth and exhibit hope amid the conflicts of earth’s longings; the Solomonic writings reveal to us the mystery of the divine love, and the Proverbs that wisdom which grows out of and is itself eternal love. When Schlegel in the same lecture says that the books of the Old Covenant, for the most part, stand under the signature of the lion as the element of the power of will and spirited conflict glowing in divine fire, but that in the inmost hidden kernel and heart of the sacred book the Christian figure of the lamb rises up out of the veil of this lion strength, this may specially be said of the Book of Proverbs, for here that same heavenly wisdom preaches, which, when manifested in person, spake in the Sermon on the Mount, New Testament love in the midst of the Old Testament.
It is said that in the times before Christ there was a tendency to apocryphize not only the Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes, but also the Book of Proverbs, and that for the first time the men of the Great Synagogue established their canonicity on the ground of their spiritual import; they became perplexed about the Proverbs, according to ὁ. Sabbath, 30b, on account of such self-contradictory proverbs as xxvi. 4, 5, and according to Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan, c. 1, on account of such secular portions as that of the wanton woman, vii. But there is no need to allegorize this woman, and that self-contradiction is easily explained. ‘The theopneustic character of the book and its claim to canonicity show themselves from its integral relation to the Old Testament preparation for redemption; but keeping out of view the book as a whole, it is self-evident that the conception of a practical proverb such as xiv. 4 and of a prophecy such as Isa. vii. 14 are very different phenomena of the spiritual life, and that in general the operation of the Divine Spirit in a proverb is different from that in a prophecy.
We have hitherto noted the character of the instruction set forth in the Proverbs according to the marks common to them in all their parts, but in such a way that we have taken our proofs only from the “Proverbs of Solomon” and the “Words of the Wise,” with the exclusion of the introductory proverbial poems of the older editor. If we compare the two together, it cannot be denied that in the type of the instruction contained in the latter, the Chokma, of which the book is an emanation and which it has as its aim (DIN nye, 1. 2), stands before us in proportionally much more distinctly defined compreliension and form; we have the same relation before us whose adumbration is the relation of the instruction of wisdom in the Avesta and in the later Minochired (Spiegel, Pursi-Grammatik, p. 182 ff.). The Chokma appears also in the * Proverbs of Solomon” as a being existing in and for itself, which is opposed to ambiguous subjective thought (xxvill. 26); but here there is attributed to it an objectivity even to an apparent personality: it goes forth preaching, and places before all men life and death for an eternally decisive choice, it distributes the spirit to those who do not resist (i. 23), it receives and answers prayer (i. 28). The speculation regarding the Chokma is here with reference to Job xxviii. (cf. Prov. ii. 4, iii. 14 ἔν, viii. 11, 19), and particularly to xxviii. 27, where a demiurgic function is assigned to wisdom, carried back to its source in eternity: it is the medium by which the world was created, iii. 19; it was before the creation of the world with God as from everlasting, His son of royal dignity, vill. 22-26; it was with Him in His work of creation, vill. 27-80; after the creation it remained as His delight, rejoicing always before Him, and particularly on the earth among the sons of men, vill. 30 f. Staudenmaier (Lehre von der Idee, p. 37) is certainly not on the wrong course, when under this rejoicing of wisdom before God he understands the development of the ideas or life-thoughts intimately bound up in it—the world-idea. This development is the delight of God, because it represents to the divine contemplation the contents of wisdom, or of the world-idea founded in the divine understanding, in all its activities and inner harmonies; it is a calm delight, because the divine idea unites with the fresh and ever young impulse of life, the purity, goodness, innocence, and holiness of life, because its spirit is light, clear, simple, childlike, in itself peaceful, harmonious, and happy; and this delight is experienced especially on the earth among the sons of men, among whom wisdom has its delight; for, as the divine idea, it is in all in so far as it is the inmost life-thought, the soul of each being, but it is on the earth of men in whom it comes to its self-conception, and self-conscious comes forth into the light of the clear day. Staudenmaier has done the great service of _ having worthily estimated the rich and deep fulness of this biblical theologumenon of wisdom, and of having pointed out in it the foundation-stone of a sacred metaphysics and a means of protection against pantheism in all its forms. We see that in the time of the editor of the older Book of Proverbs the wisdom of the schools in its devotion to the chosen object of its pursuit, the divine wisdom living and moving in all nature, and forming the background of all things, rises to a height of speculation on which it has planted a banner showing the right way to latest times. Ewald rightly points to the statements in the introduction to the Proverbs regarding wisdom as a distinct mark of the once great power of wisdom in Israel; for they show us how this power learned to apprehend itself in its own purest heicht, after it had become as perfect, and at the same time also as self-conscious, as it could at all become in ancient Israel.
