The Lord of Glory; Counterfeit Miracles; Revelation and Inspiration

teristic of the letters bearing the name of Paul. It is at least not beyond the limits of possibility that another such instance occurs in iv. 7: ‘‘saying in David.’”’ No doubt, ‘‘in David,’ may be taken here, as Dr. Westcott takes it, as meaning ‘“‘in the person of David,” i. e., through his prophetic utterances; but it seems, on the whole, much more natural to take it as parallel to év 77 BiBAw Mwvaéws (Mark xii. 26), €v TQ ‘Qoné (Rom. ix. 25), and as meaning ‘‘in the book of David ” 8 — exhibiting the consciousness of the author that he is quoting not merely ‘‘God,” but God in the written Scripture — written by the hand of men. This is the more worth insisting on that it is really not absolutely certain that the subject of the \éywy here is immediately ‘‘God”’ at all. There is no subject expressed either for it or the opife on which it depends; and when we go back in the context for an express subject it eludes us, and we shall not find it until we arrive at the ‘‘even as the Holy Ghost saith” of iu. 7. From that point on, we have a series of quotations, introduced, quite in the manner of Philo, with formule which puzzle us as to their reference — whether to God, who is the general subject of the whole context, or to Scripture, conceived as the voice of God (e. g., ili. 15, & 7T@ NEyeoOar — by whom? God? or ‘‘the Scripture” already quoted? iv. 4, elonkey — who? God? or Scripture? iv. 5, kal & TovTw wadwy). Something of the same kind meets us in the eighth chapter, where quite in the manner of Philo, we begin at ver. 5: ‘‘Hven as Moses was oracularly warned when about to make the tabernacle, for ‘see,’ dyciv, etc.’’ and proceed at ver. 8, with a subjectless \éye, to close with ver. 13 with an equally subjectless év 7@ eye. It certainly is not obvious that the subject to be supplied to these three verbs is ‘‘God”’ rather than ‘‘oracular Scripture.”’

One can but feel that with a due regard to these two classes of neglected facts, a somewhat broader comparison of the usage of the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of those letters that bear the name of Paul would not leave an impression of such sharp and indubitable divergence in point of view as Dr. Westcott’s statement is apt to suggest. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the verb Aéyw is used to introduce citations, (1) with expressed subject: 1. 6, ‘‘ But someone somewhere hath borne witness, saying....’’; 111. 7, ‘‘ Even as the Holy Ghost saith....’’; vi. 14, ‘‘God....sware by himself, saying....’’: (2) with subject to be supplied from the preceding context: 1. 6, ‘‘And when he (God) again bringeth in the firstborn into the world, he saith....”5;1. 7, ‘“And of the angels he (God) saith....’’; 11. 12, ‘‘ He (Christ) is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying....’’; v. 6, ‘‘As he (God) saith also in another place....’’: (3) with subject to be supplied from the general knowledge of the reader: x. 5, ‘“Wherefore when he (Christ) cometh into the world, he saith 2.2.27 x: 8) 4) Sayings (Chist).abovers: sass) eee ‘‘But now hath he (God) promised, saying....’’: (4) without obvious subject: ii. 15, ‘‘ While it is said, To day, ete.” (by whom? God? or the Scripture quoted, iil. 7 seqg.?); iv. 7, “‘He [ or it? ] again defineth a certain time, saying in David....”; vii. 8, ‘For finding fault with them, he [or it?] saith....” (ef. viii. 13, ‘‘in that he [or it?] saith....’’). On the other hand, in the epistles that bear the name of Paul we may distinguish some four cases of the adduction of Scripture by the formula déyer. (1) Sometimes, quoting Scripture as a divine whole, the formula runs 7 ypad7 Aeyer or A€yet 7 Ypad7: Rom. iv. 8, 1x. 17 (Aéyer 7 ypadn 7G Papaw®), xi. 2 (7 ypady év ‘Hyeia), Gal. iv. 30, I Tim. v. 18. (2) Sometimes it is adduced by the name of the author: Aaveié Néyet, Rom. iv. 6, xi. 9; “Hoaias \éyer, Rom. x. 16, 20, xv. 12. (8) Sometimes it is quoted by its contents: 6 vowos N€yer, Rom. ili. 19, vii. 7, I Cor. ix. 8, 10, xiv. 34; the righteousness that is of faith \éyet, Rom. x. 6 (ef. ver. 10); 6 xpnuariouds Neyer, Rom. xi. 4. (4) Sometimes it is adduced by the verb Aéyer without expressed subject. (A) In some of these cases the subject is plainly indicated in the preceding context: Rom. ix. 25 = ‘‘God,” from ver. 22; x. 10 = ‘‘the righteousness of faith,” (?) from ver. 6; x. 21 = ber set DORR LURE SAYS: i GOD SAYS 309

