Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews

Yet there is in them a respect unto the work which he had to do, as he was to be a child born and given unto us. And on the same account is he called the everlasting Father; a name not proper unto the person of the Son, merely with respect to his personality. There is, therefore, a regard in it to the work which he had to do, which was to be a father unto all the elect of God. And therein also was he the Prince of Peace—He who is the procurer and establisher of peace between God and mankind. On the same account, God speaking of him, says, that he is ΠΩΣ 132 “pn, ‘ My companion, and the man my fellow,’ Zech. xii. 7, such a one as with whom he had sweetened and rejoiced in secret counsel, as Ps. lv. 14, according unto what was before declared on Prov. viii. 31, 32.

§ 11. Particularly the will of the lather and Son concurred in this matter, which was necessary that the covenant might be voluntary and of choice. And the origin of the whole is referred to the will of the Father constantly. Hence our Lord Jesus Christ on all occasions declares solemnly, that he came to do the will of the Father: ‘ Lo I come to do thy will, Ὁ God, Ps. x1. 5; Heb. x.5—10. For in this agreement, the part of the enjoiner, prescriber, and promiser, whose will in all things is to be attended to, is on the father. And his will was naturally at a perfect liberty, from engaging in that way of salvation, which he accomplished by Christ. He was at liberty to have left all mankind under sin and the curse, as he did all the angels that fell. He was at liberty utterly to have destroyed the race of mankind that sprang from Adam in his fallen estate; either in the root of them, or in the branches when multiplied, as he almost did in the flood, and tq have created another stock or race of them unto his glory. And hence the acting of his will herein, is expressed by grace; which is free, or it is not grace; and is said to proceed from love acting by choice, all arguing the highest liberty in the will of the Father, John ii. 16; Eph. 1. 6.

And the same is farther evidenced by the exercise of his authority, both in the commission and commands that he gave to the Son as incarnate, for the discharge of the work that he had undertaken. For none puts forth his authority but voluntarily, or by and according unto his own will. Now he both sent the Son, and sealed him, and gave him commands, which are all acts of choice, and liberty, proceeding from sovereignty. Let none, then, once imagine, that this work of entering into-covenant about the salvation of mankind, was any way necessary unto God, or that it was required by virtue of any of the essential properties of his nature, so that he must haye done against them in doing otherwise. God was herein absolutely free, as he was also in his making of all things out of nothing. He could have left it undone without the least disadvantage unto his essential glory, or contrariety unto his holy nature. Whatever, therefore, we may afterwards assert, concerning the necessity of satisfaction to be given unto his justice, upon the supposition of this covenant, yet the entering into this covenant, and, consequently, all that ensued thereon, is absolutely resolved into the mere will and grace of God.

§ 12. The will of the Son herein, was also distinct. In his divine nature and will, he undertook voluntarily for the work of his person, when the human nature, which he determined to assume, should be united therein. For what is spoken of the second Person, is spoken with respect unto his purpose to assume our nature; for the obedience whereof, in all that was to be done upon it or by it, he undertook. This the Scripture fully declares, and that for a double end. First. To demonstrate that the things which he underwent in his human nature were just and equal, inasmuch as he whose Hu 2 it was, voluntarily consented thereto. Secondly. To manifest that those very acts which he had in command from his Father, were no less the acts of his own will. Wherefore, as it is said that the Father loved us, and gaye his Son to die for us, so also is it said, that the Son loved us, and gave himself for us, and washed us in his own blood. These things proceeded from, and were founded in the will of the Son of God; and it was an act of perfect liberty in him, to engage in his peculiar concernments in this covenant. What he did, he did by choice, in a way of condescension and love. And this his voluntary susception of the discharge of what he was, according to the nature and terms of this covenant, to perform, was the ground of the authoritative mission, sealing and commanding of the Father towards him; see Ps. xl. 7,8; Heb. x.5; John x. 1], 12. And whatever is expressed in the Scripture, concerning the will of the human nature of Christ, as it was engaged in and bent upon its work, it is but a representation of the will of the Son of God, when he engaged in this work from eternity. So then he freely undertook to do and suffer whatever on his part was required, and therein owns himself the servant of the Father, because he would obey his will, and serve his purposes in the nature which he would assume for that end, Isa. xlii. 1, 6, xlix. 9; Zech. xiii. 7, and therein acknowledgeth him to be his Lord, Ps. xvi. 2, unto whom he owed all homage and obedience. For this mind was in him, that whereas he was in the form of God, he humbled himself unto this work, Phil. ii. 6, and by his own voluntary consent was engaged therein. Whereas, therefore, he had a sovereign and absolute power over his own human nature when assumed, whatever he submitted to, it was no injury to him, nor injustice in God to lay it on him.

§ 13. But this sacred truth must be cleared from an objection to which it seems obnoxious, before we do proceed. The will is a natural property, and therefore in the divine essence itis but one. The Father, Son, and Spirit, have not distinct wills. They are one God, and God’s will is one, as being an essential property of his nature. And, therefore, are there two wills in the one person of Christ, whereas there is but one will in the three Persons of the Trinity. How then can it be said, that the will of the Father and the will of the Son did concur distinctly in the making of this covenant?

This difficulty may be solved from what hath been already declared. For such is the distinction of the persons in the unity of the divine essence, as that they act in natural and essential acts, reciprocally one towards another, namely, in understanding, love, and the hike: they know and mutually love each other. And as they subsist distinctly, so they also act distinctly in those works which are of external operation. And whereas all these acts and operations, whether reciprocal or external, are either with a will, or from a freedom of will and choice, the will of God in each person, as to the peculiar acts ascribed unto him, is his will therein peculiarly and eminently, though not exclusively, to the other persons by reason of their mutual inbeing. The will of God, as to the peculiar actings of the Father in this matter, is the will of the Father; and the will of God, with regard to the peculiar actings of the Son, is the will of the Son; not by a distinction of sundry wills, but by the distinct application of the same will unto its distinct acts, in the Persons of the Father and the Son. And in this respect, the covenant whereof we treat differeth from a pure decree. For from these distinct actings of the will of God the Father, and the Son, there doth arise a new habitude or relation, which is not natural or necessary unto them, but freely taken on them. And by virtue hereof were all believers saved from the foundation of the world, upon the account of the interposition of the Son of God, antecedently to his exhibition in the flesh. For hence was he esteemed to have done and suffered what he had undertaken so to do, and which through faith was imputed to them that did believe.

§ 14. Moreover, a covenant must be about the disposal of things in the power of them that enter into it, otherwise it is null or fraudulent. And thus things may be two ways: first, absolutely; secondly, by virtue of some condition, or something in the nature of the covenant itself. 1. Things are absolutely in the power of persons, when they are completely at their disposal, antecedently to the consideration of any covenant or agreement about them. As in the covenant of marriage, where the several persons engaging are sui juris, they have an absolute power in themselves to dispose of their own persons with respect unto the ends of marriage. So it is in all covenants, when the things to be disposed of according to the limitations of the covenant are lawful and good, antecedently to any agreement made about them, and because they are in the power of the covenanters, they may be disposed of according to the terms of the compact.

So was it in this covenant. To do good unto mankind, to bring them unto the enjoyment of himself, was absolutely in the power of the Father. And it was in the power of the Son to assume human nature, which becoming thereby peculiarly his own, he might dispose of it to what end he pleased, saving the union which ensued on its assumption, for this was indissoluble. Again, some things are made lawful or good, or suited to the glory, honour, or satisfaction, and complacency of them thatmakethe covenant by virtue of somewhat arising in or from the covenant itself. And of this sort are most of the things that are disposed in the covenant, under consideration between the Father and the Son. They become good and desirable, and suited unto their glory and honour, not as considered absolutely and in themselves, but with respect to that order, dependence, and mutual relation that they are cast into, by and in the covenant.

Such was the penal suffering of the human nature of Christ under the sentence and curse of the law. This in itself absolutely considered, without respect unto the ends of the covenant, would neither have been good in itself, nor have had any tendency unto the glory of God. For what excellenecy of the nature of God could have been demonstrated in the penal sufferings of one absolutely, and in all respects innocent? Nay, it was utterly impossible that an innocent person, considered absolutely as such, should suffer penally under the sentence and curse of the law. For the law denounceth punishment unto no such person. Guilt and punishment are related, and where one is not real, or supposed, or imputed, the other cannot be. But now in the terms of this covenant, leading to the limitations and use of these sufferings, they are made good and tend to the glory of God, as we shall see. So the pardoning and saving of sinners absolutely, could have no tendency to the glory of God. For what evidence of righteousness would there have been herein, that the great Ruler of all the world should pass by the offences of men without animadverting upon them? What justice would have appeared, or what demonstration of the holiness of the nature of God would there have been therein? Besides it

‘was impossible, seeing it is the judgment of God, that they who commit sin are worthy of death. But, as we shall see, through the terms and conditions of this covenant, this is rendered righteous, holy, and good, and eminently conducive to the glory of God.

§ 15. The matter of this covenant, or the things and ends about which, and for which it was entered into, are next to be considered. These are the things which, as we observed before, are to be disposed of unto the honour, and, as it were, mutual advantage of them that make the covenant. And the matter of this covenant in general is the saving of sinners, in and by ways and means suited to the manifestation of the glory of God. So it is compendiously expressed, where the execution of it is declared, John iii. 16, ‘ God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.’ And upon the coming of the Son into the world, he was called Jzsus, because he was to save his people from their sins, Matt.i.21. ‘ Kyen Jusus the Deliverer, who saves us from the wrath to come, 1 Thess. 1. 10. To declare this design of God, or his will and purpose in and by Jesus Christ to save his elect from sin and death, to bring his many sons to glory, or to the full enjoyment of himself to eternity, is the principal design of the whole Scripture, and whereunto the whole revelation of God unto men may be reduced. ‘This was that on the prospect whereof the Son or Wisdom of God rejoiced before him, and had his delights with the children of men before the foundation of the world, Prov. vii. 30, 31. Man having utterly lost himself by sin, and coming short thereby of the glory of God, and having become obnoxious to everlasting destruction, the prevision whereof was in order of nature antecedent to this covenant, as hath been declared; the Father and Son do enter into a holy and mutual agreement, concerning the recovery and salvation of the elect in a way of grace. This we state as the matter of this covenant, the thing contracted and agreed about. The distinction of the parts of it into persons and things, the order and respect in it of one thing to another, are not the subjects of our present consideration. The explanation of them belongs to the covenant of grace, which God is pleased to enter into with believers by Jesus Christ. But this was that m general, that was to be disposed of, to the mutual complacency and satisfaction of Father and Son.