Many other appearances also mark the advanced type of instruction contained in the introduction. Hitzig’s view (Spriiche, p- xvii. f.), that 1, 6-ix. 18 are the part of the whole collection which was earliest written, confutes itself on all sides; on the contrary, the views of Bleek in his Introduction to the Old Testament, thrown out in a sketchy manner and as if by a diviner, surprisingly agree with our own results, which have been laboriously reached and are here amply established. The advanced type of instruction in the introduction, 1.1x., appears among other things in this, that we there find the allegory, which up to this place occurs in Old Testament literature only in scattered little pictures built up into independent poetic forms, particularly in ix., where without any contradiction ΓΆΡ ῸΞ nw [a simple woman, v. 13] is an alle- — gorical person. The technical language of the Chokma has extended itself on many sides and been refined (we mention these synonyms: M230, NYT, 172, Ay, Md, Iw, mvs); and the seven pillars in the house of wisdom, even though it be inadmissible to think of them as the seven liberal arts, yet point to a division into seven parts of which the poet was conscious to himself. The common address, 3 [my son], which is not the address of the father to the son, but of the teacher to the scholar, countenances the supposition that there were at that time D'D3N ‘32, 7.e. scholars of the wise men, just as there were “sons of the prophets” (O°823), and probably also schools of wisdom. “And whien it is described
how wisdom spake aloud to the people in all the streets of Jerusalem, in the high places of the city and in every favourable place, does not one feel that such sublime descriptions could not be possible unless at that time wisdom were regarded by the people as one of the first powers, and the wise men truly displayed a great
public activity?” We must answer this question of Ewald’s in the affirmative.
Bruch, in his Weisheitslehre der Hebraer, 1851, was the first to call special attention to the Chokma or humanism as a peculiar intellectual tendency in Israel; but he is mistaken in placing it in an indifferent and even hostile relation to the national law and the national cultus, which he compares to the relation of Christian philosophy to orthodox theology. Oehler, in his Grundztige der alttestamentl. Weisheit, which treats more especially of the doctrinal teachings of the Book of Job, judges more correctly; cf. also his comprehensive article, Paédagogik des A. T. in Schmid’s Padagogischer Encyclopddie, pp. 653—695 (partic. 677-683).