When we glance over these two lists of phenomena we shall certainly recognize a difference between them: but the difference is not suggestive of such an extreme distinction as Dr. Westcott appears to indicate. The fact is that for its proper estimation we must rise to a higher viewpoint and look upon the two lists in the light of a much larger fact. For we cannot safely study this difference of usage as an isolated phenomenon: and we shall get the key to its interpretation into our hands only when. we correlate it with a more general view of the estimate of Scripture and mode of adducing Scripture prevalent at the time and in the circles which are represented by these epistles. Dr. Westcott already points the way to this wider outlook, when at the end of his discussion he adds these words:

“The method of citation on which we have dwelt is peculiar to the Epistle [to the Hebrews] among the writings of the New Testament; but it is interesting to notice that there is in the Epistle of Clement a partial correspondence with it. Clement generally quotes the LXX. anonymously. He attributes the prophetic words to God (15, 21, 46), to Christ (16, 22), to the Holy Word (13, 56), to the Holy Spirit (13, 16). But he also, though rarely, refers to the writers (26, Job; 52, David), and to Books (57, Proverbs, ‘the all virtuous Wisdom’), and not unfrequently uses the familiar form yéyparra: (14, 39, etc.). The quotations in the Epistle of Barnabas are also commonly anonymous, but Barnabas mentions several names of the sacred writers, and gives passages from the Law, the Prophets and the Psalms with the formula, ‘the Prophet saith’ (vi. 8; 2; 4, 6).”’

And, he should have added, Barnabas also repeatedly adduces what he held to be the Word of God with the formulas yéypamrau (iv. 3, 14, v. 2, xi. 1, xiv. 6, xv. 1, xvi. 6) and Aéyer h ypady (iv. 7, 11, v. 4, vi. 12, xiil. 2, xv. 5): and indeed passes from the one mode of citation to the other without the least jar, as, for example, in chap. v.: ‘‘ For zt 1s written concerning him, some things indeed with respect to Israel, and some with respect to us. For 2 saith this (Isa. lil. 5, 7)..... And the Scripture saith (Prov. 1. 17).... And still also this (Jer. 1. 25) Serie For God saith (Zech. xii. 6)..... For the prophesier SAL Esaki e2ls ebCy) een And again it savth (Isa. |. 6).”’ Though adverting thus to these facts, however, Dr. Westcott quite misses their significance. What they mean is shortly this: that the two modes of citing Scripture thought to distinguish Hebrews and the letters that bear the name of Paul, do not imply well-marked distinctive modes of conceiving Scripture; but coéxist readily within the limits of one brief letter, like the letter of Clement or that of Barnabas. No wonder, when laid side by side, we found the usages of the two to present no sharply marked division line, but to crumble into one another along the edges. And when we look beyond Clement and Barnabas and take a general glance over the literature of the time, it is easily seen that we are looking in the two cases only at two fragments of one fact, and are seeing in each only one of the everywhere current methods of citing Scripture as the very Word of God. It seems inconceivable that one could rise from reading, say, twenty pages of Philo, for example, without being fully convinced of this.