§ 16. The end of these things, both of the covenant, and of the disposition of all things made thereby, was the especial glory both of the one and the other. God doth all things for himself. He can have no ultimate end in any thing but himself alone, unless there should be anything better than himself, or above himself. But yet in himself he is not capable of any accession of glory, by any thing that he intendeth or doth. He is absolutely, infinitely, eternally perfect in himself and all his glorious properties, so that nothing can be added to him. His end therefore must be, not the obtaining of glory unto himself, but the manifestation of the glory that is in himself. When the holy properties of his nature are exercised in external works, and are thereby expressed, declared, and made known, then is God glorified. The end therefore in general of this covenant, which regulated the disposal of the whole matter of it, was the exercise, exalta-~ tion, and manifestation of the glorious properties of the divine nature; other supreme and ultimate end it could have none, as hath been declared. Now such is the mutual respect of all the holy properties of God in their exercise, and such their oneness in that same divine Being, that if any one of them be exerted, manifested, and thereby glorified, the residue of them must be therein and thereby glorified also, because that nature is glorified which they are, and whereunto they do belong. But yet in several particular works of God, his design is first, immediately and directly, ‘to exercise in a peculiar and eminent manner, and therein to advance and glorify one or more of his glorious properties, and the rest consequentially in and by them. So in some of his works, he doth peculiarly glorify justice, τ΄ some mercy, in some his power. We may, therefore, as to the end of this holy eternal compact, consider what are those properties of the divine nature which were peculiarly engaged in it, and fare peculiarly exerted in its execution, and were therefore designed to be exalted in a peculiar manner. Now these are three: 1. Wisdom attended with sovereignty. 2. Justice springing from holiness. 3. Grace, mercy, goodness, love, which are various denominations of the same divine excellency.

That this covenant sprang from these properties of the divine nature, that the execution of it is the work and effect of them all, and that it is designed to manifest and glorify them, or God in and by them unto eternity, the Scripture doth fully declare.

First. The infinite sovereign Wisdom of God, even the Father, exerted itself: 1. In passing by,the angels in their fallen condition, and fixing on the recovery of man, Heb. ii. 16; 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6. 2. In the projection or provision of the way in general to bring about the salvation of man, by the interposition of his Son, with what he did and suffered in the pursuit hereof, Acts ii. 23, iv. 28. 3. In the disposal of all things in that way, in such a holy and glorious order, soas that marks and footsteps of infinite divine Wisdom should be imprinted on every part and passage of it, 1 Cor. i: 23—31; Rom. xi. 33—-36; Eph. iii. 10, 11.

Secondly. His justice accompanied with or springing from holiness, gave as it were the especial determination unto the way to be insisted on for the accomplishment of the end aimed at; and it was effectually exerted in the execution of it. For upon a supposition that God would pardon and save sinners, it was his eternal justice which required that it should be brought about by the sufferings of the Son, and was itself expressed and exercised in those sufferings, as we shall afterwards more fully declare, Rom. i. 20, 26, vii. 3; Gal. ii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 21.

Thirdly. Grace, love, goodness or mercy, chiefly induced to the whole. And these the Scriptures most commonly cast the work upon, or resolve it into. See John iii. 16,17; Rom. v. 8, xi. 6; 1 Cor. 1, 29—31; Eph. 1. ὅ —7, iii. 7,8. In these things, in the exercise, manifestation, and exaltation of these glorious excellencies of the divine nature, with their effects in and upon the obedience of angels and men, doth consist that peculiar glory which God, even the Father, aims at in this covenant; and which supplies the place of that security or advantage, which amongst men is intended in such compacts.:

§ 17. There must also, moreover, be an especial and peculiar honour of the Son, the other party covenanting, intended therein; and was so accordingly, and is in like manner accomplished. And this was twofold: 1. What he had conjunct with the Father, as he is of the same nature with him, over all, God blessed for ever. For, on this account the divine excellencies before mentioned belong to him, or are his; and in their exaltation is he exalted. But, as his undertaking herein was peculiar, so he was to have a peculiar honour and glory thereby, not as God, but as the Mediator of the covenant of grace, which sprang from hence. For the accomplishment of the ends of this covenant, as we shall see, he parted for a season with the glory of his interest in these divine perfections, emptying himself or making of himself of no reputation, Phil. n. 7—9. And he was to have an illustrious recovery of the glory of his interest in them, when he was declared to be the ‘Son of God with power, by the resurrection from the dead,’ Rom. i. 4, when he was again glorified with the Father, ‘with that «glory which he had with him before the world was, John xvii. 3, namely, that peculiar glory which he had, and assumed upon his undertaking to be a Saviour and Redeemer to mankind; then when his delights were with the sons of men, and he rejoiced before the Father, and was his delight on that account, And this, 2dly, was attended with that peculiar glorious exaltation, which in his human nature he received, upon the accomplishment of the terms and conditions of this covenannt. What this glory was, and wherein it doth consist, I have manifested at large in the exposition on chap. i. ver. 3. See Isa. liii. 12; Ps. cx. 6, 21.:8, 9; Zeeh: ix. 105 Ps. Ixxii. 8; Rom. xiv. 11; Isa. xlv. 23; Matt. xxviii. 18; Phil. un. 10; Heb. xu. 2, &c.

§ 18. The manner how these things were to be accomplished, that is, the condition and limitation of this covenant, as it had respect to a prescription of personal obedience and promises of reward, is lastly to be considered. For, herein lies the occasion and spring of the priesthood of Christ, which we are inquiring after. And this sort of covenants hath most affinity to those relations which are constituted by the law of nature. For every natural relation, such as that of father and children, of man and wife, contains in it a covenant with respect to personal services and rewards. Now, things were so disposed in this covenant, that on the account of bringing sinners unto obedience and glory, (to the honour of God the Father, and to the peculiar and especial honour or glory that was proposed unto himself) that he, the Son, should do and undergo in his own person, all and every thing which in the wisdom, righteousness, holiness, and grace of God, was requisite or necessary to that end; provided that the presence and assistance of the Father was with him, and that he accepted of him and his works.

I shall a little invert the order of these things, that I may not have occasion to return again to them, after we are engaged in our more peculiar design. We may, therefore, in the first place, consider the promises that in this compact or covenant were made unto the Son upon his undertaking of this work, although they more naturally depend on the prescription of duty and work made unto him. But we may consider them as encouragements to the susception of the work. And these promises were of two sorts. 1. Such as concerned his person. 2. Such as concerned the prosperity of the work which he undertook. Those also which concerned his person immediately, were of two sorts. 1. Such as concerned his assistance in his work. 2. Such as concerned his acceptance and glory after his work.

1. The person of the Son of God, not absolutely considered, but with respect to his future incarnation, is a proper object of divine promises. And so was he now considered, even as an undertaker for the execution and establishment of this covenant; or as he became the minister of God to confirm the truth of the promises made afterwards to the fathers, Rom. xv. 8. And, herein he had promises,

1. As to his assistance. The worl he undertook to accomplish, as it was great and glorious, so also it was difficult and arduous. It is known from the gospel what he did and what he suffered, what straits, perplexities, and agonies of soul he was reduced to in his work. All this he foresaw in his first engagement, and thereon by his Spirit foretold what should befal him, Ps. xxii.; Isa. li.; 1 Pet. i. 11. Whatever opposition hell and the world, which were to prevail unto the bruising of his heel, could make against the Son of God, acting in the frail nature of man, he was to encounter. Whatever the law and the curse of it could bring on offenders, he was to undergo it. Hence, in that nature, he stood in need of the presence of God with him, and of his divine assistance. This, therefore, was promised unto him, in respect whereunto he placed his trust-and confidence in God, even the Father, and called upon him in all his distresses, see Isa. xli. 4,6; Ps. xvi. 10, 11, xxii., Ixxxix. 28;-Isa.1.5—9. This God promised him, and of this he gave him such ground of assurance, that at all times he might safely trust that God would not leave him under his troubles, but stand by and assist him to the utmost of what had a consistency with the design itself, which he had undertaken to execute.

2. Promises were given unto him concerning his exaltation, his kingdom and power, with all that glory which was to ensue upon the accomplishment of his work. See Isa. 11}. 12; Ps. cx. 1, 6, ii. 8, 12; Zech. ix. 10; Ps. Ixxu1. 8; Dan. vii. 14; Rom. xiv. 11; Isa. xlv. 23; Phil. ii 10. And these promises the Lord Christ had a constant eye unto in his whole work; and upon the accomplishment of it, made his request, and expected that they should be made good and fulfilled, as well he might, being made unto him and confirmed with the oath of God, Luke xxiv. 26; John xyii. 3; Heb. xii. 2. And these are an essential part of the covenant that he was engaged by.

The second sort of promises made unto him, are such as concern his work, and the acceptance of it with God. By them was he assured that the children whom he undertook for, should be delivered and saved, should be made partakers of grace and glory; see Heb. ii. 9—11, &c., and our exposition thereon. And this is that which gives the nature of merit to the obedience and suffering of Christ. Merit is such an adjunct of obedience, as whereon a reward is reckoned of debt. Now, there was in the nature of the things themselves, a proportion between the obedience of Christ the Mediator, and the salvation of believers. But this is not the next foundation of merit, though it be an indispensable condition thereof. For there must not only be a proportion, but a relation also between the things whereof the one is the merit of the other. And this relation in this case, is not natural er necessary, arising from the nature of the things themselves. This, therefore, arose from the compact or covenant that was between the Father and Son to this purpose; and the promises wherewith it was confirmed. Suppose then, a proportion in distributive justice between the obedience of Christ and the salvation of believers, (and wherein this consists shall be declared afterwards,) then add the respect and relation that they have one to another by virtue of this covenant, and in particular, that our salvation is engaged by promise unto Christ, and it gives us the true nature of his merit. Such promises were given him, and do belong to this covenant, the accomplishment whereof he pleads on the discharge of his work, Isa. liii. 10, 11; Ps. xxii. 30,31; John xvii. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12—16; Heb. vii. 26; Isa. xlix. 5—9; Ps. ii. 7; Acts xviii. 3.