5. The Alexandrian Translation of the Book of Proverbs.—Of highest interest for the history of the Book of Proverbs is the relation of the LXX. to the Hebrew text. One half of the proverbs of Agur (xxx. of the Hebrew text) are placed in it after xxiv. 22, and the other half after xxiv. 34; and the proverbs of King Lemuel (xxxi. 1-9 of the Hebrew text) are placed after the proverbs of Agur, while the acrostic proverbial poem of the virtuous woman is in its place at the end of the book. That transposition reminds us of the transpositions in Jeremiah, and rests in the one place as well as in the other on a misunderstanding of the true contents. The translator has set aside the new superscription, x. 1, as unsuitable, and has not marked the new beginning, xxi. 17; he has expunged the new superscription, xxiv. 23, and has done the same to the superscription, “The words of Agur” (xxx. 1), in two awkward explanations (λόγον φυλασ- σόμενος and τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους φοβήθητι), and the superscription, “The words of Lemuel” (xxxi. 1), in one similar (οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγι εἴρηνται ὑπὸ Θεοῦ). so that the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel are without hesitation joined with those of Solomon, whereby it yet remains a mystery why the proverbs beginning with “The words of Agur” have been divided into two parts. Ηρ explains it from a confounding of the columns in which, two being on each page, the Hebrew ms. which lay before the translator was written, and in which the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel (names which tradition understood symbolically of Solomon) were already ranked in order before ch. xxv. But besides these, there are also many other singular things connected with this Greek translation interesting in themselves and of great critical worth. That it omits i. 16 may arise from this, that this verse was not found in the original Ms., and was introduced from Isa. lix. 7; but there are wanting also proverbs such as xxi. 5, for which no reason can be assigned. But the additions are disproportionately more numerous. Frequently we find a line added to the distich, such as in i. 18, or an entire distich added, as iil. 15; or of two lines of the Hebrew verse, each is formed into a separate distich, as i. 7, xi. 16; or we meet with longer interpolations, extending far beyond this measure, as that added to iv. 27. Many of these proverbs are easily re-translated into the Hebrew, as that added to iv. 27, consisting of four lines: Mi IT DYDD IDI 2 pdb ‘317 DpH smbiyn pba’ sin smoyy ΟΡ yn But many of them also sound as if they had been originally Greek; eg. the lines appended to ix. 10, xiii. 15; the distich, vi. 11; the imperfect tristich, xxii. 14; and the formless trian, xxv. 10. The value of these enlargements is very diverse; not a few of these proverbs are truly thoughtful, such as the addition to ΧΙ, 13— He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy; He who is litigious crushes souls— and singularly bold in imagery, as the addition to ix. 12— He who supports himself by lies hunts after (7) the wind, He catches at fluttering birds; For he forsakes the ways of his own vineyard, And wanders away from the paths of his own field, And roams through arid steppes and a thirsty land, And gathers with his hand withered heath. The Hebrew text lying before the Alexandrian translators had certainly not all these additions, yet in many passages, such as xi. 16, it is indeed a question whether it is not to be improved from the LX X.; and in other passages, where, if one reads the Greek, the Hebrew words naturally take their place, whether these are not at least old Hebrew marginal notes and interpolations which the translation preserves. But this version itself has had its gradual historical development. The text, the κοινή (communis), proceeds from the Hexapler text edited by Origen, which received from him many and diverse revisions; and in the times before Christ, perhaps (as Hitz. supposes), down to the second century after Christ, the translation itself, not being regarded as complete, was in the progress of growth, for not unfrequently two different translations of one and the same proverb stand together, as xiv. 22, xxix. 25 (where also the Peshito follows the LX -X. after which it translates), or also interpenetrate one another, as xxii. 8,9. These doubled translations are of historical importance both in relation to the text and to the interpretation of it. Along with the Books of Samuel and Jeremiah, there is no book in regard to which the LXX. can be of higher significance than the Book of Proverbs; we shall seek in the course of our exposition duly to estimate the text’ as adopted by Bertheau (1847) and Hitzig (1858) in their 1 Cf. also J. Gottlob Jiiger’s Observationes in Proverbiorum Salomonis Versionem Alexandrinam, 1788; de Lagarde’s Anmerkungen zur griech. Uebersetzung commentaries, and by Ewald in his Jahrb. xi. (1861) and his commentary (2d ed. 1867). The historical importance of the Egyptian text-recension is heightened by this circumstance, that the old Syrian translator of the Solomonic writings had before him not only the original text, but also the LX X.; for the current opinion, that the Peshito, as distinguished from the Syro-Hexaplar version, sprang solely from the original text with the assistance of the Targum, is more and more shown to be erroneous. In the Book of Proverbs the relation of the Peshito and Targum is even the reverse; the Targum of the Proverbs, making use of the Peshito, restores the Masoretic text,—the points of contact with the LX X. showing themselves here and there, are brought about’ by the Peshito. But that Jerome, in his translation of the Vulgate according to the Hebrea veritas, sometimes follows the LX X. in opposition to the original text, is to be explained with Hitzig from the fact that he based his work on an existing Latin translation made from the LX X. Hence it comes that the two distichs added in the LX Χ. to iv. 27 remain in his work, and that instead of the one distich, xv. 6, we have two:—IJn abundanti (after the phrase 253 instead of Ma of the Masoretic text) justitia virtus maxima est, cogitationes autem impiorum eradicabuntur. Domus (M2) justi plurima fortitudo, et in fructibus impit conturbatio; for Jerome has adopted the two translations of the LXX., correcting the second according to the original text.
