Sermons on the Song of Songs

OF THE SIMILARITY AND LIKENESS OF THE SOUL TO THE WORD, IN RESPECT OF ITS IDENTITY OF ESSENCE, ITS IMMORTALITY OF EXISTENCE, AND ITS FREEDOM OF WILL.

IT was not without good reason that the inquiry was made in the last discourse, what affinity there was between the human soul and the Word. For what can there be in common between a Majesty so great and a poverty so extreme, that a greatness which is so exalted and a lowliness so humble should be said to be associated, as if upon an equality, in the manner and with the love of a pair who are espoused to each other? For if we assert this with truth, then great is the reason for rejoicing and confidence; but if falsely, then ours is an audacity to be greatly punished. And therefore it was necessary to inquire what was the affinity between these two, which, indeed, we have already ascertained in many respects, but not altogether. For who is so undiscerning as not to see the correspondence between the image and that which is formed after the pattern of that image? We have shown in the sermon of yesterday, if you remember, both that the Word is the Image of God and that the soul is made in that image. And we have proved in that also the close relation between the soul and that Image of God, since not only is it made in that image, but also after the likeness of it. But we have not yet declared in every particular that in which this likeness principally consists. Let us now address ourselves to this task, so that the soul, recognising more fully what its origin is, may be filled with a noble shame to degenerate from it by an unworthy manner of living, or, rather, that it may study with earnest care what it shall recognise as being corrupted in itself by sin, and thus ruling itself by the help of God in a manner worthy of its origin, may be enabled to draw near with modest confidence to communion with the ^ ord.

2. Let it recognise, then, that from this original Divine likeness it draws a natural simplicity of substance, by which to be is to it the same as to live, although not always to live well or happily; and in this it has a likeness to the Image of the Word, though not an equality with It. This is a degree of relationship, but only a degree. That to live should be synonymous with living in perfect goodness and happiness is the supreme height of moral greatness, and to this height it does not attain. If, then, the Word, because of His greatness, has this unique prerogative, and the soul, because of its likeness to the Word, has the attribute that for it to exist is to have life, though it does not attain to the lofty perfectness of the Word, yet the affinity of natures, and the privilege of the soul, are manifest herein. To express this more clearly: It is in God alone that * to live ' is the same as * to live in perfect goodness and happiness,' and He is the Essence

absolutely pure and absolutely Eternal. The second degree is that in which 'to exist is to have life'; this is the condition of the soul, and this is to be like unto God. From that degree, though a lower one, it is possible to ascend, not only to the life of goodness, but also to that of happiness; not that, even for the soul that has attained to it, existence and goodness are one and the same, because, although the Word glorifies it by His likeness, the disparity that ever exists between Him and it obliges it to say: Lord, who is like unto Thee? (Ps. xxxv. 10). Yet it is for the soul a promotion of extreme value, because from it, and from it alone, is it possible to ascend unto the life of blessedness.

3. There are two classes of beings which have life: those who are conscious of it, and those who are not conscious. The former rank above the latter, and above both the one and the other are those in whom life and thought are the same. Life, and that which lives, are not in the same degree; much less are life, and those which live not. Life is, indeed, the soul which is living; but it lives not other whence than from itself, and on this account we speak of it with propriety, not so much as living as being itself life. Thus it follows that the soul, when infused into a body, gives life to it; but that body does not, by the presence of life in it, become itself life, but living. From whence it clearly.appears that it is not the same thing even to a living body to exist and to live, since it may exist and yet not live. Much less shall those things which are without life rise into this rank. It does not even follow that everything which is said to have life, or which has it in fact, will be able forthwith to attain to this point There is a life of the lower animals, and a life of trees; the former has consciousness, the latter is without it. Yet in neither is it the same thing to exist and to live, since, according to the opinion of many persons,1 their life has been in the elements before it was in the limbs of the one class, or the branches of the other. And, according to this view, when their life ceases to animate them, they cease to live, but they do not cease to exist. They are equally unloosed and dissolved, as if they were not merely bound together, but intertwined.2 For the life of these things is not simple in its nature, but compounded out of many elements. And therefore it is not reduced to nothingness, but separated into parts, of which each returns to that whence it had its origin; for example, that which is of an airy nature to the air, that of a fiery nature to the fire, and the rest in like manner. To this kind of life, then, it is by no means the same thing to exist and to live, since when it does not live, it still exists.