§ 19. The conditions required of, or prescriptions made unto the undertaker in this covenant for the end mentioned, and under the promises directed unto, do complete it. And these may be reduced unto three heads.

1. That he should assume or take on him the nature of those whom, according to the terms of this covenant, he was to bring to God. This was prescribed unto him, Heb. ii. 9, x. 5, with which, by an act of infinite grace and condescension, he complied, Phil. ii. 6-—8; Heb. τ. 15. And therein, although he was God, and was with God, and made all things in the glory of the only begotten Son of God, yet he was made flesh, John i. 14, And this condescension, which was the foundation of all his obedience, gave the nature of merit and purchase unto what he did. This he did upon the prescription of the Father, who is therefore said ‘ to send forth his Son, made of a woman,’ Gal. iv. 4, and to ‘send forth his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, Rom. viii. 95. In answer unto which act of the will of the Father, he saith, ‘Lo! I come to do thy will’ And this assumption of our nature was indispensably necessary unto the work which he had to do. He could no otherwise have exalted the glory of God in the salvation of sinners, nor been himself in our nature exalted into his mediatory kingdom, which are the principal ends of this covenant.

2. That in this nature, so assumed, he should be the servant of the Father, and yield universal obedience to him, both according to the general law of God obliging all mankind, and according unto the especial law of the church under which he was born and made; and according to the singular law of that compact or agreement which we have described, Isa. xli. 1, xlix. 5; Phil. u.6. He came to do, to answer, and fulfil the whole will of ᾿ God; all that on any account was required of him. This he calls the commandment of his Father; the commands which he received of him, which extend themselves to all the prescriptions of this covenant.

3. Whereas God was highly incensed with, and provoked against all and every one of those whom he was to save and bring to glory, they having all by sin come short thereof, and rendered themselves obnoxious to the law and its curse; it was requisite for attaining the ends of this covenant, that he should, as the servant of the Father, make an atonement for sin in and by our nature assumed, and answer the justice of God by suffering and undergoing what was due unto them, without which it was not possible that they should be delivered or saved unto the glory of God, Isa. lui. 11,12. And as all the other terms of the covenant, so this in particular he undertook to make good; namely, that he would interpose himself between the law and sinners, by undergoing the penalty thereof; and between divine justice itself and sinners, to make atonement for them. And so are we come to the well-head, or the fountain of salvation. Here lieth the immediate sacred spring and foundation of the priesthood of Christ, and of the sacrifice of himself, which, in the discharge of that office he offered unto God.

§ 20. Man having sinned, the justice of God, as the supreme Lord, Ruler, and Governor over all, was violated thereby, and his law broken and disannulled. Every sin personally added to the first sin, which was the sin of our nature in Adam, doth so far partake of the nature thereof, as to have the same consequences with respect unto the justice and law of God. In one or both these ways, all men had sinned and come short of the glory of God, or had apostatized from the end of their creation, without power, hope, or possibility in themselves, for the retrieval thereof. Neither was there any way for our recovery, unless God were propitiated, his justice atoned, and his law repaired or fulfilled. Now, it was this which in the eternal covenant, the Son of God as he was to be incarnate, did undertake to perform. And this could no otherwise be done, but by the obedience and suffering of the nature that had offended, whereby greater glory should redound to God, in the exaltation of the glorious properties of his nature, through their eminent and peculiar exercise, than dishonour could be reflected on him or his government by sin committed in that nature. This was done by the death and blood-shedding of the Son of God, under the sentence and curse of the law. Hereunto, in this covenant he voluntarily gave himself up to the will of God, to undergo the penalty due to sinners, according to the terms and for the ends of the law. For, inasmuch as the sufferings of Christ were absolutely from his own will, the obedience of his will therein giving them virtue and efficacy; and seeing he did in them and by them, interpose himself between God and sinners to make atonement and reconciliation for them; and seeing that to this end he offered up himself to the will of God, to do and suffer whatever he required in justice and grace, for the accomplishment of the ends of this compact and agreement; which, having effected, he would persist to make effectual unto those for whom he so undertook all the benefits of his undertaking, by a continual glorious interposition with God on their behalf; he ‘so became the high priest of his people, and offered himself a sacrifice for them.. For when God came to reveal this counsel of his will, this branch and part of the eternal compact between him and his Son, and to represent to the church what had been transacted within the veil, for their faith and edification, as also, to give them some previous insight into the manner of the accomplishment of these his holy counsels; he did it by the institutions of a priesthood and sacrifices, or a sacred office and sacred kind of worship, suited and adapted to be a resemblance of this heavenly transaction between the Father and the Son. For the priesthood and sacrifices of the law were not the original exemplar of these things, but a transcript and copy of what was done in heaven itself, in counsel, design, and covenant, as they were a type of what should be afterwards accomplished in the earth. Now, although the names of priest and sacrifice are first applied to the office mentioned under the law, and to their work, from whence they are transferred under the New Testament to Jesus Christ, that we may learn thereby what God of old instructed his church in; yet the things themselves intended and signified by these names, belong first and properly unto Jesus Christ, upon the account of this his undertaking. And the very names of priest and sacrifices, were but improperly ascribed to them who were so called, to be obscure representations of what was past, and types of what was to come. § 21. The sum is, the Son of God, in infinite love, grace, and condescension, undertook freely in, and of his own will, to interpose himself between the wrath of God and sinners, that they might be delivered from sin, with all its consequences, and saved to the glory of God, according to the terms of the covenant explained. His offering, and the giving up of himself to the will of God in suffering and dying, in answer to his holiness, righteousness, and law, was in the revelation of this counsel of God unto the church, represented by his institution of a sacred office of men, to offer up by slaying the best of other creatures, and to minister by other rites of his own appointment. This office was called by him a priesthood, and these offerings were called sacrifices, these things in the first place belonging properly unto the accomplishment of the fore-mentioned holy undertaking, in and by the person of that Son of God. And, if it be inquired wherefore things were thus ordered in the wisdom and counsel of God, we answer, that with respect unto the holiness, righteousness, and veracity of God, it was absolutely and indispensably necessary, that they should be so disposed. For on the supposition of the sin of man, and the grace of

God to save them who had sinned, the interposition of the Son of God on their behalf was indispensably necessary, as shall be proved in the ensuing Exercitation.

§ 1. The necessity of the priesthood of Christ, of what nature, and on what grounds, asserted. § 2. The general nature of justice or righteousness. § 3. The nature of the righteousness of God, as declared in the Scripture. The universal rectitude of his nature. § 4. Right of rule in God, whence it proceeds. §5. The righteousness of God in particular exercise. § 6. ‘Justitia Regiminis,’ in God, the nature of it. § 7. Sundry things supposed to the necessary exercise of vindictive righteousness. § 8. The necessity and special nature of the priesthood of Christ founded thereon. § 9. Some attributes of God produce the objects about which they are exercised, some suppose them with their qualifications. Vindictive justice no free act of God’s will. The righteousness of rule in the prescription of a law, penal. Punishment, as punishment, necessary; not the degrees of it. God not indifferent whether sin be punished or not, but free in punishing; yet is it necessary that sinshould be punished. § 10. Justice and mercy, not alike necessary as their exercise. § 11. The opinion of the Socinians, in opposition to the justice of God, declared. § 12. Positions to be proved. § 13. First: argument taken from the holiness of God, Hab. i. 12. Οὐ God’s jealousy, Josh, xxiv. 19. In what sense compared toa cosuming fire, Heb. xii. 29. § 14. God the supreme Judge and Governor of the world, Gen. xviii. 25. § 15. The sum of what hath been pleaded concerning the righteousness of God. § 16. Opposition made to this righteousness of God, by whom. § 17. The arguments of Socinus examined. Justice and mercy not opposite. 418. The twofold righteousness assigned unto God by Socinus, examined. § 19, 20. The righteousness of God in the punishment of sin farther vindicated against him. § 21. And against the exceptions in the Racovian Catechism. § 22. As also those of Crellius, who is farther refuted.

" §1. It appears from the preceding discourse, that the priesthood of Christ was founded in sundry free acts of the will of God. Into that therefore it is principally to be resolved. The actual appointment of him also to this office, was a free act of the sovereign will and pleasure of God, which might not have been. The redeeming of man was no more necessary on the part of God than his creation.

Howbeit on this supposition, that God in his infinite grace and love would save sinners by the interposition of his Son, there was something in the manner of it indispensable and necessary. And this was, that he should do it by undergoing the punishment that, because of sin, was due to them who should be saved; or that he should offer himself a sacrifice to make atonement and reconciliation for them. This God did require, nor could it have been ordered otherwise, but that an inconsistency with the glory of his holiness, righteousness, and veracity, would have ensued thereon. The priesthood of the Son of God was necessary, not absolutely in itself, but on the supposition of the law, and entrance of sin, with the grace of God to save sinners.

This being a matter of very great importance, and without a due stating whereof, the doctrine concerning the priesthood of Christ, or the nature and use of this office of his, cannot be rightly conceived or apprehended, I must insist upon it somewhat largely. And I shall do it the rather, because the truth in this matter is strenuously opposed by the Socinians, and the defence of it deserted by some, who otherwise adhere to sound doctrine in the main of our cause. For I shall not mention them, who in these things are not wise beyond the writings of two or three whom they admire; nor those who, being utter strangers to the true reasons and grounds of truth herein, do boldly and confidently give vent to their own imaginations, and that with the contempt of all who are not satisfied to be as ignorant as themselves.