1Cf. Dathe, De ratione consensus Versionis Syriace el Chaldaice Proverbiorum Salomonis (1764), edited by Rosenmiiller in his Opuscula. Maybaum, in the Treatise on the Language of the Targum to the Proverbs and its relation to the Syriac, in Merx’s Archiv, ii. 66-93, labours in vain to give the priority to that of the Targum: the Targum is written from the Peshito, and here and there approaches the Hebrew text; the language is, with few differences, the Syriac of the original.
The fragments of the translations of Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, etc., contained in Greek and Syrian sources, have been recently collected, more perfectly than could have been done by Montfaucon, by Fried. Field, in his work Origenis Heaaplorum que supersunt, etc. (Oxonii, 1867, 4). Of special interest is the more recent translation of the original text, existing only in aMs. laid up in the Library of St. Mark [at Venice], executed in bold language, rich in rare and newly invented words, by an unknown author, and belonging to an age which has not yet been determined (Grecus Venetus): cf. d’Ansse de Villoison’s nova versio Graeca Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastis, Cantict Canticorum, etc., Argentorati, 1784; and also the Animadversiones thereto of Jo. Ge. Dahler, 1786.
The literature of the interpretation of the Book of Proverbs is found in Keil’s Linleitung in das A. T. (1859), p. 346 f. [Manual 9) Historico-Critical Introduction to the Old Testament, translated by Professor Douglas, D.D., Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Vol. i. p. 468 f.]. The most important of the older linguistic works on this book is the commentary of Albert Schultens (Lugduni Batavorum, 1748, 4), whose service to the cause of Semitic philology and O. T. exegesis Miihlau has brought to remembrance in the Lutheran Zeitschrift, 1870, 1; Vogel’s abstract (Hale, 1769), prefaced by Semler, does not altogether compensate for the original work. From the school of Schultens, and also from that of Schréder, originate the Anmerkungen by Alb. Jac. Arnoldi, maternal grandson of Schultens, a Latin edition of which was published (Lugduni Bat. 1783) by Henr. Alb. Schultens, the grandson of Schultens by his son. Among the commentaries of English interpreters, that in Latin by Thomas Cartwright (Amstelredami, 1663, 4), along with the Exposition of the Book of Proverbs by Charles Bridges (4th ed., London, 1859), hold an honourable place. The Critical Remarks on the Books of Job, Proverbs, etc., by Ὁ. Durell (Oxford, 1772, 4), also merit attention. Of more recent commentaries, since Keil gave his list of the literature of the subject, have been published those of Elster (1858) and of Zockler (1867), forming a part of the theologico-homiletical Bibelwerk edited by J. P. Lange. Chaps. xxv.— xxix. Rud. Stier has specially interpreted in two works entitled Der
Weise ein Konig [“The Wise Man a King”), and Salomonis Weisheit in Hiskiastagen [“‘Solomon’s Wisdom in the Days of Hezekiah ”], 1849; and chapters xxx. xxxi. in a work entitled Die Politik der Weisheit [The Politics of Wisdom”], 1850. Part 11. (1865) of the new exegetico-critical Aehrenlese [‘ Gleanings”] of Fried. Bottcher, edited by Miihlau, furnishes 39 pages of remarks on the Proverbs. Leop. Dukes, author of the Rabbinical Blumenlese [“ Anthology ”], 1844, and the Schrift zur rabbinischen Spruchkunde, 1851, has published (1841) a commentary to the Proverbs in Cahen’s French Bibelwerk. There also is furnished a list of Jewish interpreters down to the appearance of L. H. Loewenstein’s Commentary (1838), which contains valuable contributions to the critical confirmation of the Masoretic text, in which Heidenheim’s MS. remains, and also the Codex of 1294 mentioned in my preface to Baer’s edition of the Psalter, and in the Specimen Lectionum of Baer’s edition of Genesis, are made use of. Among Malbim’s best works are, after his Commentary on Isaiah, that on the