Philo’s fundamental conception of Scripture is that it is a book of oracles; each passage of it is a xpyouds or \Oyuor, and the whole is therefore ot xpnopoi or Ta \Oyta: he currently quotes it, accordingly, as ‘‘the living voice” of God, and whole treatises of his may be read without meeting with a single citation introduced by yéypamrac or with the Scriptures once called 7 ypadn. Nevertheless, when occasion serves, he adduces Scripture readily enough as % ypadn, and cites it with yéypamrac, and calls it Ta ypauuara. We have no more reason for assuming that such modes of citing Scripture would have been foreign to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (whose mode of citing Scripture is markedly Philonic) than we have for assuming that the author of the tract de Mutatione Nominum, in which they do not occur, but where Scripture is almost exclusively of xpyouot, or the author of the tracts de Somniis, where again they do not occur, but where Scripture is almost exclusively 6 iepdos (or @ Getos) NOyos (i. 14, 22, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, ii. 4, 9, 37, etc.; 1. 33, 1. 37) — which designations are rare again in de Mutatione Nominum (6 6. X., 20; 6t. X., 838) — held a different conception of Scripture from the author of the tract de Legatione ad Caium (§ 29) or the tract de Abrahamo (§ 1), in which the Scriptures are spoken of as Ta ypadupara or ai ypagdat. There is no reason, in a word, why, if the Epistle to the Hebrews had contained even a single other verse, it might not have presented the ‘‘exotic,’”’ 7 ypag@7 or yéypartat. Because Philo or the author of this Epistle was especially accustomed to look on Scripture as a body of oracles and to cite it accordingly, is no reason why he should forget that it is a body of written oracles and be incapable on occasion of citing it from that point of view. Similarly because Paul ordinarily cites Scripture as written is no reason why he should not be firmly convinced that what is written in it is oracles, or should not occasionally cite it from that point of view. In a word, the two modes of citing Scripture brought into contrast by Bishop Westcott are not two mutually exclusive ways of citing Scripture, but two mutually complementary methods. The use of the one by any writer does not argue that the other is foreign to him; if we have enough written material from his hand, we are sure rather to find in him traces of the other usage also. This is the meaning of the presence in the Epistle to the Hebrews of suggestive instances of an approach to the citation of Scripture as a document: and of the presence in the epistles bearing the name of Paul of instances of modes of citation which hint of his conception of Scripture as an oracular book. Where and when the sense of the oracular character of the source of the quotation is predominatingly in mind it tends to be quoted with the simple @yai or Aéyer, with the implication that it is God that says it: this is most richly exhibited in Philo, and, within the limits of the New Testament, most prevailingly in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Where and when, on the other hand, the consciousness that it is from a written source that the authoritative words are drawn is predominant in the mind, it tends to be quoted with the simple yéypamrrat or the more formal 7 ypad7 eye: this is the mode in which it is most commonly cited in the epistles that bear the name of Paul. Both modes of citation rest on the common consciousness of the Divine authority of the matter cited, and have no tendency to exclude one another: they appear side by side in the same writer, and must be held to predominate variously in different writers only according to their prevailing habits of speaking of Scripture, and at different times in the same writer according as the circumstances under which he was writing threw the emphasis in his mind temporarily upon the Scriptures as written oracles or as written oracles.

From this point of view we may estimate Dr. Westcott’s remark: ‘‘Nor can it be maintained that the difference of usage is to be explained by the difference of readers, as being [in Hebrews] Jews, for in the Gospels yéyparrat is the common formula (nine times in St. Matthew).’’ This remark, like his whole treatment of the subject, seems conceived in a spirit which is too hard and narrow, too drily statistical. No one, doubtless, would contend that the difference of readers directly produced the difference of usage, as if the Scriptures must be quoted to Jews as ‘‘oracles of God,” and to Gentiles as ‘‘ written documents.’’ But it is far from obvious that the difference of readers may not, after all, have had very much to do with the prevalence of the one mode of citation in the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the other in the epistles that bear the name of Paul. The Jews were certainly accustomed to the current citation of the Scriptures as the living voice of God in oracular deliverances —

as the usage of Philo sufficiently indicates: and it may be that this was subtly felt the most impressive method of adducing the words of the Holy Book when addressing Jews. On the other hand, the heathen were accustomed to authoritative documents, cited currently, with an implication of their authority, by the formula yéypamrar: % and it may well be that this subtly suggested itself as the most telling way of adducing Scripture as authoritative law to the Gentiles. We need not ride such a notion too hard: but it at least seems far from inconceivable that the selfsame writer, addressing, on the one hand, a body of devout Jews, and, on the other, a body of law-loving Romans, might find himself using almost unconsciously modes of adducing Scripture suggestive, in the one case, of loving awe in its presence and, in the other, of its binding authority over the conscience. Be this as it may, however, it is quite clear that the fact that Paul ordinarily adduces Scripture with ‘‘the forms (kaéas) yéypamra (sixteen times in the Epistle to the Romans), 7 ypapdy) Neyer, and the like, which never occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews,’’ implies no far-reaching difference of conception on his part from that exhibited by that Epistle, as to the fundamental character of the Scriptures as an oracular book — which, on the contrary, is just what he calls them (Rom. i. 2) — and certainly raises no presumption against his occasionally quoting them as an oracular book with the formula so characteristic of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 6 feos N€vyer, or its equivalents. And the fact that ‘‘Paul not unfrequently quotes the words of God as ‘Scripture’ simply (e. g., Rom. ix. 17)” so far from raising a presumption that he would not quote ‘‘Scripture”’ as ‘‘ words of God,” actually demonstrates the contrary, as it only in another way indicates the identification on his part of the written word with the voice of the speaking God.

If we approach the study of such texts as Eph. iv. 8, v.

14, therefore, from the point of view of the Pauline conception of Scripture, there is no reason why they should not be understood as adducing Scripture with a high ‘‘God says.” To say that ‘‘ we have reason to believe” that such a formula ‘could not be used by Paul,’’ is as wide of the mark as could well be. To say that it is a formula more in accordance with the point of view of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is to confound mere occasional differences in usage with fundamental differences in conception. To Paul, too, the Scriptures are a book of oracles, and though he cites them ordinarily as written oracles there is no reason why he should not occasionally cite them merely as oracles. And in any case, whether we take the subauditum in such passages as ‘‘God,” or ‘‘Seripture,’’ or prefer to render simply by ‘‘it,’’ from Paul’s point of view the meaning is all one: in any case, Scripture is to him the authoritative dictum of God and what it says is adduced as the authoritative word that ends all strife.