§ 2. Whereas we assert the necessity of the priesthood of Christ to depend on the righteousness of God, it is requisite that some things should be premised concerning the nature of righteousness in general, and in particular of the righteousness of God. Aristotle divides justice into that which is universal, and that which is particular. And he makes the former to be the same with virtue in general, only it hath, as he supposeth, a respect to others, and is not merely for itself, Ethic. lib. 5, cap. 1, 2. Particular justice is either distributive or commutative; and in its exercise it consists in words or deeds. That justice which consists in words, respects either commands, and it is called equity; or promises and assertions, and is veracity or truth. And both these, even equity in his commands, and truth or faithfulness in his prdémises, are frequently in the Scripture called the righteousness of God; see Ezra ix. 15; Neh. ix. 8; Ps. xxxi. 1; Rom. i. 17, ui. 21; 2 Tim. iv. 8. And this is the righteousness of God which David and other holy men so often plead and appeal to, whilst in the meantime they plainly acknowledge, that in the strictness of God’s justice, they | could neither stand before him, nor find acceptance with him, Ps. exxx. 3, exliii. 1, 2. The righteousness which consisteth, or is exercised in works or actions, is either the righteousness of rule in general, or of judgment in particular. And this latter is either remunerative or corrective; and this also is either chastening or avenging. And all these are subordinate unto distributive justice; for commutative hath no place between God and man. ‘Who hath first given unto him, that it should be rendered unto him again.’

§ 3. And these distinctions are of use, in the declaration of the various acceptations of the righteousness of God in the Scripture. But their ex plication and farther illustration is not at present necessary unto us. For I shall take up with a more general consideration and distribution of the righteousness of God, whereunto whatever is ascribed unto it in the Scripture may be reduced. Wherefore the righteousness of God is taken two ways: 1. Absolutely in itself, as it is resident in the divine nature. 2. With respect to its exercise, or the actings of God suitable unto that holy property of his nature.

In the first sense or acceptation, it is nothing but the universal rectitude of the divine nature, whereby it is necessary to God to do all things nghtly, justly, equally, answerably unto his own wisdom, goodness, holiness, and right of dominion, Zeph. iii. 5. ‘The just Lord in the midst thereof, he will do no iniquity: morning by morning doth he bring his judgment to light.’ I say it is the essential natural readiness and disposition of the holy nature of God to do all things justly and decently, according to the rule of his wisdom, and the nature of things, with their relation one to another. And this virtue of the divine nature considered absolutely, is not προς ἑτερον, or doth not consist in an habitude of mind with respect unto others, as all justice in men doth, but is the infinite essential rectitude of God in his being. Hence it doth so preside in and over all the works of God, that there is none of them, though proceeding immediately from mercy and goodness on the one hand, or from severity or faithfulness on the other, but that God is said to be righteous therein, and they are all represented as acts of righteousness in God. And.this not only because they are his acts and works who can do no evil, and who will do none, but also because they proceed from and are suited to that holy absolute universal rectitude of his nature, wherein true righteousness doth consist. So are we said to obtain faith through the righteousness of God, 2 Pet. 1. 1, the same with’ abundant mercy, | Pet. i. 3; Isa. li. 6, ‘My salvation shall be for ever, and myrighteousness shall not be abolished, that is my faithfulness. See the description of it in general, Job xxxiv. 1O—15. The absolute rectitude of the nature of God, acted in and by his sovereignty, is his righteousness, Rom. ix. 8, 14, 15.

§ 4. For between the consideration of this righteousness of God, and the actual exercise of it, which must respect somewhat without him, to be made by him, somewhat in his creatures, there must be interposed a consideration of the right of God, or that which we call jus Dominii, a right, power, and liberty of rule or government. For it is not enough that any one be righteous, to enable him to act righteously im all that he doth, or may do, with respect to others; but moreover he must have a right to act in those cases wherein he doth so. And this right which justice supposeth, is, or may be, twofold: 1. Supreme and absolute. 2. Subordinate. For we speak of justice and right only with respect to public actings, or actings of rule, which belong unto righteousness as it is distributive; for that which is commutative, and may have place in private transactions among private persons, we have here no consideration of. Now for that which is subordinate, it is a right to distribute justice or things equal to others, according to the direction, and by the authority of a superior. And _ this superior may either be only real, as is a law, in which sense the law of nature isa superior to all rulers on the earth, and the respective laws of nations to most; or personal also, which is that which is denied, where any one is acknowledged as a supreme Governor. That this right hath no place in God, is evident. He hath no greater whereby he may swear, and therefore swears by himself, Heb. vi. 13.

2. The right therefore which God hath to act his righteousness, or to act righteously towards others, is supreme and sovereign, arising naturally and necessarily from the relation of all things to himself. For hereby, namely by their relation to him as his creatures, they are all placed ina universal, indispensable, and absolutely unchangeable dependence on him, according to their natures and capacities. The right of God to rule over us, is wholly of another kind and nature than any thing is or can be among the sons of men; that which is paternal has the nearest resemblance to it, but itis not of the same kind. For it doth not arise from the benefits we receive from him, nor hath it any respect to our consent, for he rules over the most against their wills, but depends merely on our relation to him as his creatures, with the nature, order, and condition of our existence, wherein we are placed by his sovereignty. This in him 15 unavoidably accompanied with a right to act towards us according to the counsel of his will, and the rectitude of his nature. The state and condition, I say, of our being and end, with the relation which we have to him, and to his other works, or the order wherein we are set and placed in the universe, being the product or effect of his power, wisdom, will, and goodness, he hath an unchangeable sovereign right to deal with us, and act towards us, according to the infinite eternal rectitude of his nature. And as he hath a right so to do, so he cannot do otherwise, supposing the state and condition wherein we are made and placed, with the nature of our relation to, and dependence on God; and God can act no otherwise towards us, but according to what the essential rectitude of his nature doth direct and require; which is the foundation of what we plead in the case before us, concerning the necessity of the priesthood of Christ.

§ 5, Secondly. The righteousness of God may be considered with respect unto its exercise, which is so frequently expressed in the Scripture, and whereon depends the rule and government of the world. This supposeth the right of God before declared; as that right itself is no absolute but a relative property of God, supposing the creation of all things, in their nature, order, and mutual respects, according to his wisdom, and by his power. On this supposition it followeth naturally and necessarily, not as a new thing in God, but as a natural and necessary respect which his nature and being hath unto all creatures upon their production. For suppose the creation of all things, and it is as natural and essential to God to be the ruler of them, and over them, as it is to be God. Now the exercise of the righteousness of God in pursuit of his right of rule, is either absolute and antecedent, or respective and consequential. As it is absolute, and acted antecedently to the consideration of our obedience or disobedience, so it is put forth and exercised in his laws and promises. For they are acts or effects of righteousness, disposing things equally according to their nature, and the will of God. God’s ways are equal. His justice in legislation is universal equity. For all things being created in order by divine Wisdom, there arose from thence a ro πρεπον, a meetness and condecency, whereunto respect was had in God’s legislation, whereby his law or the commmandment became equal, holy, meet, just, and good. And whereas it was necessary that the law of God should be accompanied with promises and threatenings, the eternal rectitude of God’s nature acting righteously in their execution or accomplishment, is his truth.’ Hence truth and righteousness are in the Scripture frequently used to express the same thing.

§ 6. Again, There is a respective righteousness in actions, which also is either of rule or of judgment. First, there is, ‘ Justitia Regiminis,’ or the particular righteousness of actual rule. I do not place this as though it were absolutely consequential unto that of legislation before mentioned. For take righteousness of rule or government in its whole latitude, and it comprehends in it the righteousness of legislation also, as a part thereof. For so it is the virtue or power of the nature of God, whereby he guideth all his actions or works in disposing and governing of the things created by him, in their several kinds and orders, according to the rule of his own eternal rectitude and wisdom. For righteousness of government must consist in an attendance unto and observance of some rule. Now this in God is the absolute righteousness of his nature, with his natural right unto rule over all, in conjunction with his infinitely wise and holy will, which is that unto him which equity or law are to supreme rulers among men. And therefore God, in.the exercise of this righteousness, sometimes resolves the faith and obedience of men into his sovereign right over all, Job. xiv. 14, xxxiii. 12, 13, xxxiv. 12, 13, 14; Jer. xvii. 1—6; Isa. xlv. 9; Rom. ix. 20, xi. 32, 33. Sometimes into the holiness of his nature, Zeph. 11]. 5; Ps. xxvii.9. Sometimes into the equity and equality of his ways and works themselves, Ezek. xviii. 25. But there is a particular exercise of this righteousness of rule, which hath respect unto the law, any law given unto men immediately by God, as confirmed with promises and threatenings. The ruling and disposing of the temporal and eternal states or con- ditions of men, according to the tenor and sentence of the law given unto them, belongeth hereunto. And as this is actually executed, it is called ‘Justitia Judicialis, or the righteousness of God, whereby he distributes rewards and punishments unto his creatures according to their works. Hereof one part consisteth in the punishing of sin as it is a transgression of his law; and this is that wherein at present we are concerned. For we say that the righteousness of God, as he is the supreme ruler of the world, doth require necessarily that sin be punished: or the transgression of that law, which is the instrument of his rule, be avenged.

§ 7. The exercise of this righteousness in God, presupposeth sundry things. As,

1. The creation of ail things, in their kind, order, state, and condition by a free act of the will and power of God, regulated by his goodness and infinite wisdom. For our ‘God doth whatever he pleaseth; he worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will.’

2. In particular the creation of intelligent rational creatures in a moral dependence on himself, capable of being ruled by a law, in order unto his glory and their own blessedness. The being and nature of mankind, their rational constitution, their ability for obedience, their capacity of eternal blessedness or misery, depend all on a sovereign free act of the will of God.:

3. The nature of the law given unto these creatures, as the means and instrument of their moral orderly dependence on God; whereof the breach of that law would be a disturbance.

4, The eternal, natural, unchangeable right that God hath to govern these creatures according to the tenor of that law, which he hath so appointed for the instrument of his rule. This is no less necessary unto God than his being.