=SWLLE external title, z.e. the Synagogue name, of the whole Ἢ collection of Proverbs is *2¥ (Mishle), the word with which it commences. Origen (Euseb. H. E. vi. 25) uses the name Miardd, i.e. Miv, which occurs in the Talmud and Midrash as the designation of the book, from its contents. In a similar way, the names given to the Psalter, Dyan and nian, are interchanged.
This external title is followed by one which the Book of Proverbs, viewed as to its gradual formation, and first the older portion, gives to itself. It reaches from i. 1 to ver. 6, and names not only the contents and the author of the book, but also commends it in regard to the service which it is capable of rendering. It contains “ Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel.” The books of the ANia3 and m2n, including the Canticles, thus give their own titles; among the historical books, that of the memoirs of Nehemiah is the only one that does so. ‘v2 has the accent Dechi, to separate! it from the following complex genitive which it governs, and rp 122 is made the second hemistich, because it belongs to πον, not to 11.2 As to the fundamental idea of the word Ὁ Ὁ, we refer to the derivation given in the Gesch. der jud. Poesie, p. 196, from Dvn, Aram. 29, root $n, Sanskr. tul (whence tuld, balance, similarity), Lat. tollere; the comparison of the Arab. mathal leads to the same
1 Norzi has erroneously accented Syn with the accent Munach. The Ὁ is besides the Masoretic majusculum, like the 3, δὴ, and ἐξ at the commencement of the Law, the Canticles, and Chronicles.
2 If it had belonged to 5), then the sentence would have been accented thus: SW Joo ἽΤῚ3 Ady Ὁ"
conclusion. ἐς Ὁ signifies, not, as Schultens and others after him affirm, effigies ad similitudinem alius rei expressa, from oui in the primary signification premere, premente manu tractare; for the corresponding Arab. verb mathal does not at all bear that meaning, but signifies to stand, to present oneself, hence to be like, properly to put oneself forth as something, to represent it; and in the Hebr. also to rule, properly with 29 to stand on or over something, with 2 to hold it erect, like Arab. kam with ὃ, rem administravit [vid. Jesaia, p. 691]. Thus eg., Gen. xxiv. 2, it is said of Eliezer: ἀν ΚΡ ouitan, who ruled over all that he (Abraham) had (Luther: was a prince over all his goods). Thus W, figurative discourse which represents that which is real, similitude; hence then parable or shorter apothegm, proverb, in so far as they express primarily something special, but which as a general symbol is then applied to everything else of a like kind, and in so far stands figuratively. An example is found in 1 Sam. x. 11f. It is incorrect to conclude from this meaning of the word that such memorial sayings or proverbs usually contained comparisons, or were clothed in figurative language; for that is the case in by far the fewest number of instances: the oldest have by far the simplest and most special interpretations ” (Fleischer). Hence Mashal, according to its fundamental idea, is that which stands with something = makes something stand forth=representing. This something that represents may be a thing or a person; as ¢.g. one may say Job is a Mashal, i.e. a representant, similitude, type of Israel (vide the work entitled ovnn yy, by Ahron Ὁ. Elia, c. 90, p. 143); and, like Arab, mathal (more commonly mithl = vn, εἴ, win, Job xli. 25), is used quite as generally as is its etymological cogn. instar (instare). But in Hebr. Mashal always denotes representing discourse with the additional marks of the figurative and concise, 6.9. the section which presents (Hab. ii. 6) him to whom it refers as a warning example, but particularly, as there defined, the gnome, the apothegm or maxim, in so far as this represents general truths in sharply outlined little pictures.