4. Now, none of these things in which that is the case, can ever progress or rise into that higher life of goodness and blessedness, since they have not been able to attain even that grade which is below it. The soul of man alone can reach that higher life, inasmuch as it is seen to have been constituted as life by Him who is the Life, simple [in its nature], by Him who is simple in His Essence, as He is Infinite, and immortal by Him who is Immortal; so that it is not far from the supreme degree in which existence is identical with perfect happiness, in which He dwells for ever who alone is infinitely Blessed and infinitely Powerful, who is King of kings and Lord of lords. The soul, then, has received, by the condition in which it is, the power of attaining blessedness, though it is not now blessed; and to that supreme grade it is advancing as much as it is able to do, yet without reaching it. For, as we have already said, even when it shall attain blessedness, yet that blessedness will not be to it the same thing as its life. We allow to it a resemblance; we deny to it equality. For example, God is Life; the soul also is life; it is, then, like unto God, but it is not equal to Him. It is like unto Him, because it is life; and its life is in itself, because it is not only living, but also lifegiving (vivens, vknficans\ as also He is Himself all these things. But yet to Him it is unequal, inasmuch as a creature is unequal to its Creator. It is wholly unequal, inasmuch as neither would it have existed if it had not been created by Him, nor would it live unless He bestowed life upon it. It would not live, I say; that is, in the spiritual life, not the natural. For it lives immortally in the natural life, and that necessarily, even though spiritually it does not live. But of what kind is that life, in which it would be better not to have been born, than not to have the power to die? It is rather death than life, and that a death the more cruel, as it is the effect of sin, not of nature. For the death of the wicked is very evil (Ps. xxxiv. 22, Douay). The soul, then, which lives according to the flesh is dead while it lives, since it were good for it not to live at all rather than to live in such a manner. And, indeed, from that living death it can have no resurrection ever, except through the word of life; or, rather, through Him who is the Word, who is the Life, and bestows life.

5. But, farther, the soul is immortal; and in this respect also it is like unto the Word, but not equal to Him. For the immortality of the Divine Nature is so far above, and surpassing every other, that the Apostle says of God: Who only hath immortality (1 Tim. vi. 16). Which is spoken of Him, as I think, because He alone is unchangeable in and by His Nature who says \ I am the Lord; J change not (Mai. iii. 6). For the immortality which is true and perfect is no more susceptible of change than it is of ending, since every change is a likeness of death, and an anticipation of it. Everything which changes, in passing from one state to another, necessarily dies, so to speak, to that which it is, in order to begin to be that which it is not If, then, there are as many deaths as there are changes, where is the immortality? And to this vanity everything created is made subject, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath subjected the same in hope (Rom. viii. 20). And yet the soul is immortal, because its life is in itself, and as it cannot fall away from itself, so it cannot fall away from its life. But since it is plain that in thoughts and feelings it is subject to change, while it recognises in its immortality its likeness to God, it ought also to recognise how far, indeed, it falls short in comparison with Him to whom alone complete and perfect immortality belongs, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning (James i. 17). Yet the present discussion has shown that the dignity of 'the soul is by no means small, since it appears to draw near to the nature of the Word in two respects: in the simplicity of its essence, and the endlessness of its life.

6. But there is still another resemblance which occurs to me, and which I will by no means pass over, for it contributes no less than the other particulars to the greatness of the soul, and perhaps renders it even more like unto the Word. This is Freedom of the Will, a quality plainly Divine, and which shines forth in the soul like a jewel set in gold. It is by this that there is in the soul the power of distinguishing and the freedom of choosing between good and evil, that is, between life and death, between light and darkness, and other things similarly opposed, which present themselves before the consciousness of the soul. That eye of the soul is a close discerner and authoritative judge between opposed alternatives; as a clear-sighted observer it discerns, as a free and independent judge it decides. On this account its decision is said to be free, because it is open to be influenced by the determination of the will, and can carry out the decision when made, into action. Thence also is man capable of merit. For every action done by you, and which you were free to do or to leave undone, is rightly imputed to you for merit or demerit, according as it is good or evil. And as a person is rightly praised, both he who, having it in his power to do evil, has not done it, and he who, being free not to do good, has, nevertheless, done it; so also a person is justly blamed who, being able not to do evil actions, has done them, or to do good ones, has not done them. For where there is no liberty of action there is no merit. On this account it is that animals, which are without reason, have likewise no merit, because they are wanting both in freedom [of will] and in the power of deliberation and judgment. They are directed by the leadings of their senses, carried away by their impulses, and are under l\ dominion of their appetites. For they have not the power of judgment, by which to reflect upon their actions or control them; nor, indeed, have they the faculty of forming a judgment, that is, reason; and they are not judged, because they are not capable of forming a judgment. How can creatures who have not received the gift of reason be reasonably called to account for their actions?