In seeking to estimate the likelihoods as to the meaning of such a locution as the 6 \éyer of Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, we should not lose from sight, on the other hand, the fact that the Greek language was not partial to true ‘‘impersonals,”’ that is, absolutely indefinite uses of its verbs. Says Jelf:

‘“‘Of impersonal verbs (in English, verbs with the indefinite zt) the Greek language has but few.”’ *°

“Impersonal verbs, by which we understand a verb agreeing with the indefinite pronoun zt, are not known to the Greek language: for expressions like det, xp7... A€yerar, etc.... the Greek always conceived as personal, in that the infinitive or subjoined sentence was considered the subject of these verbs.”’ *!

No doubt, the subject often suffers ellipsis — especially when it may be counted upon readily to suggest itself, either out

PLUG SAYS eo ORTPTURE SAYS 77h GODsSAYS 7 315 of the predicate itself, or out of the context, or out of the knowledge of the reader: and no doubt this implied subject is sometimes the indefinite 71s. But it remains true that as yet there has turned up no single instance in all Greek literature of \éyer in the purely indefinite sense of ‘‘someone says,’’ equivalent to ‘‘it is said”’ in the meaning of general rumor, or of a common proverb, or a current saying; and though there have been pointed out instances of something like this in the case of the kindred word ¢yot, it still remains somewhat doubtful precisely how they are to be interpreted. The forms commonly used to express this idea are either the expressed tis, or the third person plural, as déyouvct, dact, ovowafovow, or the third person singular passive, as Aéyerat, or the second person singular optative or indicative of the historical tenses, as dains av, = dicas, or the like.”

We find it, indeed, occasionally asserted that onct is used sometimes or frequently as a pure impersonal, in the sense of ‘it is said.”’ The passage from Bernhardy, to be sure, to which reference has been made in support of this assertion, by more than one of the commentators adduced above, has its primary interest not in this point, but in the different one of the use of the singular ¢@nai for the plural — like the Latin nquit, and the English ‘‘says”’ in that vulgar colloquial locution in which it is made to do duty not only in the form ‘‘he says,” but also in such forms as ‘‘I says” and ‘‘you says,’ and even ‘‘they says” and ‘‘we says.’’ What Bernhardy remarks is: *

“The rhetorical employment of the singular for the plural rests on the Greek peculiarity (K. 3, 5; 6, 13c.) of clearly conceiving and representing the multitude by means of the individual. A ready instance of this is supplied by the formula ¢nzi, like the Latin znquzt an expression for all persons and numbers for designating an indefinite speaker (den beliebigen Redner) — ‘heisst es’; and by the more classic eiwé wou in appeal to the multitude in Attic life, Arist. (as Pac., 385, eimé you ri

The usage of noi here more particularly adverted to — for all numbers and persons — seems a not uncommon one. Instances may possibly be found in the “‘ Discourses”’ of Epictetus i. 29, 34 (Schenkl, p.95). ‘‘ Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men: ‘ He cannot lift me,’ dyat,’’ where onat might perhaps be rendered by our vernacular, ‘‘says they,”’ referring to ‘‘the athletes.’’ Again, iv. 9, 15 (Schenkl, p. 383): “But learn from what the trainers of boys do. The boy has fallen: ‘Rise,’ dai, ‘wrestle again, till you become strong!’”’ where we may possibly have another ‘says they,’ viz., the trainers. Possibly again i. 10, 20 (Schenkl, p. 133), ‘‘But consider, if you refer everything to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in your opinion damaged. ‘ Yes,’ oynot, ‘for he is mutilated in his body,’’’ where possibly gyi is ‘‘says you,” referring to the collocutor, addressed in the preceding context in the second person — though, no doubt, another explanation is here possible. Indeed, in no one of the instances cited is it impossible to conceive a singular subject derived from the contextual plural as specially in mind. If dyot were genuine in Wisdom xv. 12,*° II Cor. x. 10,** these might well supply other instances — the ‘‘says they ”’ in each case continuing the contextual or implicated plural. But in none of these instances, it is to be observed, would the subject be conceived as in the strict sense ‘‘indefinite.’”’ It is a formula of adduction, without reference to the number of those speaking. See Winer (804).”’ Cf. above, p. 289.

perfectly definite subject that is present to the mind of the writer, given either in the immediate context or in the thorough understanding that exists between the writer and reader. There is in them nothing whatever of the vagueness that attaches to the French ‘‘on dit,’’ or the German ‘‘man sagt,” or the English ‘‘it is said.’’? The Greeks had other locutions for expressing this idea, and if it was ever expressed by the simple ¢yat, only the slightest traces of it remain in their extant literature.