Ver. 2. Now follows the statement of the object which these proverbs subserve; and first, in general,
To become acquainted with wisdom and instruction, To understand intelligent discourses.
They seek on the one side to initiate the reader in wisdom and instruction, and on the other to guide him to the understanding of intelligent discourses, for they themselves contain such discourses in which there is a deep penetrating judgment, and they sharpen the understanding of him who engages his attention with them.’ As Schultens has already rightly determined the fundamental meaning of Y', frequently compared with the Sanskr. vid, to know (whence by gunating,” véda, knowledge), after the Arab. wad’a, as deponere, penes se condere, so he also rightly explains 7230 by soliditas; it means properly (from 037, Arab. hakm, R. hk, vide under Ps. x. 8, to be firm, closed) compactness, and εἰ οὐδ like πυκνότης, ability, worldly wisdom, prudence, and in the higher general sense, the knowledge of things in the essence of their being and in the reality of their existence. Along with wisdom stands the moral 70%, properly discipline, 1.6. moral instruction, and in conformity with this, self-government, self-guidance, from ἼΘ᾽ = 1D}, cogn. D8, properly adstrictio or constrictio; for the Ὁ of the noun signifies both 7d guod or aliquid quod (ὅ,τι) and quod in the conjunctional sense (ὅτι), and thus forms both a concrete (like Ibid = DN}, fetter, chain) and an abstract idea. The first general object of the Proverbs is ΠΡ, the reception into oneself of wisdom and moral edification by means of education and training; the second is to comprehend utterances of intelligence, i.e. such as xxii. 21). 12, Kal, to be distinguished (whence 3, ἘΥΤΗΡΤΣ sisi of 3, space betwee interval), signifies in Hiph. to distinguish, to understand; ΠῚ Ξ is, according to the sense, the n. actionis of this Hiph., and signifies the understanding as the capability effective in the possession of the right criteria of distinguishing between the true and the false, the good and the bad (1 Kings ili. 9), the wholesome and the pernicious.
26 in ver. 6. First the immediate object:
3 To attain intelligent instruction, Righteousness, and justice, and integrity; 4 To impart to the inexperienced prudence, To the young man knowledge and discretion