5. The sin of these creatures, which was destructive of all that order of things, which ensued on the creation and giving of the law. or it was destructive, Ist. Of the principal end of the creation, which could be no other but the glory of God from the obedience of his creatures; preserving all things in the order and state wherein he had made and placed them, 2d, Of the dependence of the creature on God, which consisted in his moral obedience unto him according to the law. And, 3d. It was introductory of a state of things utterly opposite to the universal rectitude of the nature of God. Only the right of God to rule the sinning creature unto his own glory, abode with him, because it belongs unto him as God. And this represents the state of things between God and the sinning creature: wherein we say that upon a supposition of all these antecedaneous free acts, and of the necessary continuance of God’s righteousness of rule and judgment, it was necessary that the smning creature should be punished according to the sentence of the law. Only observe, that I say not that this righteousness of judgment, as to the punitive part or quality of it, is a peculiar righteousness in God, or an especial virtue in the divine nature, or an especial distinct righteousness; which the schoolmen generally incline unto; for it is only the universal rectitude of the nature of God, sometimes called his righteousness, sometimes his holiness, sometimes his purity, exercising itself not absolutely, but on the supposition before laid down.

§ 8. On this state of things, on the necessary exercise of this righteousness of God upon the suppositions mentioned, depends both the necessity and especial nature of the priesthood of Christ. Designed it was in grace, as we have before proved, on supposition that God would save sinners; but it was this justice that made it necessary, and determined its especial nature. For this was that which indispensably required the punishment of sin, and therefore it was necessary that he who would save sinners should undergo for them the punishment that was due to them. This was therefore to be done by the Son of God, in the interposition that he made with God on the behalf of sinners. He was to answer the justice of God for their sin. But because this could not be done by mere suffering or enduring punishment, which is a thing in its own nature indifferent, the will and obedience of Christ in the manner of undergoing it was also required. This made his priesthood necessary; whereby whilst he underwent the punishment due to our sins, he offered himself an acceptable sacrifice for their expiation. This is that therefore which is now distinctly proposed unto confirmation; namely, that the justice or righteousness of God, as exercised in the rule and government of his rationalcreatures, did indispensably and necessarily require that sin committed should be punished, whence ariseth the especial nature of the priesthood of Christ. And this I shall do, 1st. By premising some observations, making way unto the true stating and explication of the truth. 2d. By relating the judgment or opinion of the Socinians, our professed adversaries, in and about these things. 3d. By producing the arguments and testimonies whereby the truth contended for is established, by which the objections of the adversaries unto them shall be removed out of the way.

§ 9. First. There are some attributes of God which as to their first exercise “ad extra,’ require no object antecedently existing unto their acting of themselves, much less objects qualified with any sort of conditions. Such are the wisdom and power of God, which do not find but produce the objects of their first actings ‘ad extra.’ These therefore in these actings must needs be absolutely and every way free, being limited and directed only by the sovereign will and pleasure of God. For it was absolutely free to God whether he would act any thing outwardly or not; whether he would make a world or not, or of what kind. But on the supposition of the determination of his will so to act in producing things without himself, it could not be but he must of necessity, by the necessity of his own nature, act according to those properties, that is, infinitely powerfully, and infinitely wisely. But herein were they no way limited by their first objects, for they were produced and had being given unto them by themselves. But there are properties of the divine nature which cannot act according unto their nature, without a supposition of an antecedent object, and that qualified in such or such a manner. Such are his vindictive justice, and his pardoning mercy. Jor if there be no sinners, none can be punished or pardoned. Yet are they not therefore to be esteemed only as free acts of the will of God. For not their existence in him, but their outward exercise only, depends on and is limited by the qualification of their objects. So then,

Secondly. The rule of God’s acting from or by his vindictive justice, is not a mere free act of his will, but the natural dominion and rule which he hath over sinning creatures, in answer to the rectitude and holiness of his own nature. That is, he doth not punish sin, because he will do so merely, as he made the world because he would, and for his pleasure; but because he is just and righteous and holy in his rule, and can be no otherwise, because of the holiness and rectitude of his nature. Neither doth he punish sin as he can, that is, to the utmost of his power, but as the rule of his government, and the order of things in the universe disposed unto his glory, doth require,

Thirdly. This justice exerted itself in one signal act antecedent unto the

Son of man; namely, in the prescription of a penal law, that is, in the annexing of the penalty of death unto the transgression of the law. This God did not merely because he would do so; but because the order of all things with respect unto their dependence on himself as the supreme ruler of all, did so require. For had God only given men a law of the rule of their dependence on him and subjection unto him, and not inseparably annexed a penalty unto its transgression, it was possible that man by sin might have cast off all his moral dependence on God, and set himself at 11- berty from his rule, as it was some such thing that was aimed at in the first sin, whereby man foolishly hoped that he should make himself like unto God. For having broke and disannulled the sole law of his dependence on God, what should he have had more to do with him? But this case was © obviated by the justice of God, in predisposing the order of punishment to succeed in the room of the order of obedience, if that were broken. And that this provision should be made, the nature of God did require.

Fourthly. This justice of God required a punishment of sin as a punishment. Hereunto do belong the way and degree, the time, season, and manner of it; but these things are not necessarily stated in the justice of God., The assignation and determination of them, belongs unto his sovereign will and wisdom. So would things have been ordered in the execution of the sentence of the law on Adam, had it not been taken off by the interposition of the Mediator. Whatever therefore God doth in this kind, when he hasteneth or deferreth deserved punishments, in the aggravation or diminution of penalties, it 1s all in the disposal of his holy will.

Fifthly. Whereas upon the supposition mentioned, I do affirm that it is necessary, on the consideration of the nature of God, and his natural right to govern his creatures, that sin should be punished; yet I say that God punisheth sin necessarily, which would express the manner of his operation, and not the reason of it. He doth not punish sin as the sun gives out light and heat, or as the fire burns, or as heavy things tend downwards by a necessity of nature. He doth it freely, exerting his power by a free act of his will. For the necessity asserted doth only exclude an antecedent indifferency upon all the suppositions laid down. It denies that on these respects it is absolutely indifferent with God whether sin be punished or no. Such an indifferency, I say, is opposite unto the nature, law, truth, and rule of God, and therefore such a necessity as excludes it must herein be asserted. It is not then indifferent with God, whether sin or the transgression of his law be punished or not; and that because his justice requireth that it should be punished; so far therefore is it necessary that so it should be. But herein is God a free agent, and acts freely in what he doth, which isa necessary mode of all divine actings ‘ad extra.’ For God doth all things according to the counsel of his own will; and his will is the original of all freedom. But suppose the determination of his will, and the divine nature necessarily requireth an acting suitable unto itself. It is altogether free to God whether he will speak unto any of his creatures or not. But supposing the determination of his will, that he will so speak, it is absolutely necessary that he speak truly. For truth is an essential property of his nature: whence he is God that cannot lie. It was absolutely free to God whether he would create this world or not. But on supposition that so he would do, he could not but create it omnipotently and wisely; for so his nature doth require, because he is essentially omnipotent and infinitely wise. So there was no absolute necessity in the nature of God, that he should punish sin; but on supposition that he would create man, and would permit him to sin, it was necessary that his sin should be avenged; for this his righteousness and dominion over his creatures did require.

§ 10. It is objected that on the same suppositions it will be no less necessary that God should pardon sin, than that he should punish it. For mercy is no less an essential property of his nature than justice. And if on supposition of the’proper object of justice and its qualification, it is necessary that it should be exercised; that’ is, that where sin is, there also should be punishment; why then on the supposition of the proper object of mercy, and its qualifications, is it not necessary that it also should be exercised; that is, that where there is sin and misery, there should be pity and pardon? And whereas one of these must give place unto the other, or else God can act nothing at all towards sinners, why may we not rather think that justice should yield as it were to mercy, and so all be pardoned, than that mercy should so far give place to justice as that all should be punished?

Answ. 1st. We shall make it fully appear that God hath in infinite wisdom and grace so ordered all things in this matter, that no disadvantage doth redound either to his justice or his mercy, but that both of them are gloriously exercised, manifested, and exerted. That this was done by the ‘ substitution of the Son of God to answer divine justice in the stead of them, who were to be pardoned by mercy, and that it could be done no otherwise, is that which we are in the confirmation of. And those by whom this is denied, can give no tolerable account why all are not condemned, seeing God is infinitely righteous; or all are not pardoned, seeing he is infinitely merciful. For what they fancy concerning impenitency will not relieve them. For if God can forgive any sin without satisfaction to his justice, he may forgive every sin, and will do so because he is infinitely merciful; for what should hinder or stand in the way, if justice do not? But,

2d. There is not the same reason of the actual exercise of justice and mercy. For upon the entrance of sin, as it respects the rule of God, the first thing that respects it is justice, whose part it is to preserve all things in their dependence on God, which without the punishment of sin cannot be done. But God is not obliged unto the exercise of mercy, nor doth the forbearance of such an exercise any way entrench upon the holiness of his nature, or the glory of his rule. It is true, mercy is no less an essential property of God than justice; but neither the law, nor the state and order of things wherein they were created, nor their dependence on God as the supreme governor of the whole creation, raise any natural respect or obligation between mercy and its object. God therefore can execute the punishment which his justice requireth, without the least impeachment of his mercy, Fer no act of justice is contrary to mercy. But absolutely to pardon, where the interest of justice is to punish, is contrary to the nature of God.

3d. It is denied that sin and misery do constitute the proper object of mercy. It is required that every thing contrary to the nature of God in sin and the sinner be taken out of the way, or there is no proper object for mercy. Such is the guilt of sin unsatisfied for, And moreover faith and repentance are required to the same purpose. Socinus himself acknowledgeth that it is contrary to the nature of God to pardon impenitent sinners. These none can have but on the account of an antecedent reconciliation, as is evident in the fallen angels. And on these suppositions, even mercy itself will be justly exercised, nor can it be otherwise.