In the seventh edition of the Greek Lexicon of Liddell & Scott,>” nevertheless, this usage is expressly assigned to @yat. We read:

It is far from obvious, however, that the passages here adduced will justify precisely the usage which they are cited to illustrate. In the passage from Demosthenes — éoTw, dnoiv, vrep a’tod 7 a’T? TLiuwpia, etc. — it seems to be quite clear, as the previous sentence suggests and the editors recognize,® that the subject of the dyct is éxaoros Tay yeypadorwr, and is far from a purely indefinite 7us. The passage from Plutarch (‘“Consolatio ad Apollonium,” xxi) is more specious. It runs: GN’ ob yap HATiCov, nol, TavTa TelcecBaL, ovdE TpoTEdOKWN; and is translated in the Latin version, ‘‘ At, inquiunt, preeter spem mihi hic casus et expectationem evenit’’; and in Holland’s old English version, ‘‘ But haply you will say, I never thought that this would have befallen unto me, neither did I so much as doubt any such thing.’’ A glance at the context, however, is enough to show that there is no purely indefinite gyoi here, though it may be that we have here another instance of its usage without regard to number and person. In any case, the subject is the quite definitely conceived interlocutor of the passage. That the éfn adduced at the end of the note as in some degree of the same sort is not an indefinite épn, but has the Clearchus of the immediately preceding context as its subject, is too obvious for remark. Clearchus was present by the request of Cyrus at the trial of Orontes, and when he came out he reported to his friends the manner in which the trial was conducted: ‘‘He said (é6n) that Cyrus began to speak as follows.” It is not by such instances as these that the occurrence of a purely indefinite @yoi can be established.*?

The subjectless ¢nai, to be sure, does occur very thickly scattered over the face of Greek literature, introducing or emphasizing quotations, or adducing objections, or the like: but the ‘‘it’”’ that is to be supplied to it is, ordinarily at least, a quite definite one with its own definite reference perfectly clear. A characteristic instance, often referred to, is that in Demosth., ‘“ Leptin,” § 56: xal yap To. uovy T&v TavTwY adbTa Tour’ &y TH oTHAN YeypamTat, éredn Kovwv, dynoiv, nrevOépwae tovs ’“A@nvaiwy cuupaxovs. — "Eat 6€ tovTo TO ypauma..... ‘ Here F. A. Wolf comments: ‘‘ Absolute ibi interjectum est gonolv, aut, si Mavis, subaudi 6 ypaWas’’; and Schaefer adds: ‘““Subaudi 7 orn.” * It does not appear why we should not render simply “it says’’: but this ‘‘it’’ is so far from an ‘‘‘indefinite’ it” that it has its clear reference to the inscription just mentioned. Perhaps even more instructive is a passage in the third Philippic * of Demosthenes, which runs as follows:

“That such is our present state, you yourselves are witnesses, and need not any testimony from me. That our state in former times was quite opposite to this, I shall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors (ypaupara rdv

89 We are indebted to Prof. S. S. Orris, of Princeton University, for suggestions in preparing this paragraph. He permits us to add that, in his opinion, “onoi is never equivalent to the general, indefinite they say or it is said.”

mpoyovwv), Which they inscribed upon a brazen column (or#Anv) erected in the citadel.... What, then, says the decree (ri obv Neyer TA Yodupara)? ‘Let Arithmius,’ it says (¢nciv), ‘of Zelia, the son of Pythonax, be accounted infamous and an enemy to the Athenians and their allies, both he and all his race.’... The sentence imported somewhat more, for, in the laws importing capital cases, it is enacted (yéypamraz) that ‘when the legal punishment of a man’s crime cannot be inflicted he may be put to death,’ and it was accounted meritorious to kill him. ‘Let not the infamous man,’ saith the law, ‘be permitted to live’ (kat &ruos, pyol, TeOvaTw), intimating that he is free from guilt who executes this sentence (rotro 617) Neyer, Kafapov Tov ToOUTwWY Ta aToKTELVAaVTA

In both eases it is doubtless enough to render ¢yot, ‘‘it says,”’ its function being in each case to call pointed attention to the words quoted: but the ‘‘it”’ is by no means ‘‘indefinite”’ in the sense that its reference was not very definitely conceived. On the second instance of its occurrence Wolf comments: ‘‘s. 6 movikds vouos,”’ * while Schaefer says: *

Pleonastice positum cum yéyparrae praecesserit. Verumtamen

h. |. sensum paulo magis juvat quam ubi post ¢fzov, ef7e, continuo sequitur édnv, eon. Ad dnoi subaudi 6 voyobérns.”’