5 Let the wise man hear and gain learning, And the man of understanding take to himself rules of conduct.
1 ny is rightly pointed by Lowenstein with Dechi after Cod. 1294; vide the rule by which the verse is divided, Torath Emeth, p. 51, § 12. 3 (Guna = arule in Sanskrit grammar regulating the modification of vowels. ]
With ny, denoting the reception into oneself, acquiring, is interchanged (cf. ii. 1) NOP, its synonym, used of intellectual reception and appropriation, which, contemplated from the point of view of the relation between the teacher and the learner, is the correlative of NA, παραδιδόναι, tradere (ix. 9). But 535 Π ὝΘΥ is that which proceeds from chokma and musar when they are blended together: discipline of wisdom, discipline training to wisdom; i.e. such morality and good conduct as rest not on external inheritance, training, imitation, and custom, but is bound up with the intelligent knowledge of the Why and the Wherefore. 2D, as xxi. 16, is inf. absol. used substantively (cf. BPWT, keeping quiet, Isa. xxxii. 17) of rly (whence 23v, wtellectus), to entwine, involve; for the thinking through a subject is represented as an interweaving, complicating, configuring of the thoughts (the syllogism is in like manner represented as δεν, Aram. inp, a bunch of grapes), (with which also 230, a fool, and 230M, to act foolishly, are connected, from the confusion of the thoughts, the entangling of the conceptions; ef. Arab. ’akl, to understand, and pyr). The series of synonyms (cf. xxiii. 23) following in 3b, which are not well fitted to be the immediate object to nnpe, present themselves as the unfolding of the contents of the 230 1D, as meaning that namely which is dutiful and right and honest. With the frequently occurring two conceptions, ΘΒ) PT¥ (ii. 9), (or with the order reversed as in Ps. exix. 121) is interchanged ΠΡῚΝ OEY (or with the order also reversed, xxi. 3). The remark of Heidenheim, that in P7¥ the conception of the justum, and in ΠΡῚΝ that of the @quum prevails, is suggested by the circumstance that not PJ¥ but ΠΡῚΝ signifies δικαιοσύνη (cf. x. 2) in the sense of liberality, and then of almsgiving (ἐλεημοσύνη); but PIS also frequently signifies a way of thought and action which is regulated not by the letter of the law and by talio, but by love (cf. Isa. xli. 2, xlii.6). T’sedek and ts’dakat have almost the relation to one another of integrity and justice which practically brings the former into exercise. DY (from baY, to make straight, to adjust, cf. yaw, Arab. salita, to be smooth) is the right and the righteousness in which it realizes itself, here subjectively considered, the right mind.’ Ov" (defect. for Dw, from, to be straight, even) is plur. tantum; for its sing. Ὁ
1 According to Malbim, ppv in is the fixed objective right, poy the righteous- ness which does not at once decide according to the letter of the law, but always according to the matter and the person.
(after the form 25") the form Ὁ (in the same ethical sense, 6.9. Mal. ii. 6) is used: it means thus a way of thought and of conduct that is straight, ἐ.6. according to what is right, true, 1,6. without concealment, honest, 1.6. true to duty and faithful to one’s word.
Ver. 4. This verse presents another aspect of the object to be served by this book: it seeks to impart prudence to the simple. The form O'8n3? (in which, as in 0.3, the » plur. remains unwritten) is, in this mongrel form in which it is written (cf. vii. 7, villi. 5, ix. 6, xiv. 18, xxvii. 12), made up of ΔῊ (i. 22, 82, once written plene, OMB, xxii. 3) and O'NMB (vii. 7). These two forms with » and the transition of * into & are interchanged in the plur. of such nouns as ‘8, segolate form, “ from DB (cogn. MMB), to be open, properly the open-hearted, 2.e. one whose heart stands open to every influence from another, the harmless, good-natured,—a vox media among the Hebrews commonly (though not always, cf. eg. Ps. cxvi. 6) in malam partem: the foolish, silly, one who allows himself to be easily persuaded or led astray, like similar words in other languages — Lat. simplea, Gr. εὐήθης, Fr. naiv; Arab. fatyn, always, however, in a good sense: a high and nobleminded man, not made as yet mistrustful and depressed by sad experiences, therefore juvenis ingenuus, vir animi generosi” (F1.). The O'8nB, not of firm and constant mind, have need of DY; therefore the saying xiv. 15, cf. viii. 5, xix. 25. The noun My (a fem. segolate form like 120) means here calliditas in a good sense, while the corresponding Arab. ’aram (to be distinguished from the verb ’aram, Dry, to peel, to make bare, nudare) is used only in a bad sense, of malevolent, deceptive conduct. In the parallel member the word “2 is used, generally (collectively) understood, of the immaturity which must first obtain intellectual and moral clearness and firmness; such an one is in need of peritia et solleitia, as Fleischer well renders it; for NYT is experimental knowledge, and M1) (from dt, according to its primary signification, to press together, comprimere; then, referred to mental concentration: to think) signifies in the sing., sensu bono, the capability of comprehending the right purposes, of seizing the right measures, of projecting the right plans.