§ 11. These things are premised, to give a right understanding of the truth which we assert and contend for. It remains that we briefly represent Lica what isthe opinion which the Socinians advance in opposition unto this foundation of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ. or they are awake unto their concern herein, and there is none of them but in one place or other attempt an opposition unto this justice of God, and the necessity of its exercise upon the supposition of sin; though the defence of it hath been unhappily and causelessly by some deserted. The judgment of these men is expressed by Socinus, Preelec. Theol. Cap. 16. lib. 1. de Jesu Christo Servator. cap. 1. lib. 3. cap. 1. Catech.-of Racoy. cap. 8. Q. 12. Oscorod. Institut. cap. 31. Volck. de Ver. Relig. lib. 5. cap. 21. Crellius, lib. de Deo, cap. 28. Vindic. Socin. ad Grot. Cap. 1. de causis mortis Christi, cap. 16. Smalcius adv. Franzium, Disputat. Quarta. Gitichius ad Lucium. Woolzogen. Compend. Relig. Christian, ὃ 46. The sum of what they all plead, is, That there is no such thing as justice in God, requiring that sin be punished. That the cause and fountain of punishment in God, is anger, wrath, or fury. That these denote free acts of the will of God, which he may exercise or omit at his pleasure. If he punish sin, he doth nothing against justice, nor if he omit so to do. In all these things he is absolutely free, such a governor of his creatures do they fancy him to be. Hence it follows that there was no necessity, no just or cogent reason, why the punishment of our sin, or the chastisement of our peace, should be laid on Christ; for there was neither need nor possibility that any satisfaction should be made to the justice of God. Only he hath freely determined to punish impenitent sinners, and as freely determined to pardon them that repent and believe the gospel. For this hath he sent the Lord Christ to testify and declare unto us; with respect whereunto, he is called and to be esteemed our Saviour. The words of Socimus are express to this purpose.

De Christo Servatore, lib. 1. cap. 12. ‘ Queerente aliquo, qui fiat, ut mortem zternam meriti, nihilominus ad vitam eternam perveniamus, non est germanum responsum, quia Christum servatorem habemus: sed Quia supplicium mortis zterne a Deo, cujus libera voluntate atque Decreto eam meriti fueramus, nobis pro ineffabili ipsius bonitate condonatum fuit; atque ejus loco datum vite zterne premium; dummodo resipiscamus, et abnegata omni impietate vitze innocentize ac sanctimoniz deinceps studeamus. Quod si, qua ratione istud nobis innotuerit queeratur, cum neque Deum videamus unquam, neque audiamus loquentem, quisve nobis tante divine liberalitatis non dubiam fidem fecerit, Respondendum est, Jesum Christum id nobis enarrasse, et multis modis confirmasse. This is the substance of the per-

suasion of these men in this matter, and that this is contradictory to the whole mystery and design of the gospel, and contains a complete renunciation of the mediation of Christ, will in our ensuing discourse be made to appear.

§ 12. That therefore which we are engaged in the confirmation of, may be reduced to two heads. Ist. That the justice of God whereby he governeth the world, and ruleth over all, is an essential property of the divine nature, whence God is denominated just or righteous; and that on the account hereof, it is necessary that sin should be punished, or not be absolutely pardoned without respect to satisfaction given to that justice of God. 2d. That hence it became necessary, that in the designation of the Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God to his office of priesthood, he should make his soul an offering for sin, to make an atonement thereby for it, without which there could have been no remission, because without it there could be no satisfaction given, or reconciliation made. ᾿

δ 13. Our first argument is taken from the consideration of the nature of

God and of his holiness. Whatever is spoken of the purity and holiness of God, with his hatred of and aversation from sin and sinners on the account thereof, confirmeth our assertion. For we intend no more thereby, but that God the great ruler of the world is of so holy a nature, as that he cannot but hate and punish sin, and that so to do, belongs unto his absolute perfection. For the purity and holiness of God is nothing but the universal perfection of his nature, which is accompanied with a displicency in and a hatred of sin, whence he will punish it according to its desert. So is it expressed Hab. i. 13. ‘Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity.’ Not to be able to look on or behold iniquity expresseth the most inconceivable detestation of it. God is ΣΝ 710; which expresseth the infinite holiness of his nature, with what respect therein he hath, and cannot but have, towards that which is perverse and evil. So when the prophet had made his inference from hence, namely, that he was holy, yo myn, that any look or aspect unsuitable thereunto towards sin or evil, is not to be expected from him; he adds expressly, nd dny bx warm

ΞῚΠ, ‘and he cannot’ (that is, because of the holiness of his nature, which such an action would be contrary unto) ‘look upon,’ that is, pass by, spare, or connive at iniquity. For that is the rule of what God can do, or cannot do. He can do every thing that is not contrary to himself, that is, the essential properties of his nature. He can do nothing that is contrary to or inconsistent with his truth, holiness, or righteousness. Wherefore, whereas not to look on sin, not to behold it, do include in them, and by the negation of contrary acts, express the punishing of sin, that is, all sin, or sin as sins, and these are resolved into the nature of God, or his essential holiness, this testimony declares that the punishment of sin is thence necessary to God, as he is the holy supreme Governor of the world.

fence this holiness of God is sometimes expressed by jealousy, or hath jealousy joined with it, or accompanying of it; Josh. xxiv. 19, ‘He isa holy God, he is a jealous God, he will not forgive your trespasses nor your sins. And God makes mention of this his jealousy where he would instruct men in his severity in the punishing of sin, Exod. xx. 5. For the nature of jealousy is not to spare, Prov. vi. 34, nothing but the executing of vengeance will satisfy it. And this is that which God intended in the revelation of himself, which he made by the proclamation of his name before Moses, Exod. xxxiv. 7, ‘That will by no means clear (or acquit) the guilty; namely, for whom no atonement is made.

And it is to instruct us herein, that this holiness of God is expressed by fire, Heb. xu. 29, ‘Our God is a consuming fire.’ ‘ Devouring fire and everlasting burnings,’ Isa. xxxiii. 14, and that a fiery stream is said to proceed from him, and that his throne is like a fiery flame, Dan. vii. 9, 10. Now, it is certain that God acteth not in any external work, by a mere and absolute necessity of nature, as fire burneth. This, therefore, we are not taught by this representation of the holiness of God. But if we may not learn thence, that as eventually fire will burn any combustible thing that is put into it, so the holiness of God requires that all sin be as assuredly punished, we know not what to learn from it. And it is certainly not made use of merely for our amazement.

An account of the nature and holiness of God is given us to the same purpose, Ps. v. 4—6, ‘ For thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand in thy sight, thou hatest all workers of iniquity. Thou shalt destroy them that speak lies: the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man.’ All the actings of God in the hatred and punishment of sin, proceed from his na~ ture. And what is natural to God is necessary. The negative expression, ‘Thou art not a God that hath pleasure, ver. 4, includes strongly the affirmative expressed, ver. 5, ‘Thou hatest the workers of iniquity. And this he doth, because he is such a God as he is; that is, infinitely holy and righteous. And that hatred which is here ascribed unto God, contains two things in it. J. A natural displicency: he cannot like it, he cannot approve it, he cannot but have an aversation from it. 2. A will of punishing it proceeding therefrom; and which is therefore necessary, because required by the nature of God. Expressions are here multiplied, to manifest that sin is contrary to the nature of God, and that it is inconsistent therewith to pass it by unpunished. And if the punishing of sin depend upon a mere free act of the will of God, which might or might not be without any disadvantage to his nature, there is no reason why his holiness or righteousness should be made mention of, as those which induce him thereunto, and indispensably require it. Thisis that which from this consideration is confirmed to us, namely, that such is the holiness of the nature of God, that he cannot pass by sin absolutely unpunished. For it is contrary to his holiness, and, therefore, he cannot do it; for he cannot deny himself.

§ 14. Again, God, in the Scripture is proposed unto us as the supreme Judge of all, acting in rewards and punishments according to his own righteousness, or what the rectitude and holy properties of his own nature do require and make just, good, and holy. Although his kingdom, dominion, government, and rule, be supreme and absolute, yet he ruleth not as it were arbitrarily, without respect unto any rule or law. That God should have any external rule or law in his government of the world, is absolutely and infinitely impossible. But his law and rule is the holiness and righteousness of his own nature, with respect to that order of all things which in his will and wisdom he hath given and assigned unto the whole creation. In respect hereunto, he is said to do right as a ruler and a judge, Gen. xviii. 25, ‘Shall not the Judge of all the world do right? punt 55 wew, expresseth that core of the divine nature, and that office as it were of God, which in this matter he represents himself to us, as vested withal. He is that supreme Rector or Governor of all the world, who useth and is to use, righteousness in his government, or to govern righteously. Before such a one, the just and unjust cannot, ought not to be treated or dealt withal in the same manner. Jor, although none be absolutely righteous in his sight, yet some may be so comparatively, with respect unto some kind of guilt and guilty persons. According as the distance is between persons, so the righteousness of God requires that they be differently dealt withal.

But it is pleaded, that the intention of the expression here used, is to ‘plead for mercy, that the just should not be utterly destroyed with the unjust, and that we improve the testimony unto a contrary end, namely, to prove that God must punish all sin.’ But all that is hence aimed at, is no more but that God is denominated just and righteous, from that righteousness whereby he punisheth sin; which, therefore, can be no free act of his will, but is an essential property of his nature. And if so, then doth that righteousness of his require that sin be punished. For God doth right asa judge, and a judge cannot acquit the guilty without injustice. And what an external law is to a subordinate judge, that is God’s righteousness and holiness unto him, as he is the Judge of all the earth. And this appeal of Abraham unto the righteousness of God, as he is a judge, is founded in a principle of the light of nature, and as such is repeated by our aposile,

Rom. 11. 5, 6. And unto this end is God, as the Ruler of the world, represented as on a throne, executing justice and judgment; the introduction of which solemnity is of no use, unless it instruct us that God governeth the world as a righteous Judge, and that justice requireth that he inflict punishment on sinners, Ps. ix. 7—14, Ixxxix. 14, exvii. 2, ‘Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne; that is, they always dwell and reside there, because God on his throne, acts according to the justice and righteousness of his nature. And, hence he is both denominated righteous, and declared so to be, in and by the punishment of sin, Rev. xvi. 5, 6. See Rom. 1. 32; 2 Thess. i. 6; Exod. ix. 27. Which places I have to the same purpose pleaded and vindicated elsewhere.