7. Man alone is not put under a constraint by his nature, and therefore man alone among living beings is free. And yet he also, by the intervention of sin, suffers a kind of violent constraint; but this arises not from his nature, but from his own will, and he is not thereby deprived of the liberty which is natural to him. For that which is done voluntarily is done freely. And, indeed, it is by sin if is brought about that the corruptible body weighs upon the soul; but this is not by its own weight, but by its love for that which is amiss. For that the soul which was capable of falling by its own action is not capable of rising again by its own action is the fault of the will, which, being weakened and prostrated by the corrupted and vicious affections of the corrupt body, is no longer capable of an equal love for righteousness. And thus, I know not how, it happens that the will, having fallen by sin into a state so changed and miserable, imposes upon itself a strange and sad necessity, and that of such a kind, that being voluntary, it forms no excuse for the will, while the will, being led away by the false good which attracts it, has no power of resisting the necessity, a voluntary necessity, if it may be so called. For there is a pleasing violence, which overcomes by flattering, and flatters while overcoming; and then the will, become a traitor to itself, and having once consented to that which is evil, is no longer able to free itself by its own strength, yet can found no reasonable excuse upon its own weakness. From thence comes that complaint of one who groaned under the yoke of that necessity: O Lord^ I am oppressed: undertake for me (Is. xxxviii. 14). But knowing, on the other hand, that he could not justly make complaint against the Lord, when it was his own will that was in fault, take notice of what he adds: What shall I say, or what shall He answer for me, when I myself have done it P1 He was weighed down by a heavy yoke, but it was the yoke of a voluntary servitude; and that servitude excited pity, but the assent of his will to it rendered it inexcusable. For it was the will which, when it was free, made itself the slave of sin by consenting to sin, and it was also the will which, by submitting itself to sin, made the servitude a willing one.

8. Some one, perhaps, will thus reply to me: 4 Take heed of what you say. Do you call that voluntary, which it is plain to all the world is done under constraint? It is true that the will has rendered itself subject, but it does not remain in that state of subjection willingly; it is held captive in spite of itself.' Very good; you allow at least that it is held captive. But consider that it is the will of which you say this. Do you assert, then, that the will is not willing? But the will is not constrained against itself. It is not will at all unless it wills. The word expresses the action of one who exercises a power of determining, not of one who has no such power to exercise. If the will is constrained willingly it constrains itself. What, then, shall it answer, or what excuse shall it make to God, since its action is its own? What has it done? It has made itself a servant. Wherefore it is said: Whosoever eommitteth sin is the servant of sin (John viii. 34). On this account, when it has sinned (and it has sinned when it has determined to obey a sinful impulse) it has made itself a servant of sin. But it becomes free if it no longer does the bidding of sin. But while it chooses to abide in the same servitude it goes on following the temptation to sin. Yet it is not retained in bondage unwillingly, from the very fact that it is the will. If, then, it has made itself a slave voluntarily, it is also voluntarily that it remains in its bondage. What, then, shall it reply in excuse for itself, since its servitude (and this is always to be borne in mind) has been, and is, its own doing.

9. ' But you will not make me disbelieve ' (says an objector) ' in the necessity under which I labour, which I experience in my own self, and against which I continually struggle.' Where, then, I ask, do you feel this constraint? Is it not in your will? You do ndt, then, will with too little strength what you will of necessity. You will strongly what you are unable not to will, whatever strength of resistance you exert. Now, where there is the power to will, there is liberty. And in saying this I refer to the liberty which is by nature, not that which is spiritual and by grace; namely, that liberty wherewith, as says the Apostle, Christ hath made us free (Gal. v. i). And the same Apostle, speaking of that liberty, says: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty (2 Cor. iii. 17). It is thus that the soul is at the same time free, and enslaved by this necessity which, as unhappily as strangely, is voluntarily incurred; free, by the possession of the power of will, and enslaved, by the pressure of necessity. And farther, which is at once stranger and more deplorable, it is guilty because it is free, and a slave because it is guilty; and thus by a strange paradox is a slave because it is free. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from this servitude so shameful? Unhappy I am indeed; but I am free. Free, because I am a man; unhappy, because a slave. Free, because I am in the likeness of God; unhappy, because I am contrary to Him. O Thou Preserver of men! why hast Thou set me as a mark against Thee? (Job vii. 20). For indeed Thou hast in a sense done that, the doing of which Thou hast not hindered. But, in other respects, it is I who have set myself where I am, so that I am a burden to myself {Ibid,). It is indeed most just and right that he who is Thy enemy should be mine also, and that he who opposes Thee should oppose me too. In truth, I have become contrary to Thee and to my own self also, and I find in my members a revolt against my own soul and against Thy law. Who shall set me free from my own hands? That which I would, that do I not; and it is not another person, but my own self, who hinders me. So also that which I hate, that do I; and it is no other person, but my own self, who obliges me to do it. I would that this prevention on the one hand, and this compulsion on the other, were so violent that my actions ceased to be voluntary, for then perhaps I might be excused; or that it were so far voluntary that it was not violent, for so perhaps I might be corrected. But now no opening for escape appears on either side for me unhappy, whom, on the one hand, the assent of my will renders, as I have said, inexcusable; and on the other, necessity renders incapable of being corrected. Who shall deliver me from the hands of a sinner, from the hand of the unrighteous and cruel man? (Ps. lxxi. 4).