These instances will supply us with typical examples of the ‘‘absolute”’ @yat; and, in this sense, ‘‘subjectless gnci”’ is of very common occurrence indeed in Greek literature.

But really ‘‘subjectless dyct,’’ i. e., dyot without any implied subject in context or common knowledge, which therefore we must take quite indefinitely, is very rare indeed, if not non-existent. Perhaps one of the most likely instances of such a usage is offered us by a passage in Plutarch’s “ Consolatio ad Apollonium,”’ 34. Holland’s old version of it runs thus: *

“ And verily in regard of him who is now in a blessed estate, it has not been naturall for him to remaine in this life longer than the terme prefixed and limited unto him; but after he had honestly performed

the course of his time, it was needfull and requisit for him to take the way for to returne unto his destinie that called for him to come unto her.”

From this we may at least learn that dyoiv here presented some difficulty, as Holland passes it by unrendered. The common Latin version restores it, reading the last clause thus: ‘‘Sed ita postulabit natura ut hoc expleto fatale quod aiunt iter conficeret, revocante eum jam ad se natura’’; the Greek running thus: ‘‘a\X’ eiraKxTws TovTov éxmA\NoavTe pos THV eluapuerny érravaryew Topelay, Kadovons avThs, dynoliv, On pos éauTnv.”’ The theory of the Latin version obviously is that onotv here is to be taken indefinitely, that is as an index hand pointing to a current designation of death as an entering upon the ‘‘fated journey’’ — 7 eiwapyévn wopeia. This is explained to us by Wyttenbach’s note: ”

““dnotv] non debebat offendere viros doctos. Est ut azt poeta ille unde hoc sumptum est. Videt hoc et Reiskius. Correxi versionem. De Tragici dicto in Animadversibus dicetur.”’

Accordingly, in the Animadversions,* he addresses himself first to showing that the expression here signalized was a current poetical saying — appealing to Plato,® Julian, Philo; and then adds:

49 Phaedo, 401 B. (115): ‘‘in these arrayed, [the soul] is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls (€ué 5 viv Hin Karel, hain av avip tpay.xds, F eiuapuevn).”’ The other passages adduced witness only to the currency of the phrase % eluappern topeia. But the language of both Plutarch and Plato would seem to imply that the “calling” is certainly a part of the quotation.

It does not seem, however, that Wyttenbach would have us read the not here quite indefinitely, as adducing for example a current saying: judging from his own paraphrase this might appear to him as a certain exaggeration of its implication. Its office would seem rather to be to call attention to the words, to which it is adjoined, as quoted, and thus, in the good understanding implied to exist between the writer and his readers, to point definitely to its source: so that it might be a proper note to it to say, ‘‘subaudi 6 TpaylKos, vel 6 months’? — and this might be done with a considerable emphasis on the 6; nay, the actual name of the poet, well known to both writer and reader, though now lost to.us, might equally well be the subauditum, and such, indeed, may be the implication of the subauditum suggested by Wyttenbach: wt art poeta rlle unde hoc scriptum est. Surely, an instance like this is far from a clear case of the absolutely indefinite or even generally undefining use of dyct.

Among the references with which Wyttenbach supports his note, the most promising sends us to Epictetus, whose “Discourses”? abound in the most varied use of @yci, and offer us at the same time one of our most valuable sources of knowledge of the Greek in common use near the times of the apostles.*1 We meet with many instances here which it has been customary to explain as cases of g@yci in a wholly indefinite reference. But the matter is somewhat complicated by the facts that we are not reading here Epictetus’ “ Discourses’”’ pure and simple, but Arrian’s report of them; and that Arrian may exercise his undoubted right to slip in a gynot of his own whenever he specially wishes to keep his readers’ attention fixed upon the fact that they are his master’s words he is setting down, or perhaps even merely out of the abiding sense, on his own part, that he is reporting Epictetus and not writing out of his own mind. When such a ¢not occurs at the beginning of a section it gives no trouble: every reader recognizes it at once as Arrian’s. But when it occurs unexpectedly in the midst of a vivacious discussion, the reader who is not carrying with him the sense of Arrian’s personality, standing behind the Epictetus he is attending to, is very apt to be stumbled by it, and to resort to some explanation of it on the theory that it is Epictetus’ own and is to find its interpretation in the context. An attempt has been made by Schenkl in the index to his edition of Epictetus * to distinguish between the instances in which gynot occurs “‘inter Epicteti verba ab Arriano servata,’’ and those in which it occurs “‘inter Arriani verba.”’ It will be found that most of the instances where it has been thought markedly indefinite in its reference are classed by him in the second group and are thus made very definite indeed — the standing subauditum being ‘‘Epictetus.’’ Opinions will, no doubt, differ as to the proper classification of a number of these: and in any case many instances remain which cannot naturally be so explained — occurring as they do in the midst of vividly conceived dramatic passages. In this very vividness of dramatic action, however, is doubtless to be found the explanation of these instances. So far are the verbs here from being impersonal, that the speakers in these little dialogues stood out before Epictetus’ mind’s eye as actual persons; and it is therefore that he so freely refers to them with his vivid ¢yot.