Ver. 5. In this verse the infinitives of the object pass into independent sentences for the sake of variety. That YY cannot mean audiet, but audiat, is shown by ix. 9; but 1D) is jussive (with the tone thrown back before np?; δεν Of and xvi 21e 23 where the tone is not thrown back, as also 2 Sam. xxiv. 3) with the consecutive Vav (1) (= Arab. 9, /): let him hear, thus will he... or, in order that he. Whoever is wise is invited to hear these proverbs in order to add learning (doctrinam) to that which he already possesses, according to the principle derived from experience, ix. 9, Matt. xin. 12. The segolate np, which in pausa retains its — (as also NOS, yur, Noy, 129, ΡΝ, O13, and others), means reception, and concretely what one takes into himself with his ear and mind; therefore learning (διδαχὴ with the object of the ἀποδοχή), as Deut. xxxii. 2 (parallel 178, as iv. 2 MIF), and then learning that has passed into the possession of the receiver, knowledge, science (Isa, xxix. 24, parall. 123). Schultens com pares the Arab. lakah, used of the fructification of the female palm by the flower-dust of the male. The part. fi23 (the jin. of which is found only once, Isa. x. 13) is the passive or the reflexive of the f/iph. 135, to explain, to make to understand: one who is caused to understand or who lets himself be informed, and thus an intelligent person—that is one who may gain nizann by means of these proverbs. This word, found only in the plur. (probably connected with bah, shipmaster, properly one who has to do with the Dan, ship’s ropes, particularly handles the sails, LXX. κυβέρνησιν), signifies guidance, management, skill to direct anything (Job xxxii. 7, of God’s skill which directs the clouds), and in the plur. conception, the taking measures, designs, in a good sense, or also (as in xii. 5) in a bad sense; here it means guiding thoughts, regulating principles, judicious rules and maxims, as xi. 14, prudent rules of government, xx. 18, xxiv. 6 of stratag¢ms. ΕἾ. compares the Arab. tedlir (guidance, from 134, to lead cattle), with its plur. teddbir, and the Syr. dubdro, direction, management, etc.
Ver. 6. The mediate object of these proverbs, as stated in ver. 2h, is now expanded, for again it is introduced in the infinitive construction:—The reader shall learn in these proverbs, or by means of them as of a key, to understand such like apothegms generally (as xxil. 17 ff.):
To understand proverb and symbol, The words of wise men and their enigmas,
In the Gesch. der 714. Poesie, p. 200 f., the derivation of the noun myo is traced from 12, primarily to shine, Sanskr. das, frequently with the meanings ludere and lucere; but the Arab. brings near another primary meaning. “ myn, from Arab. root las, floxit, torsit, thus properly oratio detorta, obliqua, non aperta; hence 2, mocker, properly gut verbis obliquis utitur: as Hiph. pba, to scoff, but also verba detorta retorquere, i.e. to interpret, to explain” (FI.). Of the root ideas found in 17%, to be sharp, pointed (1, perhaps related to the Sanskr. fatu, sharp of taste, but not to acutus), and to be twisted (cf. INN, TAN, TY, harmonizing with the at present mysterious catena), the preference is given to the latter already, Ps, Ixxviii. 2. “ The Arab. hdd, to revolve, to turn (whence hid, bend, turn aside.!), thence 17, στροφή, cunning, intrigue, as also enigma, dark saying, perplexe dictum” (F].) The comparison made by Schultens with the Arab. Aidé as the name of the knot on the horn of the wild-goat shows the sensible fundamental conception. In post-biblical literature ΠῚ Π is the enigma proper, and myo poetry (with nyon of poetical prose). The Grace. Venet. translates it ῥητορείαν.
The fear of Jahve is the beginning of knowledge; Wisdom and discipline is despised by fools.