§ 15. The whole of what hath been thus far pleaded, may be reduced to the ensuing heads.

1. God is naturally and necessarily the supreme Governor of his rational creatures, with respect unto their utmost end, which is his own glory. Upon the supposition of his being and theirs, an imagination to the contrary would imply all serts of contradictions.

2. The law of obedience in and unto such creatures ariseth naturally and necessarily from the nature of God and thereon. For this original law is nothing but that respect which a finite, limited, dependent creature, hath upon an absolute, infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator, suited unto the principles of the nature which it is endued withal. Therefore, it is indispensably necessary.

3. The annexing of a penalty unto the transgression of this law, was nothing but what the righteousness of God as the supreme Ruler of his creatures did make necessary, as that without which the glory and holiness of his rule could not be preserved upon the entrance of sin.

4. The institution of punishment answerable unto the sanction of the law, is an act of justice in God, and necessary unto him as the supreme Governor of the universe.

And this is the first ground whereon the necessity of the satisfaction of Christ, and of the atonement he was to make as our High Priest, is founded. For on supposition that God in infinite grace and mercy would eternally save sinners, the punishment due to their sins was to be undergone by him who interposed himself between them and the justice of God which required it. Now, as there are some who believe the satisfaction of Christ on the abundant testimonies given unto it in the Scripture, and yet resolve the reason of it into the infinite wisdom and sovereign pleasure of God only, with whom I do not now expressly deal, because, although we differ about the way, we agree in the end; so the Socinians employ the chief of their strength in opposition unto this righteousness of God, as knowing that if it be maintained, they are cast in their whole cause. I shall, therefore, remoye all those objections which they principally fortify themselves with, against the evidence of the truth asserted, and their exceptions also which they put in to the testimonies and arguments wherewith it is confirmed, and thereby put an end to this exercitation.

§ 17. He whom [I shall first begin with, is Socinus himself, who in all these things laid that foundation which his followers have built upon. And as almost in all his other works, he casually reflects on this righteousness of God; so in that De Jesu Christo Servatore, he directly opposeth it in two chapters at large, lib. 1, cap. 1, lib. 3, cap. 1. In the first place, he designeth to answer the arguments produced by his adversary for it, and in the latter he levieth his objections against it. And in the first place he proceedeth solely on this supposition, that the righteousness which we here plead for, and that mercy whereby God forgiveth sins, are contrary and opposite unto one another, so that they cannot be properties of his nature, but only external acts of his will and power.

This is the foundation of his whole discourse in that place; which he asserts as a thing evident, but undertakes not at all to prove. But this _ supposition is openly false. For the justice and mercy of God may be considered either in themselves, or with respect unte their effects. In neither sense are they contrary or opposite to each other. For in themselves, being essential properties of the nature of God, as they must be, in that they are perfections of an intelligent being, they differ not from the universal rectitude of his holy nature, but only add a various respect unto external things. So that, in themselves they are so far from being opposite, as that God is denominated just, from the exercising the perfections of his nature in a way of justice; and merciful, from a like exercise in a way of mercy. Absolutely, therefore, and essentially, they are the same. Neither are their effects contrary or opposite to each other, only they are diverse, or not of the same kind, nor are the effects of the one contrary unto the other. To punish, where punishment is deserved, is not contrary to mercy; but where punishment is not deserved, there it is so; for then it is cruelty. And yet also in that case, the part of wrong, namely, in punishing without desert, is more opposite to justice itself, than the cruel part is to mercy. And so is it where punishment exceeds guilt, or where proceedings are not according unto an equal measure or standard. Nor is to spare through or by mercy, contrary to justice. For if to spare and pardon, be not for the good of the whole, for the preservation of order, and the end of rule, it is not mercy to pardon or spare, but facility, remissness in government, or foolish pity. Secure those things in rule and government which justice takes care of and provides for, and then to spare in mercy, 1s no way contrary untoit. If these things be not provided for, to spare is not an act of mercy, but a defect in justice. And, if these things were not so, it would be impossible that any one could be just and merciful also, yea, or do any act either of justice or mercy. For if he punish, he is unnierciful, that is wicked, if punishment be contrary to mercy; and if he spare he is not just, if sparing be opposite to justice. There is, therefore, nothing solid or sound, nothing but an outward appearance of reason, really contrary to the highest evidence of right reason indeed, in this sophism which is laid as the foundation of the opposition made to the righteousness of God pleaded for.

§ 18. On this false supposition, Socinus grants a two fold righteousness in God with respect unto sin, and the punishment thereof; one which he perpetually useth, whilst he destroys obstinate, impenitent, and contumacious sinners; the other whereby sometimes he punisheth sinners according unto his law, which yet are not obstinate, without any expectation of their repentance. And these several sorts of justice in God, he confirms by sundry instances in the place before alleged. But it is plain that these things belong not unto the question under debate. For they respect only the external manner and acts of punishing; and nothing is more fond than thence to feign various righteousnesses in God, or to conclude that therefore, every transgression of the law doth not require a just recompence of reward. Nor is it supposed that the justice of God doth so exact the punishment of sin, as that all sin must be immediately punished in the same manner, especially as unto temporal punishments which respect this life.

It belongs unto the sovereign authority and infinite wisdom of God, as the Governor of the world, so to dispose of the time, season, manner, and measures of the punishments due unto sin, as may most conduce to the end aimed at in the whole. Thus, he cuts off some in their entrance into a course of sin; others he endureth with much long suffering, though vessels of wrath and fitted for destruction, Rom. ix. And this he doth because he is willing so to do; or so it pleaseth him. But hence it follows not that finally he pardoneth or spareth some, or punisheth others merely because he willeth.

That, therefore, whereby he deceives himself and others in this matter is, the exclusion of the satisfaction of Christ, from having the place of any cause, or from being of any consideration in the matter of pardoning sin. For this he expressly pleads and contends, in this place, as is evident from the words before recited, wherein he allows no more to Christ and his mediation, but only that he came to declare that God would forgive us our sins. His whole proof, therefore, is but a begging of the thing in question. For the reason why God constantly punisheth them who are obstinate in their sin, and impenitent, is really because their sins deserve in his justice, and according to his law, so to be punished; and they are not spared, because they obstinately refuse the remedy or relief provided for them, in that they fulfil not the condition whereby they might be interested in the sufferings of Christ for sin. ‘He that believeth not shall be damned; that is, shall personally be left unto the justice of God, and sentence of the law. Those whom God spareth and punisheth not, it is not because their sins do not deserve punishment, or because the justice of God doth not require that their sins should be punished, but because they are interested by faith in the satisfaction made by Christ, when he underwent the punishment due to their sins, by the will of God. And this is the rule of punishment and sparing, as they are final and decretory, according to a sentence never to be repealed nor altered. As for temporary punishments, whether they are corrective only, or vindictive, their dispensation depends absolutely on the will and pleasure of God, who will so order and dispose of them, as that they may be subordinate unto his final determination of the eternal condition of sinners. But this exclusion of the consideration of the interposition of Christ, in a way of suffering punishment for the procuring of the pardon of sin, is that which disturbs the whole harmony of what is. taught us, concerning the justice and mercy of God in the Scripture.

And the venom hereof hath so infected the minds of many in these latter days, that they have even rejected the whole mystery of the gospel, and taken up with a religion which hath more of Judaism, Mahometanism, and Gentilism, in it than of Christianity. And indeed if it be so, that in the remission of sins, there is no respect unto the Lord Christ but only that he hath declared it, and showed the way whereby we may attain it, it must be acknowledged that there is no righteousness in God requiring the punishment of sin; as also that it was merely from an act of the will and pleasure of God, that by any sins we deserve everlasting punishment. For neither then was the sanction of the law, or the constitution of the penalty of its transgression, any act of the justice in God, but of his will absolutely, which might not have been, and so notwithstanding the state and condition wherein we were created, and our moral dependence on God, and God’s government over us, man might have sinned, and sinned a thousand times, and broken the whole law, and yet have been no way liable unto punishment, namely, if God had so pleased; and it was as free unto him to reward sin as to punish it. For if you allow any reason to the contrary from the nature and order of things themselves, and our relation to God as rational creatures made meet to be subject unto him in a way of moral obedience, you introduce a necessity of punishment from the righteousness of God, which is denied. And on this supposition upon an alike act of the will of God, sin might have been made to be virtue, and obedience, sin; and so it might have been the duty of man to have hated God, and to have opposed him to the uttermost of his power. For all the merely free acts of God's will, might have been otherwise, and contrary to what they are. And if you say it could not be so in this case, because the nature of God, and his righteousness required it should be otherwise, you grant all that is contended for. This false supposition made way for the twofold righteousness which Socinus feigns in God. And the mstances which he gives in the confirmation of it, respect only God’s actual punishing of sin and sinners in this world, some sooner, and some after more forbearance, which none deny to proceed from his sovereign will and pleasure.