The following are some of the most striking examples of his usage of the word. ‘‘ But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely progress or improvement. Such a person, @yoty, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress’’ (i, 4, 9).°’ Here Schenkl suggests that the dyotv is Arrian’s, and this would seem to be a good suggestion, as it illuminates the passage in more ways than one. If not, the subauditum would seem to be the collocutor of the paragraph: a ‘‘some one,” no doubt, but rather the ‘‘some one”’ most prominent in the mind of writer and reader in this discussion. ‘‘But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat, when I have nothing (kal 700ev dayw, doi, undev Exwv;)?” (i. 9, 8). Here again the @yat seems best explained as Arrian’s (Schenkl): if not, the subauditum is again the collocutor prominent through the context, and only, in that sense, indefinite. ‘“Who made these things and devised them? ‘No one,’ you say (dnoiv). O amazing shamelessness and stupidity”’ (i. 16, 8). The reference is to the collocutor. ‘‘ They are thieves and robbers you may say (kAémra, dnotv, eiot....)’’ (1. 18, 3). Either Arrian’s (Schenkl), or with the collocutor as the subauditum. ‘‘How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By applying terror to it, he replies (¢yciv), I will conquer it” (i, 29, 12). Subaud? the collocutor. ‘‘ For why, a man says (gyat), do I not know the beautiful and the ugly?”’ Gi, 11,?). Either Arrian’s (Schenkl), or subaudi the collocutor. ‘‘ How, he replies (¢yciv), am I not good?”’ (ii, 13, 17). Either Arrian’s (Schenkl), or subaudi the collocutor. So also similarly in 11, 22, 4; ili, 2, 5; i1, 5, 1, ete. Cf. also i, 23, 16; ili, 3, 12; 9, 15; 20, 12; 26, 19. Similarly, in the “ Fragments ”’ we have this: ‘‘ They are amusing fellows, said he (gy = Epictetus), who are proud of the things which are not in our power. A man says, I (é€yw, @ynot) am better than you, for I possess much land and you are wasting with hunger. Another says (GAdos Aeyel)..... ”(“Frag.,” xvili. [Schw., 16 ]). Here the gnot is brought in as the initial member of a series and in contrast with dos Neyer: it would seem to be Epictetus’ own, therefore, and to mean ‘‘says one,” as distinguished from another; and thus it appears to be the most likely instance of the ‘‘indefinite @yct’”’ in the whole mass. But even it seems an essentially different locution from the really indefinite Pitismsaid, 9 on dit... manisact.’

A glance over the whole usage of gyai in Arrian-Epictetus leaves on the mind a keen sense of the lively way in which the word must have been interjected into Greek conversation, but does not greatly alter the impression of its essential implication which we derive from the general use of the word. Take a single instance of its current use in the “ Discourses”’ in its relation to kindred words:

“So also Diogenes somewhere says (zou Aéyer) that there exists but one means of obtaining freedom — to die contentedly, and he writes (ypader) to the king of the Persians, ‘You cannot enslave the city of the Athenians, any more,’ says he (¢yaiv), ‘than fishes.’ ‘How? Can I not catch them?’ ‘If you catch them,’ says he (¢yciv), ‘they will immediately leave you and be gone, just like fishes: for whatever one of them you catch dies, and if these men die when they are caught, what good will your preparations do you?’”’ (iv, 1, 30).

The lively effect given by such unexpected interpositions of oynoly is lost in our decorous translation of the New Testament examples: but it exists in them too. Thus: ‘‘ But she, being urged on by her mother, ‘Give me,’ says she, ‘here upon a charger, the head of John the Baptist’’’ (Matt. xiv. 8); ‘‘But he, ‘Master, speak,’ says he”’ (Luke vii. 40); ‘‘ But Peter to them, ‘Repent,’ says he, ‘and be baptized each one of you’” (Acts ii. 38); ‘‘‘ Let those among you,’ says he, ‘that are able, go down with me’” (Acts xxv. 5); ‘‘‘ To-morrow,’ says he, ‘thou shalt hear him’’’ (Acts xxv. 22); ‘‘But Paul, ‘I am not mad,’ says he, ‘most noble Festus’’’ (Acts xxvi. 25).°* The main function of not then would appear to be to keep the consciousness of the speaker reported clearly before the mind of the reader. It is therefore often used to mark the transition from indirect to direct quotation *: and it lent itself readily, therefore, to mark the adduction both

54 The matter of this interposition is investigated for Plato by Stallbaum, p. 472 D., 580 D.—where he seems to have collected all the instances of interposed gaue in Plato. Cf. also Bornemann and Sauppe on Xenophon’s Memorab., iil. 5, 13, and the indices of Schenkl on Arrian-Epictetus and Thieme-Sturz on Xenophon (sub. voc. dévat).