i a Someone asks me, perhaps, * Of whom am I complaining?7 Of myself It is I who am that sinner, that man unrighteous and cruel. A sinner I am, for I have, in fact, sinned; and unrighteous, because I persist voluntarily in violating the law of righteousness. For my will itself is as a law in my members warring against the Divine Law. And because the Law of the Lord is of right a law unto my soul, as it is written: The Law of his God is in his heart (Ps. xxxvii. 31), for that very reason it is that my will is found in opposition to my own self, which is the height of iniquity. For to whom am I not unjust, when I am unjust to myself? ' He that is evil to himself,' it is said, 'to whom will he be good? (Ecclus. xiv. 5). I am not good, I confess, [even to myself], for in me is no good thing. Yet I am consoled for this, because even a saint said: / know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelUth no good thing (Rom. vii. 18). Nevertheless he makes a distinction when he says, in himself, and explains that he means, ' in his flesh/ because of the law of contradiction [to the Law of God], which is in it. For that better law is also in the soul. Is not the Law of God good? If, then, he is evil, because of the law of evil which is in him, why is he not good by reason of the law of good which is in him likewise? Will you say that the law of evil is his own because it is in his flesh, and that therefore he is evil because his law is evil, and not also that he is good because of a law which is good? That cannot be the case. The Law of God is in his soul, and so in his soul as to be the law of his soul. He is a witness of this, who says: / see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind (Rom. vii. 23). Is that his which is in his flesh, and not that which is in his soul? I say that it is his even more. Why should I not say what the same master of the spiritual life says: With the mind (that is, following the impulse of the spirit which is myself) / myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin (vii. 25). He shows very clearly by those words, which law he regards as being his own, since he considers the evil which is in his flesh as being alien to him, for he says: // is no more I that do it [the evil], but sin that dtvelleth in me (vii. 20). And it is perhaps for that very reason that he has declared expressly that he found another law in his members, because he regarded it as foreign to him, and coming from without. Therefore I venture (yet not, I think, rashly) to add something more, that St. Paul was not a sinner on account of the evil which he had in his flesh; but rather good on account of the good which he had in his soul. Is he not good who consents unto the law of God, that it is good? For although he confesses that he is in captivity to the law of sin, this he does in the flesh, not in the soul. For with the mind he senses the law of God, though with the flesh the law of sin, and which of these two ought the rather to be attributed to St. Paul, you can easily judge. For my part, I confess that I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that that which was of the spirit was more truly his than that which was of the flesh; and this is not my belief alone, but it was that of St Paul himself, as is shown by what he has said, which I have quoted above: If I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me, 11. This will suffice respecting liberty. In the treatise which I have written on Grace and Free Will you will perhaps find other points discussed, in which the soul is made after the image and likeness of God; but nothing, 1 think, contrary to what is said here. That treatise you have read, and what has just now been said you have heard; which of the two you rather approve I leave to your judgment, and if there is anything in either which approves itself to you, in this I rejoice and will rejoice. However that may be, you will bear in mind that we have remarked upon three great qualities as distinguishing the nature of the soul: its simplicity of substance, its immortality, and its liberty of will. And I think that it will appear very clear to you that the soul, by these three points of resemblance in the qualities which are its birthright and are natural to it, has no small affinity to the Word, the Bridegroom of the Church, Jesus Christ our Lord, who is above all, God blessed for ever. Amen.