§ 19. The same author in the same place betakes himself to another plea; and will not allow that God doth at all punish sin because he is just; or that his so doing is an act of justice in him. For so he speaks, lib. 1, p- 1, cap. 1, ‘Ea res que ad Deum relata, misericordize opponitur, non justitia appellatur, sed vel severitas, vel ira, vel indignatio, vel furor, vel vindicta, vel simili alio quopiam nomine nuncupatur. Ans. There are no things in God that are opposite or contrary unto one another; and this sophism was before discovered. Nay, anger and fury, though they denote not any thing in God but outward effects from that which is in him, are not opposed to mercy. For mercy being a virtue and a divine perfection, whatever is contrary unto it is evil. Only as they denote effects of justice, they are diverse from the outward effects of mercy. This therefore proves not, that, that from whence it is that God punisheth sin is not justice, which must be proved, or this man’s cause is lost. I do acknowledge that both ΤΕ and δικαιοσυνὴ are variously used in the Scripture when applied unto God, or do signify things of a distinct consideration. For upon the supposition of the rectitude of the divine nature in all things, righteousness may be variously exercised, yea it is so in all that God doth. Hence Socinus gives sundry instances where God is said to be righteous, in acts of mercy and goodness, as very many may be given. For besides that the rectitude, equity, and holiness, which are in all his ways, is from his righteousness, in the declaration that he makes of himself, and his dealings with men, in a way of goodness, kindness, benignity, and mercy, there is universally a supposition of his promise of grace in Jesus Christ, the accomplishment whereof depends on his righteousness, which therefore may be pleaded, even when we pray for mercy, as it is often by David. For the faithfulness of God in fulfilling his promises, whether in the pardon of our sins, or the rewarding of our obedience, is his righteousness in his word. Thence is he justified in his sayings, Rom. iii. 4, that is, he is declared righteous in the fulfilling his promises and threatenings. Yet this hinders not, but that God is just when he taketh vengeance; that is, when he doth so, and in his so doing, Rom. 111. 5.

That anger and fury are not properly in God, all do acknowledge. The outward effects of the righteousness of God in the punishing of sin are so expressed, to declare the certainty and severity of his judgments. ‘To say that God prescribes a penalty unto the transgression of his law, and executeth accordingly merely in anger, wrath, or fury, is to ascribe that unto him, which ought not to be done unto any wise law-maker or governor among men. Nor will it follow, that because God is said to punish sin in anger and wrath, that therefore he punisheth sin only because he will, and not because he is just; or that his justice doth not require that sin be punished. Yea, it thence follows, that the justice of God is the cause of the punishment of sin. For to act in anger and fury, any otherwise than as they are effects of justice, is vicious and evil. God doth not therefore punish sin because he is angry, but to show the severity of his justice, he maketh an appearance of anger and wrath in punishing. These things belong to the outward manner, and not the inward principles of inflicting punishment.

§ 20. In the first chapter of his third book, he again attempts an opposition unto this righteousness of God. ‘Justitia ista (saith he) cui vos satisfaciendum esse omnino contenditis, in Deo non residet, sed effectus est voluntatis ipsius. Cum enim Deus peccatores punit, ut digno aliquo nomine hoc opus ejus appellemus, Justitia tune eum uti dicimus.’ Therefore it seems do we deal benignly with God; and what he doth only in anger and fury, we give it a worthy mame, and say he doth it in righteousness. But what shall we say when God himself ascribeth his punishing of sin, to his justice and judgment in governing the world? This he doth plainly, Ps. ix. 7, 8, 1. 6, xeviil. 9; Rom. i. 32, and iii. 5. Shall he also be said to find out a worthy name for what he doth, though he do it on such accounts as wherein the thing signified by that name is not concerned? It is a hard task, doubtless, to prove that God doth not judge the world in righteousness. But he hath reason as he supposeth for his assertion; for he adds, ‘Quod autem justitia ista in Deo non resideat ex eo maxime apparere potest, quod si ea in Deo resideret nunquam is ne minimum quidem delictum cuiquam condonaret. Nihil enim -unquam facit aut facere potest Deus, quod qualitatibus que in ipso resident adversatur. [xempli causa cum in Deo sapientia et ezquitas resideat, nihil unquam insipienter nihil inique facit aut facere potest. ‘That there is no such justice in God appears from hence, that if there were, he could never forgive the least sin unto any. For God doth nothing, nor can do any thing, that is contrary to the qualities which reside in him. For instance, whereas there is wisdom and equity in God, he can do nothing unwisely, nothing unjustly. So he. But he seems not to observe that herein he pleads our cause more forcibly than his own. For we say, that because this justice is a natural property of God, he can do nothing against it, and so cannot forgive any sin absolutely, without respect unto satisfaction made to that righteousness. And when this is done, to pardon and forgive sin, is no way adverse or contrary unto it. This whole difficulty is reconciled in the cross of Christ, and can be so no otherwise. For God set him forth to be a propitiation, εἰς ἐνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσυνης, Rom. ili. 25, which when it is done, as pardon is a fruit or effect of mercy, so it is consistent with the severity of justice. See 2 Cor. v. 21; Rom. vill: 3; Gal. iii. 13, 14; Heb. ix. 14,15. And the whole ensuing discourse of Socinus in that chapter, may be reduced unto these two heads. First. A supposition that Christ did not, nor could undergo the punishment due to our sins; which is to beg the matter in question, contrary to Scripture-testimonies innumerable, many whereof I have elsewhere vindicated from the exceptions of himself and his followers. For let this be granted, and all his discourse about the impossibility of pardoning any sin, upon the supposition of such a righteousness in God, falls to the ground.

And if he will not grant it, yet may he not be allowed to make a supposition on the contrary, to be the ground of his argument, whereby he endeavours to overthrow it.

Secondly. He confounds the habits of justice and mercy, with the acts of them. Hence would he prove an inequality betwixt justice and mercy, because there is so between punishing and pardoning. And so also God declares that he delights in mercy, but is slow to anger. But actually to pardon, is no way opposite to justice, where satisfaction is made; nor to punish, unto mercy, where the law of obtaining an interest in that satisfaction is not observed. And all that God declares in the Scripture concerning his justice and mercy, with the exercise of them towards sinners, is grounded on the supposition of the interposition and satisfaction of Christ. Where that is not, as in the case of the angels who sinned, no men- κῶς is made of mercy more or less, but only of judgment according to their desert.

§ 21. The author of the Racovian Catechism manageth the same plea against the vindictive justice of God, and gathers together the objections which Socinus more largely debated on, cap. 8. De morte Christi. And although little be added therein, to what I have already recited, yet, as it contains the substance of what they are able to plead in this cause, I shall take a view of it in the words of these Catechists. ‘Ham misericordiam et

justitiam qualem hic adversarii inseri volunt, negamus Deo inesse naturaliter. Nam quod attinet ad misericordiam, eam Deo non-ita natura inesse, ut isti sentiunt, hinc patet; quod si natura Deo inesset non potest Deus ullum peccatum prorsus punire; atque vicissim si ea justitia natura Deo inesset, ut illi opinantur, nullum peccatum Deus remitteret. Adversus enim ea, quz Deo insunt natura, nunquam potest quidquam facere Deus. Hxempli causa; cum Sapientia Deo insit natura, nunquam contra eam quidquam Deus facit, verum queecunque facit, omnia facit Sapienter. Verum cum Deum constet remittere peccata et punire, quando velit, apparet Deo ejusmodi misericordiam et justitiam, qualem illi opinantur, non inesse natura, sed esse effectus ipsius voluntatis. Preeterea eam justitiam quam adversarii misericordize opponunt, qua Deus peccata punit, nusquam liter sacree hoc nomine justitiz insigniunt, verum iram et furorem Dei appellant; immo justitie Dei in Scripturis hoc attribuitur, cum Deus peccata condonat,’

1 John i. 9; Rom. iii. 25, 26. And hereon they conclude that there was no need, nor can there be any use of the satisfaction of Christ, Ans. 1. The design of this discourse is to prove, that justice and mercy are not properties of the divine nature. For if they are, it cannot be denied but that the sufferings of Christ were necessary, that sin might be pardoned. Now herein we have against our adversaries the light of nature; and that not only as teaching us by the conduct of right reason, that there is a singular perfection in these things, which must therefore be found in him, who is so the Author of all goodness and limited perfections to others, as to contain essentially and eminently all goodness and perfection in himself; but also it is not difficult to evince the actual consent of all mankind, who acknowledge a deity, unto this principle—that God is just and merciful, with that justice and mercy which haye respect unto the sins and offences of men. There is, indeed, this difference betwixt them, that justice is ascribed to God properly as a habit, or an habitual perfection; mercy analogically and reductively as an affection. And, therefore, mercy in God is not accompanied with that sympathy and condolency which are mixed with it in our human nature. But that natural goodness and benignity, whence God is ready to relieve, whereof his sparing and pardoning are proper effects, are that mercy of God, which he represents to us under the highest expressions of tenderness and compassion; see Ps. ciii.8—14. And in such declarations of himself, he instructs us, what apprehensions we ought to have of his nature, which if it be not gracious and merciful, we are taught by him to err and mistake. So, when God showed unto Moses his glory, and made a declaration of himself by his name, he did it, not by calling aver the free acts of his will, or showing what he would or could do if so be he pleased; but described his nature unto him by the essential properties of it, that the people might know who and what he was with whom they had to do, Exod. xxxivy. 6, 7. And yet among them is that mercy reckoned, which is exerted in the pardoning of iniquity, transgression, and sin. The same is to be said concerning the justice of God. For this vindictive justice is nothing but the absolute rectitude of the nature of God, with respect to some outward objects, namely sin and sinners. Had there, indeed, never been any sin or sinners, God could not in any outward acts have exercised either vindictive justice or sparing mercy; but yet he had been notwithstanding eternally just and merciful.

And there is this difference between the justice and mercy of God on the one hand, and his power and wisdom on the other; that these latter being absolutely properties of the divine nature, without respect to any other thing, do constitute their own objects; so that in all the works of God, he doth not only not act against them, but he cannot act without them, for all that he doth, must necessarily be done with infinite power and wisdom. But for the other, they cannot outwardly exert nor act themselves, but towards objects antecedently qualified; whence it is enough that God neither doth nor can do any thing against them. And this he cannot do; for, secondly, [t is weakly pleaded, that if God be merciful, he cannot punish any sin. For to punish sin absolutely, is no way contrary to mercy. If it were, then every one who correcteth or punisheth any for sin, must needs be unmerciful. Nor is it contrary to justice to pardon sin, where satisfaction is made for it, without which God neither doth nor can pardon any sin, and that for this reason, namely, that it is contrary to his justice so todo. Thirdly. Whence God is said to pardon sin in his righteousness, or because he is righteous, hath been declared before. His faithfulness in his promises, with respect unto the mediation of Jesus Christ is so called, which our adversaries cannot deny.