5 On Acts xxv. 5, Blass has this note: “5 fit transitus ex or. obliqua in rectam, ut I. 4 al; hinc ¢noiv interpositum ut I. 4 B.,” i. e., in the Western text of

I, 4, which reads: “‘‘Which ye heard,’ says he, ‘from my mouth.’” The interposition of a “‘he says,’’ or some similar phrase, to keep the consciousness of the of objections and of literary citations. But, one would imagine, it did not very readily lend itself to vague and indefinite references.

If we desire to find cases of ‘‘subjectless \éyer’”’? in any way similar to those of ¢@yci, we must apparently turn our back on profane Greek altogether.*® We have fortunately in Philo, however, an author, the circumstances of whose writing made literary quotation as frequent with him as oral is in the lively pages of Epictetus’ “ Discourses.’’ And in Philo’s treatises \éyer takes its place by the side of its more common kinsman @gyot, and is used in much the same way, though naturally somewhat less frequently. In harmony with his fundamental viewpoint — which looked on the Scriptures as a body of oracular sayings — Philo adduces Scripture commonly with verbs of ‘‘saying’’ — dyai, Néyerar, Eyer, eimey (yéyparra: falling into the background). Passages so adduced are often woven into the fabric of his discussion of the contents of Scripture; and where the words adduced are words of a speaker in the Biblical narrative, the subject of the g@not or Aé€yee Which introduces them naturally is often this speaker — whether God or some other person. Equally often, however, the subject given immediately or indirectly in the context is something outside of the narrative that is dealt with: in this case it is sometimes Moses, or ‘‘the prophet,” or ‘‘the lawgiver’’ — at other times, ‘‘the Holy Word,” or ‘‘the sacred Word,” or ‘‘the Oracle,” or ‘‘the Oracles”’ (6 Oetos Adyos, 6 iepos NOYos, 6 XPNoLUOs, TO NOYLOV, OF xXpnopol, Ta Oya) — at other times still it is ‘‘God,” under various designations. Often, however, the verb — ¢dyot or Neyer — stands not only without expressed subject, but equally without indicated subject. The rendering of these cases has given students of Philo some trouble, arising out hearer or reader bright on the fact that the words before him are quoted words is, of course, a general linguistic and not a specifically Greek usage. It is found in all languages. A Hebrew instance, for example, may be found in I Kgs. ii. 4.

56 Schenk! catalogues in the “‘ Discourses” of Epictetus two cases of interposited Aéyer, quite in the style of ¢nci—iii. 19, 1 and “ Fragment,” xxi. 10 — but in both cases the subject is expressed.

of the apparent confusion, when the subject is expressed, of the reference of the verb, — now to a speaker in the text of Scripture and now to the author of the particular Scripture, to God as the author of all Scripture, or to Scripture itself conceived as a living Word. This apparent confusion is due solely to Philo’s fundamental conception of Scripture as an oracular book, which leads him to deal with its text as itself the Word of God: he has himself fully explained the matter,” and we should be able to steer clear of serious difficulties with his explanation in our hands.

Nevertheless, a somewhat mechanical mode of dealing with his citations has produced, on more than one occasion, certain odd results. Prof. Ryle says: *

“The commonest forms of quotation employed by Philo are ¢ya%, elrev, Neyer, NeyeTar, yeypatrar yap. Whether the subject of dnai be Moses or Scripture personified cannot in many cases be determined.”

In no case is the subject strictly indeterminate, however, and the failure to determine it aright may introduce confusion. Thus, for example, in “‘De Confus. Ling.,” § 26 (Mangey, i. 424), Philo mentions the Book of Judges, and cites it with the subjectless @yot. Prof. Ryle comments thus: ®

‘He does not mention any opinion as to authorship, and introduces his quotation with his usual formula gyciv. We are hardly justified in assuming that Philo intended Moses as the subject of gnolv, and regarded him as the author of Judges (so Dr. Pick, Journal of Biblical Literature, 1884). Moses is doubtless often spoken of by Philo as if he were the personification of the Inspired Word; but we cannot safely extend this idea beyond the range of the Pentateuch. All that we can say is that ¢noiv, used in this quotation from Judges, refers either to the unknown writer of this book or to the personification of Holy Scripture.”

Or else, we may add, to God, the real author, in Philo’s conception, of every word of Scripture. Prof. Ryle, however, has